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Preface
In an organization, individuals can cooperate in order to achieve a joint surplus. Yet,
individual objectives are often not aligned with the collective goal, which potentially
yields opportunistic behavior. Arguments that conflicting interests are widespread and
potentially detrimental to the performance of an organization go back to Knight (1921),
who stated that “the internal problems of the corporation, the protection of its various
types of members and adherents against each other’s predatory propensities, are quite as
vital as the external problem of safeguarding the public interests against exploitation by
the corporation as a unit.” This problem of opportunism is easily solved if it is feasible
to write and enforce a complete contingent contract, specifying an action for all potential
states of the world. However, this is often impossible since the optimal action depends on
some state of the world, which is private information of one party (hidden information),
or because the action itself cannot be observed (hidden action). Both situations induce
organizational inefficiencies which potentially result in a monetary loss to the firm.
One challenge organizations face is that decision makers often lack relevant information in
order to take optimal decisions. As already Hayek (1945) emphasized, “[. . . ] the knowl-
edge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or
integrated form, but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradic-
tory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess.” Thus, information has to be
transmitted in order to optimize decision making in organizations and to alleviate ineffi-
ciencies. However, information processing might be costly because the decision maker is
not able to master all relevant information or due to his limited capacity to communicate
with all parties. In addition, and more importantly, parties might be reluctant to share
information because they follow different objectives.
1
Preface
One way to mitigate this inefficiency due to asymmetric information in the presence of
conflicting interests is to involve the informed party in the decision process by granting
her certain decision rights. While private information is then fully taken into account,
it might be risky to delegate the decision if the informed party’s interest is imperfectly
aligned with the organizational goal. Hence, a fundamental question in the design of
organizations is how to optimally allocate decision rights in order to limit agency costs.
The idea that authority plays a central role in the nature and function of a firm has a
long tradition among economists, including Knight (1921), Coase (1937), Simon (1951),
Arrow (1974) and Williamson (1975).
Instead of delegating decision rights to an informed agent, the principal – who represents
the firm’s interests – can simply ask the agent for a recommendation. Yet, if the principal
is not able to verify the correctness of the agent’s statement, the agent has an incentive to
lie in order to manipulate the principal’s decision in a favorable direction. As Crawford
and Sobel (1982) state in their seminal paper, “sharing information makes available better
potential agreements, but it also has strategic effects that make one suspect that revealing
all to an opponent is not usually the most advantageous policy. Nevertheless, it seems
clear that even a completely self-interested agent will frequently find it advantageous
to reveal some information.” This strategic transmission of information thus alleviates
informational asymmetries in the organization.
A second source of inefficiency in organizations stems from the fact that actions or efforts
of subordinate agents are often not observable to the principal or cannot be contracted
upon. If individual efforts influence the success of some project, but agents cannot be
rewarded contingent on this success, the agent’s rational and self-interested reaction is to
shirk by exerting inefficiently low effort. Anticipating this, the principal might refuse to
hire the agent in the first place and the project is not implemented, although a successful
realization would benefit both the principal and the agent.
In such a setting, efficiency can only be achieved if the principal trusts that the agent
exerts high effort and the agent cooperates in turn – which is not possible assuming
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individuals to behave self-interestedly. However, behavioral economists and psychologists
have shown that non-binding communication, such as informal agreements, statements of
intent or promises, can be an effective tool to increase trust and to enhance cooperation,
thereby amending organizational inefficiencies.1
This dissertation deals with both contractual and informal remedies to mitigate organiza-
tional inefficiencies due to asymmetric information in the presence of conflicting interests
(hidden information; chapters 1 and 2) or due to shirking incentives when the agent’s
action is unobservable (hidden action; chapter 3). The first two chapters theoretically
deal with the optimal allocation of formal authority if the agent is better informed than
the principal and potentially exhibits diverging preferences. In chapter 1, we consider the
effect of an opportunity to evaluate the agent on the principal’s decision to delegate au-
thority. Chapter 2, instead, investigates the merits of retaining authority if the principal
can ask the agent for a non-verifiable recommendation. The third chapter experimentally
investigates how non-binding communication can increase trust and enhance cooperation
if subjects have an incentive to shirk.
For an illustration of the first two chapters, consider a situation where a principal, for
example the headquarters of a firm, has to decide about the size of a certain project, such
as the investment into a new plant or the allocation of human resources to a marketing
campaign. Moreover, assume that the first best decision for the organization depends
on some noisy variable, like market demand or consumer needs. While the headquarters
is not familiar with these local conditions, a subordinate agent, for instance a division
manager, is aware of these circumstances.
In this context, chapter 1 focuses on the role of interim performance evaluations when the
principal is uncertain about the loyalty of the agent.2 The agent can either be aligned
with the principal’s preferences or biased in the sense that the agent prefers a different
project than the principal. We analyze a two-period interaction where the principal can
1Research on the effect of non-binding communication on cooperation goes back to Loomis (1959).
Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland (1994) and Sally (1995) survey experimental results along these lines.
2This chapter is based on the article “Delegation and Interim Performance Evaluation”, which is joint
work with Philipp C. Wichardt from the University of Rostock.
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observe the agent’s performance, as reflected in his project choice, after delegating the
decision right in the first period – which gives rise to a signaling game. Furthermore, we
assume that the agent’s wage is tied to the market belief about his type, and that the
principal can disclose a performance evaluation to the public.
Given that decision rights are delegated to the agent in the first period, an interim perfor-
mance evaluation allows the principal to condition his delegation decision in the second
period on the agent’s project choice if he learns about the agent’s type. In turn, a biased
agent has some incentive to align his behavior in the first period to that of an unbiased
agent in order to regain authority in the second period. If the evaluation is public, this
adjustment incentive is further increased by the prospect of a higher wage in the second
period.
We find that evaluating the agent privately always benefits the principal as he possibly
acquires information about the agent’s type. Furthermore, the principal discloses the
result of the performance evaluation if the corresponding expected wage increase is not
too large. In any case, the principal is more likely to delegate authority to the agent in the
first place if an interim performance evaluation takes place, as the evaluation effectively
reduces the economic risk of delegation. Finally, we show that in view of aggregate welfare,
it is optimal to disclose an evaluation to the public since this strengthens the incentives
for the biased agent to act in line with the principal’s preferences and thereby minimizes
agency costs.
We contribute to the existing literature on the optimal delegation of authority by consid-
ering a repeated interaction between the principal and the agent, where the principal can
revise his delegation decision after the first period.3 In an extension, we show that our
results are robust to a finite repetition of the one-period game, where the principal can
observe the agent’s project choice after each period. From a methodological perspective,
we extend the beer-quiche game, first discussed by Cho and Kreps (1987), by allowing
payoffs to be endogenous in that they may depend on posterior market beliefs.
3Related works either consider reputation concerns when the principal and the agent are equally un-
informed about the agent’s type (e.g. Blanes i Vidal, 2007; Englmaier et al., 2010) or analyze asymmetric
information about the agent’s type in the absence of reputation concerns (e.g. Armstrong, 1995; Frankel,
2010; Kovàč and Krähmer, 2012).
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Most studies considering conflicts of interest in organizations assume that the agent ex-
hibits a systematic bias, implying that he always prefers to choose a larger project than
the principal, independent of the realized state of the world.4 Alternatively, it could be
the case that managers act in line with the headquarters’ objective as long as the environ-
ment resides in some status quo, but tend to under- or overreact to changes in the state
of the world relative to the first best decision from a corporate point of view. Imagine,
for example, a manager who is delegated to build up a new branch in an emerging mar-
ket. While he acts in line with the organizational goal in case the market is stable, he
potentially overreacts to changes in consumer demand since he is not familiar with this
market environment. Thus, the manager exhibits a state-dependent bias.
In chapter 2, we assume that the preference divergence between the principal and the
agent can contain both a systematic and a state-dependent component.5 In addition,
the principal, who is unaware of the market environment, can ask the informed agent
for advice if he keeps the decision right. We build on the seminal paper by Crawford
and Sobel (1982) in modeling strategic information transmission if the principal and the
agent potentially agree about the right course of action in some state of the world. In
this framework, we first characterize communication equilibria for this more general set
of preference divergences between the principal and the agent. Second, we consider the
delegation of decision rights as an alternative to retaining authority and communicating
with the agent and analyze the optimal allocation of authority, thereby extending the
model by Dessein (2002).
Introducing a state-dependent component into the agent’s bias changes the precision of
strategic information transmission in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, which is characterized
by a partition of the state space such that the agent truthfully reveals the interval which
contains the state of the world. If the agent reacts stronger to changes in the state of the
world than the principal, his incentive to misrepresent his private information is largest
4Prominent examples for systematic biases include status concerns or empire building, that is, to
grow the own division beyond the optimal size in order to strengthen one’s position in the organization
(see, for instance, Chen et al., 2008, or Du et al., 2013).
5This chapter is based on the article “Communicating with Extreme or Conservative Agents”.
5
Preface
for extreme states. Hence, extreme messages are noisy in equilibrium in order to make
exaggerations costly for the agent, while messages near the agreement state are rather
precise. In this case, the transmission of information can be infinitesimally precise near the
agreement state. On the other hand, if the agent reacts more conservatively to changes
in the state of the world than the principal, he has an incentive to distort his reports
towards the agreement state. Consequently, messages are noisy even if preferences are
almost aligned.
Different from Crawford and Sobel (1982), we find that a compact state space can be
partitioned into infinitely many intervals in equilibrium if and only if the agreement state
realizes with positive probability – given that the agent reacts stronger to changes in
the state of the world than the principal. However, if the agent’s reaction to a changing
environment is more conservative than the principal’s, communication is noisier in the
sense that the state space is partitioned into only finitely many intervals. If the principal
and the agent even exhibit reversed preferences, in the sense that the principal’s preferred
project increases in the state of the world while the agent’s preference decreases, com-
munication does not transmit any information. With regard to the optimal allocation
of authority, we find that the principal retains authority if the agent’s bias is “large”
enough, which is in line with Dessein (2002). However, while Dessein’s model predicts
that communication is uninformative if the agent’s systematic bias is so large that the
principal retains decision rights, we find that, in the more general case, communication
can be informative and dominate delegation from the principal’s point of view.
To the best of our knowledge, chapter 2 is the first study to provide a comprehensive
model of strategic information transmission for a general linear preference divergence.
Thereby, it embeds the models by Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Alonso et al. (2008),
where the latter consider a purely state-dependent bias and overreacting agents. Further-
more, in terms of the optimal allocation of authority, the present analysis emphasizes the
importance of considering subordinates’ likely reaction to environmental changes when
designing organizations.
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In both of the above chapters we assume that individuals are rational and self-interested,
and that information is asymmetric with regard to the state of the world (and the agent’s
type), hence communication fulfills the mere function of strategic information transmis-
sion. Alternatively, economic experiments have shown that communication can also take
on the role of enhancing trust and cooperation, in contrast to any prediction based on
rationality and self-interest. In this context, promises have been found to be particularly
effective.6
In chapter 3, we experimentally investigate the effect of promises on trust and cooperation,
given that individuals have an incentive to free ride on their team partner’s decision to
trust.7 More precisely, we are interested in reasons why people stick to an informal
commitment and analyze the effect of social image concerns on the decision to keep a
promise. In a controlled laboratory experiment, participants are randomly matched in
pairs and play a one-shot trust game. A first mover decides whether to enter the game or
to opt out, the latter choice inducing a low outside option for both players. If she enters
the game, a second mover chooses between a selfish option, yielding a payoff of zero for
the first mover, and cooperation, in which case a chance move determines whether the
first mover gets a positive payoff or zero. The second mover maximizes his payoff by
choosing the selfish option. Prior to the strategic decisions, the second mover sends one
out of three predefined messages to the first mover, including a promise to cooperate. In
order to test for social image concerns, we vary the ex-post observability of the second
mover’s action.
We observe slightly more cooperation by the second mover if his action choice is revealed
than if it is not, though the results are not significant. The fact that already 81% of second
movers deliver on their promises even if their action is not observable speaks to an inherent
preference for keeping one’s word as a reason for why people stick to a promise. The so-
called “promise keeping per se” (Vanberg, 2008) seems to play a more important role
than social image concerns in our experiment. Interestingly, we find that the preference
6See Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004) or Bochet and Putterman (2009), amongst others.
7This chapter is based on the article “Promises and Image Concerns”, which is joint work with Carmen
Thoma from the University of Munich.
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for sticking to one’s word does only exist for promises and not for statements of intent,
which we add to the set of eligible messages in a further treatment. While most of the
promises are kept, statements of intent tend to be broken. In line with this result, the
possibility to communicate increases cooperation by second movers if they can only choose
between sending a promise or an empty message, while communication has no effect on
second movers’ behavior if they have the additional option of sending a statement of intent.
However, the receivers of messages trust both a promise and a statement of intent to the
same degree, which is anticipated by the communicating party. Hence, guilt aversion, as
argued by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), is unlikely to account for promise keeping
in our setting. A guilt-averse individual feels guilt proportional to the amount that he
disappoints other’s expectations and should thus behave similarly upon communicating a
statement of intent as after sending a promise in our setting.
Chapter 3 is one of the first economic studies analyzing the combined effect of commu-
nication and social image concerns on cooperation. While previous works focus on the
effect of communication on cooperation, our experiment is designed to gain insight into
the relative importance of different reasons why people stick to a promise. Furthermore,
this experiment highlights how the set of messages available to experimental subjects
influences the effect of communication.
The three chapters in this dissertation are concerned with different approaches to alleviate
inefficiencies in organizations, which arise due to informational asymmetries or incentives
to free ride. Chapter 1 shows that introducing interim performance evaluations fosters
the delegation of decision rights to the agent and hence improves the use of private
information. In chapter 2, we find that strategic information transmission can be more
precise if the agent agrees with the principal in some state of the world than if he always
dissents. Chapter 3 illustrates that non-binding communication can increase trust and
enhance cooperation, mainly due to a preference to stick to a given promise.
All three chapters are self-contained and include their own introductions and appendices
such that they can be read independently. The respective appendices contain all proofs,
the experimental instructions and further details on some experimental results.
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Chapter 1
Delegation and Interim Performance
Evaluation∗
A central question in the design of organizations, which has been much discussed in the
literature over the last decades, is how to optimally allocate decision rights to subordinate
agents (e.g. Holmström, 1977, 1984; Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Alonso and Matouschek,
2008). The general problem is that while agents often may have better information about
the profitability of certain projects – or at least be able to obtain such information –
this does not necessarily imply that they will always opt for the projects which are most
preferred by the principal.1 A possible reason for this is that agents may be biased and
therefore disagree with the principal on which project to choose.2
In order to illustrate the problem, consider a situation where a principal, e.g. the head-
quarters of a firm, has to implement a certain project. Moreover, assume that the success
of the project depends on its fit with some noisy variable, and that the realization of this
variable is not observable to the principal but to some subordinate agent, e.g. a division
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Philipp C. Wichardt.
1For a discussion of how the expected profit from delegation decreases due to too frequent choices of
suboptimal projects see, for example, Jensen and Meckling (2012).
2Alternatively, agents may differ in their ability to interpret incoming signals about the state of the
world so that delegation becomes very costly if the probability of unable agents letting opportunities
pass, or choosing the wrong projects, is too high (e.g. Levy, 2005).
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manager.3 If the preferences of the principal and the agent are perfectly aligned, the
problem can obviously be solved simply by either delegating the decision to the agent
or asking him about his information. However, if there is a possibility that the agent’s
preferences differ from those of the principal, things change and the principal may rather
prefer to take an uninformed decision himself.4
A possible way to improve matters for the principal in such a situation, which we focus
on in the present chapter, is to introduce performance evaluations. In practice, such
evaluations typically serve multiple goals, e.g. providing the agent with incentives (see
MacLeod and Malcolmson, 1989, or Baker et al., 1994) or with performance feedback
(see Zabojnik, 2011). What is more relevant in the present setting, however, is that
performance appraisals are also used to determine assignments (cf. Cleveland et al., 1989),
thereby taking an authority allocating function.
In fact, analyzing a two-period interaction with asymmetric information about the type
of the agent, loyal or biased, we show that if the project can be subdivided into different
stages, evaluating the agent on the way is always beneficial for the principal. First of all,
the evaluation naturally grants the manager a possibility to learn the type of the agent
and to condition at least the later delegation decision on this information. And, what is
more, if the agent’s wage is tied to the market’s belief about his type, the principal may
even want to make the result of the evaluation public. The reason for this is that the
disclosure of the evaluation creates an incentive for the biased agent to align his behavior
with that of the unbiased one in period one in order to gain from a higher wage in period
two.5 Thus, if the compensation of the agent in terms of an increased wage is not too
high relative to the benefit of the principal from an aligned behavior in the first period,
public evaluation is preferred by the principal.6 In any case, with an interim performance
3Here one might think of certain aspects of market demand, the quality of some input, etc.
4There is, for example, anecdotal evidence that many managers engage in empire building, i.e. they
invest more than would be optimal from the perspective of their principals (e.g. Jensen, 1986).
5For the case with more than two periods, which we consider as an extension, the effect persists for
all but the last period (see Section 1.2.2 for details).
6Although the assumption of (partly) endogenous wages slightly complicates the analysis, the resulting
overall two-period game is amenable to a common backward induction argument. Relying on standard
equilibrium selection arguments (Cho and Kreps, 1987), we characterize the equilibria of the resulting
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evaluation, there is more delegation in period one as the evaluation effectively reduces the
economic risk of delegation for the principal.
Moreover, it is worth noting that the different outcomes in case of evaluation imply
different effects on aggregate welfare compared to the situation without evaluation. As
the exact nature of the (unique) outcomes depends the prior belief about the agent’s type
and the relation between wage schedule and utility, the details of the results are somewhat
involved; see Section 1.1.5 for a discussion. Yet, at least two general observations can
be made which are important from the perspective of a social planner. First of all,
we find that, while wages have no direct impact on aggregate welfare,7 they matter if
the evaluation is public, namely through their (indirect) influence on outcomes. And,
with high priors, giving all bargaining power to the agents maximizes aggregate welfare.
Moreover, we show that, in terms of aggregate welfare, any evaluation conducted ought to
be disclosed to the public. Thus, inasmuch as allowed by the stylized argument given in
the sequel, strengthening the agent’s rights regarding bargaining power and accessibility
of evaluations is welfare enhancing in situations like the one considered here.
Related Literature.
As already indicated above, we are, of course, by no means the first to analyze delegation
of authority in organizations. Since the seminal works by Holmström (1977, 1984), a
stream of literature has been concerned with the question of how to optimally allocate
decision rights to potentially biased but better informed subordinate agents. And opti-
mal mechanisms to delegate decisions have been studied, for example, by Melumad and
Shibano (1991) or Alonso and Matouschek (2007, 2008). Moreover, granting authority
to the agent may not only serve as a means to optimally use available information. As
demonstrated by Aghion and Tirole (1997), granting authority also provides an incentive
to the agent to engage in information acquisition as formal control rights are vacuous
without knowing the state of the world. In a similar vein, Bester and Krähmer (2008)
signaling game, depending on the observability of the evaluation. These equilibria are uniquely determined
by the prior belief about the agent being loyal and the specific relation between wages and utilities.
7Note that wages affect only the redistribution of payoffs and, hence, have no direct effect on aggregate
welfare.
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show that delegating a project decision to the agent may also provide incentives to exert
implementation effort. Adding to this literature, the present model focuses on the incen-
tive effects of delegation in a context of asymmetric information about the type of the
agent where delegation in early rounds induces reputation concerns due to the evaluation.
While reputation concerns themselves have already been studied in a delegation context –
for example, Blanes i Vidal (2007) or Englmaier et al. (2010) consider situations with the
principal and the agent being equally uninformed about the agent’s ability and analyze
a model of career concerns (see Holmström, 1999)8 – the present analysis assumes that
agents know their type ex ante in such a setting. However, inasmuch as optimal delegation
mechanisms with asymmetric information about the agent’s type have been studied before
(e.g. Armstrong, 1995; Frankel, 2010; Kováč and Krähmer, 2012), reputation concerns are
not central to the respective arguments.
Closer to the present discussion, Aghion et al. (2004) consider the optimal allocation of
control rights contingent on announcing a type. They find that, if control is contractible,
the loyal type will not be delegated any decision in order to induce truth-telling by the
biased type. Different from the present setting, however, Aghion et al. consider a two-
stage (but one-shot) interaction where the principal benefits from learning the agent’s
type but where there are no incentives for pooling derived from later periods.
Results that are more similar to the ones derived in this chapter, however, have been
obtained for situations in which the principal cannot commit to a delegation mechanism
such that transferring control is cheap talk (Crawford and Sobel, 1982). In particular, a
common finding in these models is that agents shade their reports in order to gain the
principal’s trust in the future (e.g. Sobel, 1985, Benabou and Laroque, 1992, or Morris,
2001).9 While considering a different environment, these results are similar in spirit to the
8Prat (2005) and Ottaviani and Sørensen (2006 a and b) analyze career concerns when the principal
can not commit to delegate authority.
9While repeated games arguments do not lie at the heart of the present discussion, it is worth noting
that similar arguments have been given in the literature on repeated games and reputation (see, for
example, Kreps and Wilson, 1982, Milgrom and Roberts, 1982, and Mailath and Samuelson, 2001, for
other models with incomplete information, or Fudenberg and Levine 1989, 1992 and Cripps et al. 2004,
2007, for examples where the asymmetry of information between players stems from a short-lived player
playing against a long-lived one).
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present ones, which show that, in a context with delegation, interim evaluations provide
incentives for biased agents to align their choices with the principal’s preferences.
A second important strand of literature, which is naturally related to the present discus-
sion, is the literature on performance evaluations. In this area, most work is concerned
with subjective performance evaluations and, thus, focuses on the problems caused by the
non-verifiability of performance (e.g. Prendergast and Topel, 1996, or Fuchs, 2007).10 In
the present model, by contrast, the performance measure is perfectly observable (although
not verifiable by courts), and the – strategic – disclosure of performance information to-
gether with the resulting incentives for the agent are central to our results.
Another related type of argument is provided by Goltsman and Mukherjee (2011), who
consider a multi-stage tournament where the strategic disclosure of performance informa-
tion in the first period can increase effort incentives in the second period. Different from
our setting, however, they analyze information disclosure to peers in a tournament, who
subsequently update winning probabilities. In contrast to this, we are concerned with
the influence of signaling on outside option wages determined by market beliefs. Outside
option wages, in turn, play a crucial role in Mukherjee (2008), who investigates strategic
information disclosure to raiders in order to strengthen incentives for workers and shows
that full disclosure is optimal. Although the main idea is related to the present one,
Mukherjee assumes that principal and agent are equally uninformed about the agent’s
type, i.e. ex ante asymmetric information about types is not an issue.11
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the methodology applied in this analysis goes back
to the seminal paper by Spence (1973), who analyzes signaling in a job market context.
More specifically, the signaling game analyzed in the sequel can be viewed as a modified
version of the beer-quiche game first discussed by Cho and Kreps (1987) except that we
allow payoffs to be endogenous in that they may depend on posterior beliefs.
10To give one example, Baker et al. (1994) show that supervisors may be tempted to under report
worker’s performance and implicit incentives can be crowded out by explicit ones.
11Further works considering outside option wages in other contexts are Acemoglu and Pischke (1999)
or Blanes i Vidal (2007).
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The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 1.1, we introduce and analyze
the model. In Section 1.2, we briefly discuss two possible extensions: a flexible timing of
the evaluation and repeated evaluations. Section 1.3 concludes. All proofs are gathered
in the appendix.
1.1 Model and Results
In the sequel, we describe the underlying delegation problem (Section 1.1.1). After briefly
considering the benchmark case without evaluation in Section 1.1.2, we proceed to analyze
the equilibria of the delegation game with private and with public intermediate evaluation
(Section 1.1.3). As a next step, we compare the principal’s optimal delegation decision
in these three cases and analyze the principal’s corresponding profit (Section 1.1.4). The
analysis concludes with a discussion of welfare effects (Section 1.1.5).
1.1.1 The Underlying Delegation Problem
Consider the following standard delegation problem: A firm has to implement a project
where the principal has the formal authority to decide which project is chosen, but he
needs an agent to implement it.
Setup. The set of possible projects, X, is given by a subset of the real line, i.e. X ⊆ R.
Both the principal and the agent enjoy a personal benefit from a project choice x ∈ X.
However, by assumption, the principal himself is unable to implement his preferred
project, e.g. because he lacks some important information about local conditions which
only the agent can acquire. Thus, in order to circumvent his lack of information, the
principal can delegate the project decision to the agent.12 The agent can be either of two
12In line with the delegation literature, this lack of information can be modeled by the realization
of some state of nature, θ, which is observed only by the agent. For the present purposes, we omit an
explicit reference to θ as focus of the argument lies primarily on the agent’s signaling motive (and not on
the effects of different realizations of θ).
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types, τ ∈ T := {b, l}. If the agent is loyal, τ = l, his preferences are aligned with those
of the principal. If the agent is biased, τ = b, the preferences of the principal and the
agent do not match. A priori, the principal and the market share a common prior that
the agent is loyal with probability p ∈ (0, 1), i.e. p = Pr(τ = l).
Remark 1. For the purposes of the present discussion, we think of biases as reflecting
differences in preferences. However, as should become clear from the subsequent argument,
it is also possible to think of the agent’s and the principal’s preferences as being generally
aligned. In that case, being biased would reflect a high cost when trying to satisfy these
preferences for a given state of the world (and being unbiased would reflect a low cost of
doing so). While some details of the modeling would of course change, the general thrust
of the argument does not hinge on the interpretation.
Utility. The players’ utility is given by ui(x), i ∈ {P, b, l}. For the sake of argument, we
assume that there always exists a unique optimal project xi, i ∈ {P, b, l}, which maximizes
utility for player i, i ∈ {P, b, l},13 i.e.
xi := arg max
x∈X
ui(x) .
Note that, as the preferences of the biased agent differ from those of the principal, we
have xb 6= xP , while the loyal agent prefers the same project, i.e. xl = xP .
The corresponding utility is referred to as u+i , i.e. for i ∈ {P, b, l} we define
u+i := ui(xi).
Similarly, utilities in case an undesired project is implemented are defined as follows:
u−b := ub(xP )
u−P := uP (xb)
u−l := ul(xb).
13Here and in the following, we slightly abuse notation by sometimes referring to the agent’s different
types as player b and player l.
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Furthermore, if the principal retains authority, he chooses a default project x0P , which
can be interpreted as the best choice according to the principal’s knowledge. The default
utilities realized in this case are denoted by
u0i := ui(x0P ) , for all i ∈ {P, b, l} .
In order to make the problem interesting, we assume that delegating to a loyal agent is
profitable for the principal while delegating to a biased agent is harmful, i.e.
u−P < u
0
P < u
+
P .
The biased (loyal) agent’s default utility u0b (u0l ), in turn, is always smaller than his optimal
choice, i.e. u0b < u+b (u0l < u+l ); whether u0b (u0l ) is smaller or larger than u−b (u−l ) need not
be specified here.
Contracts and Wages. As usual, the principal allocates authority, i.e. he determines
whether he or the agent decides on the project x. The actual choice of x is not contractible,
though. Only the allocation of authority can be contractually fixed. In either case, the
principal pays a wage w(µ) to the agent, which depends on the market’s belief about
the agent being loyal, µ. Thus, while not restricting attention to common competitive
wages, we still assume that the wage paid by the principal correctly matches the agent’s
expected outside option. In that sense, wages are considered endogenous and depend on
the observability of the agent’s project decision.
Note that the principal benefits from compensating the agent for potential upward adjust-
ments in the market’s belief whenever the payoff-surplus from the increased probability
of employing the loyal agent outweighs the loss through increased wages. For high priors,
this is generally the case if outside wages do not increase too fast. In order to ensure
that this is also the case for small priors, we assume that the agent is needed for the
implementation of the project and that employing a new or no agent is costly for the
principal, e.g. because a new agent has to acquire firm-specific knowledge.14
14The point to note here is that, for small priors p and certain parameters, the only incentive for the
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Moreover, although the project choice is observable to the principal (and to the market),
we assume that it is not enforceable by the courts. Thus, the principal cannot reward
the agent for a loyal decision, but instead pays a flat wage which can be adjusted after a
public evaluation.15
As mentioned before, the principal and the market share a common prior that the agent is
loyal with probability p ∈ (0, 1). Accordingly, without any further (verifiable) information
about the agent, i.e. if no evaluation takes place or evaluation is private, the common
market wage for the agent is w(p) ≥ 0.
Finally, we normalize w(0) = 0 and assume that w is (weakly) increasing in the market
belief that the agent is loyal, µ.16
It is important to note that, if it is commonly known that the agent is loyal, the maximal
profit the principal expects to earn, net of what he is able to generate himself, is given
by u+P − u0P . In the following, we therefore assume that the wage cannot exceed this
threshold, i.e.
w(µ) < u+P − u0P ∀µ ∈ (0, 1)
and w(1) ≤ u+P − u0P .17 Furthermore, we assume that w is continuous and weakly convex,
i.e.18
w(tx+ (1− t)y) ≤ tw(x) + (1− t)w(y) ∀x, y, t ∈ [0, 1].
biased agent to choose the loyal action, xl, with positive probability (if the decision is delegated) is the
increased wage in Period 2 because the principal may centralize in Period 2 no matter which project the
agent chooses. In that case, the principal would be better off paying only w(p) – such that the agent
leaves – and employing a new agent. However, assuming the agent to be needed for the implementation
of the project and that employing a new or no agent is costly, with cost being larger than w(η) − w(p)
(where η is the delegation threshold without evaluation; see Section 1.1.2 for details), ensures that also
these special cases remain tractable.
15In case of private evaluations, we assume that downward adjustments of wages require publicly
verifiable information (public evaluation) and upward wage adjustments are never profitable for the
principal as the agent’s outside option remains fix.
16Assuming the agent to be liability constrained does not change the results of the analysis which
essentially rely on the monotonicity of wages.
17Here we implicitly assume that all principals face the same constraints so that this threshold will
not exclude any of them from the market.
18From a technical point of view, if wages are assumed to be competitive and thus reflecting the
expected marginal product of a worker given the belief about his loyalty, one would have to pay negative
wages in case p ≤ η. If agents are protected by limited liability, principals are forced to pay a constant
wage of zero for low prior beliefs, and a linearly increasing wage for p > η. This case provides an example
for a weakly convex wage schedule. Besides lacking a real-world justification, concave wage functions do
not provide any new results, which is why they are not considered.
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In the sequel, we divide the agent’s employment with the principal into two equal periods
– before and after an evaluation takes place – and refer to these as Period 1 and Period 2,
respectively. In the baseline case, where the agent is not evaluated, these two periods are
equivalent and the respective payoffs are considered to be generated in each period.
Summing up, with the above specifications, total per period payoffs for the principal can
be specified as
UP (x, µ) = uP (x)− w(µ) ,
and the corresponding expression for the agent is given by
Uτ (x, µ) = uτ (x) + w(µ) .
1.1.2 No Evaluation
To begin with, consider the case where the principal does not evaluate the agent so that
reputation is not an issue. In this case, the principal has to decide whether or not to
delegate decision authority to the agent at the beginning of the employment phase.
Obviously, without interim evaluation, the principal cannot observe the agent’s choice
after Period 1 so that the agent always chooses his preferred project xτ if the decision is
delegated to him. Accordingly, the principal’s expected per period benefit from project
choice in case of delegation is given by
E[uP (xτ )] = pu+P + (1− p)u−P .
This immediately leads to Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Without intermediate evaluation, the principal prefers delegation to cen-
tralization if
p ≥ η := u
0
P − u−P
u+P − u−P
.
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1.1.3 Equilibria With Evaluation
As a next step, consider the case where the principal evaluates the agent in the middle
of his employment phase.
Private Evaluation.
Recall that by assumption neither the project choice nor the allocation of authority in
either period can be contractually fixed ex ante. However, we now assume that the
principal privately observes the agent’s project choice after the first half of the employment
(given that it has been delegated to the agent). In this case, the agent’s outside option
remains unchanged as the market remains ignorant about the outcome of the evaluation
so that the agent’s wage in Period 2 is again given by w(p). The principal, however, might
reconsider his delegation decision at the beginning of Period 2.
More specifically, in Period 1, the principal decides whether or not to delegate the decision
to the agent. The action space of the principal, thus, is given by AP = {D,C}, consisting
of delegation, D, and centralization, C. If the principal retains his decision authority, C, he
always takes the default decision and his belief about the agent’s loyalty is not updated.
If the principal delegates his decision authority to the agent, D, the agent decides which
project to implement. At the end of Period 1, the principal’s profit is realized and the
principal is informed about the agent’s project choice.
In Period 2, the principal faces essentially the same delegation problem as in the first
except that he now can utilize the agent’s observed behavior from Period 1 to update his
belief about the type of the agent. The updated beliefs are denoted as follows:
µ+ := Pr(τ = l|x = xl)
µ− := Pr(τ = l|x = xb).
The resulting signaling game that arises after delegation in Period 1 is illustrated in
Figure 1.1.
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Figure 1.1: Graphical illustration of the strategic situation with private evaluation after
a delegation decision of the principal in Period 1. Player 1, the sender, is the agent and
player 2, the receiver, is the principal. First period wages are neglected as they are of no
strategic relevance.
In the sequel, we analyze the subgame that arises after delegation by the principal in
Period 1 while neglecting Period-1-wages (as these have no strategic impact). In doing
so, we denote the action the principal chooses in Period 2 upon observing x by aP (x). A
strategy of the principal in the subgame, thus, consists of a pair sP = (aP (xl), aP (xb)).
A strategy for the agent in the resulting subgame, in turn, comprises the choice of an
action both in case of delegation in Period 1 (which has occurred by assumption) and in
Period 2. As it is strictly dominant for the agent to choose his preferred action whenever
the decision is delegated in Period 2, we focus the analysis on the agent’s strategy in
Period 1, denoted by sτ , which is given by specifying x ∈ {xb, xl}.
Noting that it is dominant for the principal to choose D (C) upon observing xl (xb resp.)
if µ+ ≥ η (µ− ≤ η) and defining
∆b := u+b − u−b ,
i.e. ∆b is the biased agent’s utility differential between choosing xb and xl, we obtain the
following equilibria;19 see Figure 1.2 for an illustration.20
19If µ = η, the principal is indifferent which is why the dominance is not strict.
20The structure of these equilibria is robust to introducing some noise into the principal’s observation
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Lemma 1. For the signaling game depicted in Figure 1.1, the following three types of
equilibria are compatible with the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987):
• If ∆b < u+b − u0b and p > η:
Pooling (pool(D,C)): sP = (D,C), sl = sb = xl
• If ∆b < u+b − u0b and p ≤ η:
Principal and biased agent randomize (mix2(λP ,C)):
sP = λPD + (1− λP )C, sl = xl, sb = λxl + (1− λ)xb, (λ = 1 if p = η)
• If ∆b = u+b − u0b :
Biased agent randomizes (mix1(D,C)): sP = (D,C), sl = xl, sb = λxl + (1− λ)xb
• If ∆b > u+b − u0b :
Separating (sep(D,C)): sP = (D,C), sl = xl, sb = xb
-
6
r
r
r r
0 η p1
u+b − u0b
∆b
sep(D,C)
mix2(λP ,C) pool(D,C)
mix1(D,C)mix1(D,C)
Figure 1.2: Equilibria of the signaling game with private evaluation depending on the
prior belief p and the biased agent’s utility differential, ∆b. Note that outside of the
null-set where the mix1(D,C) equilibrium or the mix2(λP ,C) equilibrium with p = η is
played, all equilibria are unique for a given pair of parameters (p,∆b).
of the agent’s project choice.
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The main point to note here is that the biased agent’s incentive to choose his preferred
project in Period 1 is stronger the larger his utility from centralization in Period 2, i.e. u0b ,
is compared to his utility from taking an opportunistic choice in Period 1, u−b . Put
differently, an equilibrium where the biased agent separates is more likely the larger the
difference between the biased agent’s utility differential ∆b and u+b − u0b . The principal
on the other hand chooses to centralize in Period 2 whenever he observes a separating
behavior. Upon observing the loyal project, though, he again delegates the decision in
Period 2 – if his prior belief about the agent being loyal is high enough.
Public Evaluation.
Finally, we consider the case where the principal evaluates the agent and reveals this
information to the market. In this case, the agent’s outside option might change as a
function of µ, the principal’s and the market’s posterior belief about the agent’s loyalty
after observing his project choice. More specifically, with public evaluation, the agent’s
wage depends on the updated beliefs, µ+ and µ−; the signaling game which arises after
delegation in Period 1 is illustrated in Figure 1.3.
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Figure 1.3: Graphical illustration of the strategic situation with public evaluation after
a delegation decision of the principal in Period 1. Player 1, the sender, is the agent and
player 2, the receiver, is the principal. First period wages are neglected as they are of no
strategic relevance.
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The analysis of the resulting signaling game is analogous to the one in case of private
evaluation. The results are provided in the following lemmata.
Lemma 2. If p > η, the following three types of equilibria of the signaling game depicted
in Figure 1.3 are compatible with the Intuitive Criterion:
• If ∆b ≤ w(p) + u+b − u0b :
Pooling: (pool(D,C)) sP = (D,C), sl = sb = xl
• If w(p) + u+b − u0b < ∆b < w(1) + u+b − u0b :
Biased agent randomizes (mix1(D,C)): sP = (D,C), sl = xl, sb = λxl + (1− λ)xb
• If ∆b ≥ w(1) + u+b − u0b :
Separating (sep(D,C)): sP = (D,C), sl = xl, sb = xb
Thus, similar to the case with private evaluation, we find that, for p > η, the biased
agent is more likely to imitate the loyal agent if his utility differential, ∆b, is small.
However, with public evaluation the biased agent benefits from a loyal project choice
after delegation in Period 1 not only through additional delegation in Period 2 but also
through an increased wage in Period 2. Thus, pooling incentives and, hence, the area
where the biased agent imitates the loyal one are increased. Moreover, there is a non-
degenerate area where the biased agent trades off wage and project-choice based incentives
and therefore randomizes between project choices (mix1(D,C)).
For the case of low prior beliefs, considered in the lemma below, we also observe a larger
area for the mix1(D,C) equilibrium. Furthermore, if the biased agent’s utility differential,
∆b, is sufficiently small, his incentive to opt for his preferred project is dominated by an
increased wage resulting from the loyal project choice, even if the principal centralizes
either way. The principal, in turn, is not willing to delegate in Period 2, even after
observing his preferred project choice as his prior belief about the agent’s loyalty is too
small.
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Lemma 3. If p ≤ η, the following three types of equilibria of the signaling game depicted
in Figure 1.3 are compatible with the Intuitive Criterion:
• If ∆b ≤ w(p):
Pooling (pool(C,C)): sP = (C,C), sl = xl, sb = xb, (principal randomizes if p = η)
• If w(p) < ∆b ≤ w(η):
Biased agent randomizes (mix1(C,C)): sP = (C,C), sl = xl, sb = λxl + (1− λ)xb
• If w(η) < ∆b < w(η) + u+b − u0b :
Principal and biased agent randomize (mix2(λP ,C)):
sP = λPD + (1− λP )C, sl = xl, sb = λxl + (1− λ)xb, (λ = 1 if p = η)
• If w(η) + u+b − u0b ≤ ∆b < w(1) + u+b − u0b :
Biased agent randomizes (mix1(D,C)): sP = (D,C), sl = xl, sb = λxl + (1− λ)xb
• If ∆b ≥ w(1) + u+b − u0b :
Separating (sep(D,C)): sP = (D,C), sl = xl, sb = xb
Note that with public evaluation, all equilibria outside of the null-set {p = η} ∩{
∆b ≤ w(η) + u+b − u0b
}
are unique for a given pair of parameters (p,∆b). Figure 1.4
illustrates the resulting equilibria and their relation to the underlying wage schedule.
In contrast to the situation with private evaluation, the biased agent now benefits from
pooling with the loyal type not only because he may decide on the project in Period 2
but also because he receives a higher wage in the later period. Accordingly, the pooling
equilibrium is played up to larger values of ∆b if the prior belief is high. The mixed
equilibrium, in turn, extends to a non-null set for p ≥ η because the biased agent’s wage,
given by w(µ+) = u0b − u−b , endogenously adapts to changes in ∆b, thereby keeping him
indifferent for a continuum of values of ∆b. Thus, if the prior belief is low, the principal
might even choose to centralize in Period 2 independent of the agent’s decision as the
wage schedule entails some incentive to pool for the biased agent – in contrast to the case
where evaluation is private.
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Figure 1.4: Equilibria of the signaling game with public evaluation depending on the
prior belief p and the biased agent’s utility differential, ∆b – for a given wage schedule
(indicated by the lower curve). The upper curve depicts the wage schedule increased by
u+b − u0b . Solid lines determine the borders of the respective equilibrium area.
1.1.4 The Principal’s Behavior
We proceed to analyze whether the principal prefers to delegate the project decision to the
agent in Period 1, depending on his prior belief about the agent’s loyalty and the utility
parameters. Having done so, we investigate if the principal benefits from an evaluation,
given the policy of information disclosure, and whether he chooses to disclose an evaluation
if he is allowed to do so.
The Principal’s Delegation Decision
In case the principal retains authority in Period 1, the belief about the agent’s loyalty
cannot be updated and the principal delegates in Period 2 if p ≥ η. Thus, the overall
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payoff of the principal in case of centralization, depending on p, is given by
E[UP |C] =

2u0P − w(p) if p < η,
u0P + pu+P + (1− p)u−P − w(p) else,
where the first-period wage w(p) is again left out.
In the sequel, we compare the principal’s payoffs with and without evaluation depending
on whether the evaluation is public or private.
Private Evaluation.
In case of a private evaluation, it is straightforward to show that the principal is more
likely to delegate in the first period compared to the situation without evaluation.
Proposition 2. If the principal can privately evaluate the agent, he delegates more often
in Period 1 than in an interaction without evaluation. In particular, the principal delegates
for all p ≥ p∗U(∆b), where p∗U is given by
p∗U(∆b) =

η2 if ∆b < u+b − u0b ,
∈
[
η2, η2−η
]
if ∆b = u+b − u0b ,
η
2−η if ∆b > u
+
b − u0b .
Furthermore, η2 < η2−η < η, thus
• the principal delegates for a larger range of prior beliefs than without evaluation, in
which case he delegates only for p ≥ η, and
• the principal delegates more the lower the biased agent’s concern about the decision,
∆b, is.
Note that this result is rather intuitive. The biased agent has an incentive to deviate from
his preferred option in Period 1 in order to signal loyalty if he does not suffer too much
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from an opportunistic choice in the first period.21 By delegating the project decision to
the agent, the principal benefits either from learning the agent’s type (if ∆b is high), or
from more aligned decision making (if ∆b is low). Thus, in either case the principal is
more likely to delegate the decision to the agent than in the case without evaluation.
Moreover, aligning the biased agent’s preferences is in fact more beneficial to the principal
than learning his type. Therefore, the principal is more likely to delegate in the pooling
equilibrium than in the separating equilibrium – indicated by η2 < η2−η .
Public Evaluation.
If the evaluation is observable to the market, the principal has to pay a higher wage to
the biased agent in a pooling equilibrium than in a separating one. Still the principal is
more likely to delegate the project choice than in the case without evaluation.
Proposition 3. If evaluations are public, the principal delegates more often in Period 1
if he evaluates the agent than in an interaction without evaluation. In particular, he
delegates if p ≥ p∗O(∆b), where the threshold p∗O(∆b) is implicitly defined via
p∗O = δw,µ(p∗O) =
[u0P − u−P − w(p∗O)]µ
(u+P − u−P ) max {µ, η}+ (u+P − u0P )− w(µ)
and µ(∆b) ∈ [0, 1] is given by
µ(∆b) =

w−1(∆b) if ∆b ≤ w(η),
η if w(η) < ∆b < w(η) + u+b − u0b ,
w−1(∆b − (u+b − u0b)) if w(η) + u+b − u0b ≤ ∆b < w(1) + u+b − u0b ,
1 if ∆b ≥ w(1) + u+b − u0b ,
Furthermore, δw,µ(p) ≤ η for all p ∈ [0, 1], so the principal delegates for a larger range
of prior beliefs than without evaluation, in which case he delegates the decision only for
p ≥ η.
21Cast in the ability interpretation indicated in Remark 1, the biased agent would invest a high
effort/cost, which is individually suboptimal in the setting without evaluation, in order to imitate the
more able agent.
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Note that the notion of the inverse wage function is valid in the above definition even for
weakly increasing wages, as the domain of ∆b is defined by means of the image of w.
The main point to note here is that the biased agent again has an incentive to deviate
from his preferred option in Period 1 in order to signal loyalty – essentially as in the case
with private evaluation. However, in exchange for this, he now not only is more likely to
be granted the right to decide over the project but also receives a higher wage in Period 2.
In combination, this induces more aligned decisions in the first period of the relationship
and, hence, more delegation.
Furthermore, even if wages matter, the principal still benefits more from aligning the
biased agent’s preferences than from learning his type and paying him less in the later
stage. Therefore, we obtain a similar result as in the case of private evaluation: The
principal is more likely to delegate if the probability for the biased agent to choose the
loyal project is higher.
Finally, we can show that the delegation threshold increases in ∆b, that is, the principal
benefits more from aligning the biased agent’s preferences than from learning his type
and paying him less in the later stage.
Proposition 4. All other things equal, the principal delegates more the lower the biased
agent’s concerns about the decision are, i.e. the delegation threshold p∗O(∆b) fulfilling p∗O =
δw,µ(p∗O) increases in ∆b.
Assuming wages to be linear in µ, the increasing delegation threshold can be determined
explicitly, as stated in Corollary 1.
Corollary 1. If wages are linear, i.e. w(µ) = µW , the delegation threshold in Proposi-
tion 3 is given by
p∗O(∆b) =

η
W
∆b if ∆b ≤ ηW,
η2 if ηW < ∆b < ηW + u+b − u0b ,
(u0b−u
−
b
)η
(u0
b
−u−
b
)+(1−η)W if ηW + u
+
b − u0b ≤ ∆b < W + u+b − u0b ,
η
2−η if W + u
+
b − u0b ≤ ∆b.
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A Comparison of Public and Private Evaluation.
A natural question that arises from the above analysis is how the observability of the
evaluation influences the principal’s delegation decision. At first sight, it might seem
intuitive to assume that the principal is less likely to delegate if the evaluation is public in
order not to reveal too much information to the market and thereby possibly increasing
the agent’s outside option. In the present setting, however, this may not be true. In
fact, exposing the agent’s behavior to the market can be beneficial to the principal if this
changes the biased agent’s behavior. However, as we will see below, this effect crucially
depends on the shape of the wage schedule.
Proposition 5 shows that, if the biased agent’s concern about the project decision, ∆b, is
high enough, the principal is more likely to delegate if the evaluation is not observed by
the market.
Proposition 5. If w is convex, there exists a threshold ρ ∈ [0, w(1) + u+b − u0b ], such that
for ∆b ≥ ρ delegation is more likely if the evaluation is private than if it is public.
Note that the level of the threshold strongly depends on the shape of the wage function
and decreases with its convexity. In fact, for “very convex” wage functions, ρ can be
smaller than w(η), such that public evaluation grants more discretion to the agent only
if his concern about the project choice is negligible.
Figure 1.5 illustrates the results from Proposition 5; for the case of public evaluation, it
distinguishes two cases:
• w is “not too convex”, i.e. η2−ηw(η)− ηw(
η
2−η ) ≤ (1− η)
η
2−η (u
+
P − u0P ),
• w is “very convex”, i.e. η2−ηw(η)− ηw(
η
2−η ) ≥ (1− η)
η
2−η (u
+
P − u0P ),
where p∗V C refers to the “very convex” case and p∗NC to the “not too convex” case. These
two thresholds are shown as solid lines, whereas the delegation threshold in case of private
evaluation is depicted as a dashed line. The benchmark threshold where no evaluation
takes place is indicated by a dotted line.
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Note that the shape of w(µ) does not allow for any conclusions about the shape of p∗O(∆b)
so that Figure 1.5 is just an illustration of the delegation thresholds.
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Figure 1.5: Illustration of the delegation threshold in case of public evaluation, p∗ (solid
lines). The upper graph, p∗V C , refers to the “very convex” case, the lower graph, p∗NC , to
the “not too convex” case. The dashed (dotted) line illustrates the delegation threshold in
case of private evaluation (no evaluation); here we assume w(η) < u+b − u0b (the opposite
case looks similar). Except for the constant parts of p∗, the slope and curvature of the
graph are only exemplary – the shape cannot be inferred from the shape of w(µ).
Moreover, considering linear wages, there is weakly more delegation with public evalua-
tion.
Corollary 2. If wages are linear, delegation is (weakly) more likely if the evaluation is
public than if it is private.
Figure 1.6 illustrates the results from Corollary 2. In particular, it shows the delegation
thresholds depending on the evaluation regime.
The Principal’s Profit
In the following, we analyze the rent effects for the principal resulting from an intermediate
evaluation. The main point to note here is that a separation of agents as well as an
alignment of the agents’ behavior (in Period 1), which only occur when evaluation takes
place, can be beneficial for the principal.
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Figure 1.6: Illustration of the delegation threshold in the three cases of no evaluation
(dotted line), private evaluation, p∗U (dashed line), and public evaluation, p∗O (solid line).
Here, wages are linear and w(η) < u+b − u0b is assumed; the opposite case looks similar.
Private Evaluation.
For the principal, an intermediate evaluation can be profitable either because he learns the
agent’s type or because the biased agent imitates the loyal one by choosing the principal’s
preferred project in the first period. If the evaluation is not observable to the market,
outside options do not change and the principal does not have to reimburse the agent for
an opportunistic choice – as opposed to the case where the evaluation is public. Thus,
the following proposition is immediate.
Proposition 6. If the interim evaluation is private, the principal is always (weakly) better
off by evaluating the agent.
In order to see this, consider any equilibrium where p > η, the principal plays (D,C) and
the biased agent plays a mixed strategy (λ, 1 − λ) with λ ∈ [0, 1]. Then the principal’s
expected total profits with (unobservable) private evaluation, ΠU , net of the profits with
no evaluation, ΠN , are given by
E[ΠU − ΠN ] = (1− p)
[
λ(u+P − u0P ) + (u0P − u−P )
]
.
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As this term is non-negative for all λ ∈ [0, 1], it is immediate that the principal always
prefers to evaluate for p > η if the result is not observable to the market. A similar
argument holds for intermediate prior beliefs where the principal still decides to delegate
in Period 1 if a private evaluation takes place. If the prior belief is too low for the principal
to delegate in Period 1, he is indifferent between evaluating or not.
Public Evaluation.
If the interim evaluation is observable to the market, the principal has to later compensate
the biased agent for an earlier opportunistic behavior. Thus, it is no longer true in general
that evaluating the agent benefits the principal. In fact, whether the biased agent’s
aligned behavior in Period 1 outweighs the possible losses in terms of higher Period-2-
wages depends on which equilibrium is played in the respective case.
In particular, in case of high prior beliefs, the principal plays (D,C) and the biased agent
plays a mixed strategy (λ, 1− λ) with λ ∈ [0, 1] in any equilibrium. Thus, the principal’s
expected total profits with (observable) public evaluation, ΠO, net of the profits with no
evaluation, ΠN , are given by
E[ΠO − ΠN ] = (1− p)
[
λ(u+P − u0P ) + (u0P − u−P )
]
− [[p+ (1− p)λ]w(µ+)− w(p)] ,
where λ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the probability of the biased agent choosing xl.
The above formula illustrates that the principal trades off his earnings from the agent’s
project choice in Period 1, which are increasing in the biased agent’s probability to imitate
the loyal one, against the wage payment to the agent, also increasing in λ.
In particular, in a pooling equilibrium, evaluating the agent publicly does not change
his outside option, while the principal still profits from the biased agent imitating the
loyal one. Thus, the principal decides to evaluate the agent in this case. However, as
the probability of the biased agent choosing the principal’s preferred project decreases,
the expected wage payment to the agent increases faster than the corresponding gain
from the agent’s project choice due to convexity of wages. Thus, the principal prefers
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to evaluate the agent for p > η whenever there is “enough pooling” and his scope of
evaluation depends on the shape of the wage function.
For low prior beliefs, the principal centralizes authority in Period 1 if no evaluation takes
place and the principal prefers to evaluate the agent if and only if he delegates the project
choice in case of a public evaluation. Proposition 7 summarizes these findings.
Proposition 7. If p > η and the interim evaluation is observable to the market, the
principal is better off by evaluating the agent if and only if
pw(µ+)− µ+w(p) ≤ p(1− µ+)(u+P − u0P ) + (1− p)µ+(u0P − u−P ).
In particular, for all p > η, there exists a threshold ρ(p) > 0 such that an evaluation is
preferred for all ∆b ≤ ρ(p), i.e. if the biased agent’s concern about the project choice is
low enough.
If p ≤ η, the principal weakly prefers to evaluate the agent if the evaluation is public.
Remark 2. The posterior belief µ+ ∈ [0, 1], in case a public evaluation takes place, is
endogenously given by the model parameters. In particular, if p ≤ η, we have
µ+(∆b) =

p if ∆b ≤ w(p),
w−1(∆b) if w(p) < ∆b ≤ w(η),
η if w(η) < ∆b < w(η) + u+b − u0b ,
w−1(∆b − (u+b − u0b)) if w(η) + u+b − u0b ≤ ∆b < w(1) + u+b − u0b ,
1 if ∆b ≥ w(1) + u+b − u0b ,
and if p > η, this yields
µ+(∆b) =

p if ∆b ≤ w(p) + u+b − u0b ,
w−1(∆b − (u+b − u0b)) if w(p) + u+b − u0b < ∆b < w(1) + u+b − u0b ,
1 if ∆b ≥ w(1) + u+b − u0b .
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Moreover, again assuming wages to be linear, it is easy to see that pw(µ+)−µ+w(p) = 0.
Furthermore, as p(1− µ+)(u+P − u0P ) + (1− p)µ+(u0P − u−P ) ≥ 0, the following corollary is
immediate.
Corollary 3. If wages are linear and the interim evaluation is observable to the market,
the principal is (weakly) better off by evaluating the agent.
A Comparison of Public and Private Evaluation.
Although we have seen that the principal always prefers to evaluate the agent for high
prior beliefs if the evaluation is private – which is not necessarily the case for public
evaluations – this does not allow us to conclude that the principal would always prefer to
conceal the evaluation if he had the choice. In fact, for a given prior p > η and a given
utility differential ∆b, the behavior of the biased agent might change if his evaluation
is public because wage considerations then play a role. Thus, equilibria played in the
two regimes might be different. Figure 1.7 illustrates this change of the biased agent’s
behavior for p > η.
-
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Figure 1.7: Illustration of the different equilibria played in case p > η. The left-hand
side states the equilibria played in a private regime, whereas the right-hand side indicates
which equilibrium is played in the same area of the graph if the evaluation is public.
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For example, if the biased agent pools in the public regime in order not to lose his wage,
he separates in a private regime for the same parameter values. In this case, the principal
is better off in the public regime where he gets a profit of
E[UP |O, pool(D,C)] = 2pu+P + (1− p)(u+P + u−P )− w(p),
compared to
E[UP |U, sep(D,C)] = 2pu+P + (1− p)(u−P + u0P )− w(p)
in the private case; here O and U again indicate public (observable) and private (unob-
servable) evaluation, respectively. Thus, whenever the separating equilibrium is played in
the case of private evaluation, the principal is better off with public evaluation as long as
this results in “enough pooling.” And this occurs if the biased agent’s utility differential
is relatively low as stated in Proposition 8.
Proposition 8. If p > η, there exists a threshold ρ(p) ∈ [w(p) +u+b −u0b , w(1) +u+b −u0b ],
such that the principal reveals the evaluation for ∆b < ρ and conceals it for ∆b > ρ.
If p ≤ η and ∆b is such that the decision is delegated both in case of private and public
evaluation, then there exist thresholds ρ1(p) ∈ [w(p), w(η)] and ρ2(p) ∈ [ρ1(p), w(1) +
u+b − u0b ], such that the principal reveals the evaluation if ∆b < ρ1(p) and conceals it if
∆b > ρ2(p). Furthermore, if w(η) ≤ u+b − u0b and w is “very convex”, i.e.
pw(η)− ηw(p) ≥ p(1− η)(u+P − u0P ),
we have ρ1(p) = ρ2(p).
However, if wages are assumed to be linear, the principal pays an expected wage of w(p)
to the agent in any case. Hence, the biased agent’s increased incentive to imitate the loyal
agent in case of public evaluation is no longer costly for the principal.
Corollary 4. For any prior belief p, the principal weakly prefers to reveal the evaluation
to the market if wages are linear.
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1.1.5 Welfare
In the following, we consider the players’ welfare obtained with evaluation and compare
the results to the interaction without evaluation. As the results differ depending on
whether delegation occurs without evaluation, we split the subsequent discussion in two
parts: to begin with, we analyze the case of high priors, p > η, where we see delegation if
no evaluation takes place, and then move on to the case of low priors, p ≤ η, where there
is no delegation without evaluation.
The Case of High Priors: p > η
First, we analyze aggregate welfare, followed by a discussion of comparative statics with
regard to utility parameters and the wage schedule. As the main analysis is essentially
the same whether evaluation is public or not – as transfers from principal to agent cancel
out – the following propositions hold for both regimes unless otherwise stated.
Aggregate Welfare.
As we have seen in Section 1.1.4, introducing an interim evaluation may be beneficial
for the principal, because both a separation of agents and an alignment of the agents’
behavior (in Period 1), which only occur with evaluation, can increase his profit.
Regarding the agent, the appreciation of the evaluation depends on his type. In particular,
the loyal agent weakly prefers being evaluated: he always chooses the principal’s preferred
project in Period 1; and with public evaluation, he may not only gain discretion but also
a higher wage in Period 2 (except a pooling equilibrium is played). The biased agent, by
contrast, is always better off without evaluation: with evaluation, choosing his preferred
project is always punished by centralization (and a wage drop to zero if the evaluation is
public), while without evaluation the decision is always delegated.
Formally, accounting for both players and both types of the agent, expected aggregate
welfare with evaluation, WE, net of expected aggregate welfare with no evaluation, WN ,
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is given by
E[WE −WN ] = (1− p)λ[(u+P − u0P )− (u0b − u−b )] + (1− p)[(u0P − u−P )− (u+b − u0b)],
with λ = 0 if u0b − u−b ≥ w(1) (separating equilibrium) and λ = 1 if u0b − u−b ≤ w(p)
(pooling equilibrium).
Thus, assuming that the principal’s benefits from an optimal project decision outweigh
the respective benefits of the biased agent, i.e. assuming
u+P − u−P =: ∆P ≥ ∆b = u+b − u−b ,
welfare is increased by an evaluation whenever a pooling equilibrium is played. Whether
evaluating an agent is efficient in general, though, depends on the relation of the principal’s
profit from centralization compared to a biased project choice, u0P − u−P , to the biased
agent’s net gain from deciding over the project, u+b − u0b .
Proposition 9. If p > η, the comparison of expected welfare with and without evaluation
yields the following results:
• If u0P − u−P ≥ u+b − u0b , an interim evaluation increases aggregate welfare.
• If u0P − u−P < u+b − u0b , there exists a threshold ρ ∈ [w(η) + u+b − u0b , w(1) + u+b − u0b ]
(ρ = u+b − u0b) if the evaluation is public (private), such that an interim evaluation
increases aggregate welfare if and only if ∆b < ρ.
The intuition for the first result is straightforward. With evaluation, the principal has the
opportunity to centralize in the second period when observing an inappropriate project
choice whereas without evaluation the decision is always delegated if the prior is high. If
this opportunity to centralize is more valuable to the principal than it harms the biased
agent, evaluation increases the aggregate welfare.
Regarding the second result, if centralization harms the biased agent more than it benefits
the principal, welfare is no longer increased if a separating equilibrium is played. Never-
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theless, aggregate payoffs are larger if the biased agent imitates the loyal agent in Period 1
– compared to the situation where the principal delegates twice without evaluation. Thus,
welfare is still increased if (and only if) the biased agent’s utility differential, ∆b, is low
enough as this increases pooling incentives.
A Comparison of Public and Private Evaluation.
Considering each type of equilibrium separately, aggregate welfare is the same whether
the evaluation is public or private. However, the highest aggregate welfare is achieved in
the pooling equilibrium and it decreases in the probability that the biased agent separates.
Furthermore, for any given prior p > η, the probability that the biased agent separates is
at least as high with private evaluation than it is with public evaluation. Thus, Lemma 4
is immediate.
Lemma 4. If p > η, the aggregate welfare generated in case of public evaluation is at
least as high as if the evaluation is private.
Welfare Effects of the Wage Schedule.
Another determinant of aggregate welfare is the wage schedule. Of course, total welfare
never changes under a simple redistribution of payoffs. Thus, in a usual context, the wage
schedule does not influence total welfare. In the present setting with public evaluation,
however, the wage schedule, together with u0b − u−b , determines the equilibrium played
in the signaling game which, in turn, influences total welfare. In particular, high wages
(weakly) increase the area where a pooling equilibrium is played and (weakly) decrease the
area where a separating equilibrium is played, which has a positive effect on aggregate
welfare. Hence, focusing on the effect of the wage schedule, paying competitive wages
weakly increases welfare when intermediate evaluation takes place if prior beliefs are
high.
Proposition 10. If p > η, welfare in case of public evaluation is maximized if w(µ) is
maximal within the principal’s budget constraints for µ ∈ [p, 1].
Intuitively, increasing wages for a given belief µ strengthens the incentive for the biased
agent to mirror the behavior of the loyal agent in Period 1 (so as to obtain the high
38
Delegation and Interim Performance Evaluation
wage and the discretion to choose in Period 2). In particular, the higher the wages, the
more likely is the biased agent to choose the project which is aligned with the principal’s
preferences. Accordingly, for higher wages, the region where a pooling equilibrium is
played is increased (while the region for a separating equilibrium is reduced). As the
pooling equilibrium is welfare enhancing if u+b −u−b = ∆b ≤ ∆P = u+P −u−P , this improves
aggregate welfare. If the evaluation is private, the wage schedule has no influence on
aggregate welfare.
The Case of Low Priors: p ≤ η.
Finally, we briefly turn to the case where the prior belief is such that the principal would
not delegate without an evaluation, i.e. p ≤ η.
Unfortunately, for such small priors, it is difficult to determine clear-cut welfare results.
However, if the principal’s benefit from centralization compared to letting the biased agent
decide about the project, u0P −u−P , is smaller than the biased agent’s respective gain when
choosing the project, u+b − u0b , welfare is enhanced with evaluation if ∆b is large enough.
Still assuming that the principal’s benefit from an optimal project decision outweighs the
respective benefits of the biased agent, i.e. u+P −u−P = ∆P ≥ ∆b = u+b −u−b , we obtain the
following result.
Proposition 11. If p ≤ η and ∆b ≥ w(η)+u+b −u0b if the evaluation is public (∆b ≥ u+b −u0b
in case of private evaluation), total expected welfare is (weakly) increased with evaluation
if
u+b − u0b ≥ u0P − u−P .
Note that the intuition for this result is in line with the interpretation in case p > η.
If the prior is low, the principal centralizes if no evaluation takes place. By contrast, if
the agent is evaluated, he delegates in the first period and thereby induces a benefit of
u+b for the biased agent – instead of u0b without evaluation. If this relative gain of the
biased agent is larger than the principal’s benefit from centralizing compared to letting
the biased agent decide, aggregate welfare is increased.
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Arguing along the same lines as in the case p > η, we conclude that public evaluation
yields a higher aggregate welfare than private evaluation whenever the former regime
yields more pooling by the biased agent.
Lemma 5. If p ≤ η and ∆b ≥ w(η) + u+b − u0b , public evaluation generates a higher
aggregate welfare than private evaluation.
1.2 Extensions
In this section, we briefly consider two natural extensions of our model. First, in Sec-
tion 1.2.1, we relax the assumption of equally long/important periods. Finally, Section
1.2.2 shows that our results are robust to adding more evaluations and inter-temporal
discounting.
1.2.1 Flexible Timing of the Evaluation
Instead of presupposing that the principal might evaluate the agent in the middle of
his employment period, we now consider a situation where the principal can choose to
evaluate the agent after a fraction α ∈ [0, 1] of his employment period. In particular,
we analyze at which point in time it is optimal for the principal to evaluate the agent
depending on the observability of the evaluation.
For the sake of argument, we focus on the case of high prior beliefs, i.e. p > η. Moreover,
we define
αb(µ) :=
w(µ) + (u+b − u0b)
w(µ) + (u+b − u0b) + (u+b − u−b )
.
Note that αb is increasing in µ.
Private Evaluation
Consider first the case of private evaluation. In this case, the biased agent chooses xl in
the first period if the importance of the first period is sufficiently low, i.e. α < αb(0) =: αb.
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Otherwise, a separating equilibrium is played and the biased agent randomizes between
strategies if α = αb. Furthermore, the principal’s payoff in the separating equilibrium
decreases in α, whereas it increases in α for the pooling equilibrium. Thus, Lemma 6 is
straightforward.
Lemma 6. For p > η, the principal maximizes his expected utility by choosing α =
αb(0) =: αb for all p. His expected payoff in this case, given that the biased agent plays
the mixed strategy (λ, 1− λ), is then given by
E[ΠU |α = αb] = pu+P + (1− p)λ[αbu+P + (1− αb)u−P ]
+ (1− p)(1− λ)[αbu−P + (1− αb)u0P ]− w(p).
Public Evaluation
Similarly, in case of public evaluation, a pooling equilibrium is played if the weight on the
first period is low, i.e. α < αb(p), and the biased agent separates for α > αb(1).
However, different from the private case, a mixed equilibrium is played for α ∈
[αb(p), αb(1)]. Moreover, assuming pw(1) − w(p) ≤ (1 − p)(u0P − u−P ) for all p ≥ η, the
same dynamics as in the previous case apply. Yet, the optimal α in case the mix1(D,C)
equilibrium is played cannot be derived without further assumptions on the wage schedule.
Lemma 7. For p > η and pw(1)−w(p) ≤ (1− p)(u0P − u−P ), the principal maximizes his
expected utility by choosing some α ∈ [αb(p), αb(1)]. In this case, the biased player mixes
between strategies and the principal’s expected payoff is given by
E[ΠO|α] = pu+P + (1− p)λ[αu+P + (1− α)u−P ] + (1− p)(1− λ)[αu−P + (1− α)u0P ]
− αw(p)− (1− α)[p+ (1− p)λ]w(µ+).
Further,
w(µ+) =
α
1− α(u
+
b − u−b )− (u+b − u0b).
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Thus, the principal decides to evaluate the agent at an earlier stage if the evaluation
is private in order to increase the importance of the second period. If the evaluation is
public, the second period already provides higher incentives because of wage concerns and
the principal evaluates the agent at a later stage, thereby emphasizing the first period.22
1.2.2 More Evaluations
Finally, we consider the case where N − 1 evaluations take place, thereby dividing the
employment period into N intervals. For reasons of tractability, we focus on the case
p > η. For small prior beliefs, however, the dynamics of the model are the same and
similar results apply.
The game we analyze in the following is a repeated game where the principal is uncertain
about the type of the agent. Both players are long-lived, as for example in Schmidt (1993)
or Mailath and Samuelson (2006, ch. 16). However, our subsequent argument does not
strictly follow these lines in the literature but rather gives an inductive argument for what
happens if further periods are added.
As we consider a repeated game with incomplete information, the One-Shot-Deviation
Principle does not hold. Nonetheless, we can show that for high prior beliefs an equilib-
rium strategy for the principal is to delegate upon observing the loyal outcome and to
centralize up to the final period otherwise – regardless of the observability of the evalua-
tions. This grim-trigger strategy turns out to be the principal’s unique subgame perfect
strategy consistent with the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987).
Private Evaluation
In order to reach a solution for the multi-period game, we apply a backward induction
argument. If the evaluations are private, the biased agent chooses xb in the penultimate
period if u0b > u−b , he pools if u0b < u−b and he plays a mixed strategy if u0b = u−b .
22This result hinges on the assumption that wages are non-negative and not “too convex,” i.e. pw(1)−
w(p) ≤ (1− p)(u0P − u
−
P ).
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The Case u0b ≥ u−b .
If u0b > u−b , the biased agent chooses the biased project in the penultimate period, N − 1,
and the principal centralizes. Thus, if the biased agent chooses xl in Period N − 2, the
principal’s belief is unchanged and the separating equilibrium is played in the penultimate
period.23 However, if he chooses xb, the principal’s belief regarding the agent being loyal
immediately drops to zero and, hence, the principal centralizes from then on. Thus, by
choosing xl instead of xb, the biased agent receives only u−b in Period N − 2 but avoids
getting u0b in Period N − 1.
In the borderline case, if u0b = u−b , the biased agent plays a mixed strategy in the penulti-
mate period. However, if we analyze prior periods it turns out that this behavior cannot
be sustained and the biased agent chooses xb in prior periods, followed by centralization
by the principal (see Appendix A1 for details).
Lemma 8 shows that these results hold even if we allow for arbitrary discounting by the
biased agent, where δ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the biased agent’s discount factor.
Lemma 8. If u0b ≥ u−b , there is an equilibrium in the finitely repeated game where, in all
periods, the biased agent chooses xb if the decision is delegated to him for all δ ∈ [0, 1].
The loyal agent chooses xl, and the principal delegates unless he observes xb, in which
case he centralizes in all remaining periods.
The Case u0b < u−b .
If u0b < u−b , a pooling equilibrium is played in Period N − 1 and the principal delegates
the decision to the agent. Thus, in Period N − 2, the biased agent gets u−b by choosing xl
until in the last period he chooses his preferred project and gains a profit of u+b . On the
other hand, if he chooses xb at some point, he momentarily earns u+b but is stuck with a
payoff of u0b for all remaining periods. Lemma 9 shows that it is therefore indeed optimal
for the biased agent to pool up to the last period if he is patient enough.
23The belief does not change if the biased agent pools because the loyal agent always chooses xl.
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Lemma 9. If u0b < u−b and δ >
u+
b
−u−
b
u+
b
−u0
b
, there is an equilibrium in the finitely repeated
game where the biased agent chooses xl in all but the last period if the decision is delegated
to him, and xb in the last period. The loyal agent chooses xl, and the principal delegates
unless he observes xb, in which case he centralizes in all remaining periods.
Public Evaluation
If the evaluations are public, the equilibria also depend on the wage schedule, and the
area where a mixed equilibrium is played with one evaluation is not a null-set (as opposed
to the case of private evaluation).
The Case ∆b > w(p) + u+b − u0b .
If ∆b ≥ w(1) + u+b − u0b , that is, u0b − u−b ≥ w(1), the biased agent chooses xb in Period
N − 1 and the principal centralizes in Period N , the last period. Moving back to Period
N − 2, an argument similar to the one in the case of private evaluation can be applied.
The difference is that by choosing xl the biased agent not only gains discretion in the
following period but also earns a higher wage. However, as wages cannot exceed u0b − u−b
in the separating equilibrium, this effect is too small to make the biased agent pool in
any prior period.
If ∆b ∈ (w(p)+u+b −u0b , w(1)+u+b −u0b), the biased agent plays a mixed strategy in Period
N − 1. However, in this case it turns out that he chooses xb in previous periods for all
discount factors.
Lemma 10. If ∆b > w(p) +u+b −u0b , there is an equilibrium in the finitely repeated game
where, in all periods, the biased agent chooses xb if the decision is delegated to him for all
δ ∈ [0, 1]. The loyal agent chooses xl, and the principal delegates unless he observes xb,
in which case he centralizes in all remaining periods.
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The Case ∆b ≤ w(p) + u+b − u0b .
Finally, if ∆b is low, a pooling equilibrium is played in the penultimate period, N−1, and
the decision is delegated to the agent in Period N . Therefore, the biased agent chooses
xl in any previous period if he is sufficiently patient.
Lemma 11. If ∆b ≤ w(p) + u+b − u0b and δ >
u+
b
−u−
b
u+
b
−u0
b
+w(p) , there is an equilibrium in the
finitely repeated game where the biased agent chooses xl in all but the last period if the
decision is delegated to him, and xb in the last period. The loyal agent chooses xl, and
the principal delegates unless he observes xb, in which case he centralizes in all remaining
periods.
To conclude, the pure strategy equilibria observed in the two-period version of the repeated
game in case p > η extend to an arbitrary finitely repeated game, given that the biased
agent is patient enough. The equilibria where the biased agent mixes between strategies
however can not be sustained with more periods. In these cases, the biased agent chooses
the non-cooperative strategy irrespective of his patience.
1.3 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have analyzed a model of delegation between an uninformed principal
and an informed but potentially biased agent. In particular, assuming generic utilities
and discrete choice options, we have explored the effects of an interim evaluation of the
agent compared to a situation where no evaluation takes place.
As we have shown, in the relationship with interim evaluation, concerns for reputation
may lead the biased agent to misrepresent his preferences and choose the project which is
preferred by the principal at an early stage of the interaction, thereby inducing increased
levels of delegation by the principal in the first period. Moreover, we have seen that this
effect is particularly strong if the evaluation is observable to the market, in which case the
monetary compensation for the agent’s outside option provides an additional incentive.
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Regarding the principal, it turned out that, somewhat contrary to what one might think
at first glance, he may even benefit from a public evaluation compared to a situation
without evaluation, if the biased agent’s imitating behavior is not too costly in terms
of wages. Thus, although the principal always benefits from a private (and costless)
evaluation, revealing the evaluation to the market may even increase the profitability
of the evaluation for the principal. This derives from the fact that, while the agent’s
expected wage may increase in case the evaluation is observable, the biased agent also
has a stronger incentive to align his project choice with the principal’s preferences which
may overcompensate the wage effect.
In addition, we have argued that, from a welfare perspective, an interim evaluation may
lead to an increase in aggregate welfare compared to the case without evaluation. More-
over, we have shown that, if the agent is evaluated, it is always welfare-enhancing to
reveal this information to the market (as this increases the biased agent’s incentive to
imitate the loyal one). And, last but not least, considering the welfare effects of the wage
schedule, we have shown that, if delegation occurs both with and without evaluation,
paying competitive wages is optimal. This is due to the fact that increases in welfare
are essentially achieved at the expense of the biased agent, and high wages provide the
strongest incentives for this type to align his first period behavior with the principal’s
preferences.
Regarding possible policy implications, the analysis thus suggests that, in a setting as the
one considered here, strengthening the agent’s rights in terms of access to the results of
his evaluation and wage claims improves welfare. However, while these results may indeed
indicate some lines of thought for more general intuitions, we are fully aware that general
claims are of course difficult to make based on the stylized theoretical analysis conducted
here.
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A1 Mathematical Appendix
Equilibrium Refinement
In this chapter, we use the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987) as a refinement for
equilibria in the signaling game. In short, the Intuitive Criterion rules out all equilibria
which are sustained by unreasonable beliefs off the equilibrium path. In particular, in a
pooling equilibrium where both types choose xb, the loyal agent is the first one to switch
to xl when payoffs are gradually changed. Thus, reasonable off-equilibrium beliefs have to
satisfy µ+ = 1 in this case. But if µ+ = 1, the principal delegates after observing xl and
the agent’s wage after choosing xl is maximal. Therefore, choosing xl is strictly dominant
for the loyal agent if µ+ = 1 and pooling on xb cannot be sustained in equilibrium. This
leads us to the following lemma.
Lemma 12. All pooling equilibria of the signaling game where both types choose xb are
ruled out by the intuitive criterion.
Accordingly, for a pooling equilibrium where both types choose xl, the Intuitive Criterion
requires µ− = 0. This requirement is not restrictive for the considered equilibria. See
Cho and Kreps (1987) or Mas-Colell et al. (1995, pp. 467ff.) for further details on the
Intuitive Criterion.
Proofs of Section 1.1
Proof of Proposition 1. The principal prefers delegation to centralization when no
evaluation takes place if pu+P + (1− p)u−P ≥ u0P , which is equivalent to
p ≥ u
0
P − u−P
u+P − u−P
.
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Proof of Lemma 1. In order to analyze the equilibria of the signaling game in case
of private evaluation, we have to conduct an analogous analysis to the one in the proof
of Lemma 2 and Lemma 3. However, the difference with private evaluation is that wages
are omitted in the analysis of best replies as they have no strategic impact. Hence, the
equilibrium analysis in case of private evaluation yields the same result as assuming w ≡ 0
in the statement of Lemma 2 and Lemma 3. Indeed, by applying Lemmata 2 and 3 to
w ≡ 0, the mix1(D,C) equilibrium reduces to a null-set and the equilibria where the
principal centralizes in any case vanish.
Proof of Lemma 2 and Lemma 3. In order to analyze the equilibria of the signaling
game in case of public evaluation, we consider all possible strategies of the principal
separately. The pure strategies are analyzed in cases 1 to 4, while case 5 includes all
possible mixed strategies by the principal. Throughout the proof, we omit the analysis of
pooling equilibria where both types choose xb because of Lemma 12.
Case 1: sP = (D,C)⇒ µ− ≤ η, µ+ ≥ η
In this case, the loyal agent chooses xl if sP = (D,C) and µ+ ≥ µ−, irrespective of the
biased agent’s strategy. In a separating equilibrium, we have sb = xb, µ− = 0 and µ+ = 1.
Thus, sb = xb is a best reply for the biased agent if w(0) + u+b + u0b ≥ w(1) + u−b + u+b , or
∆b ≥ w(1) + u+b − u0b .
In a pooling equilibrium, we have sb = xl and µ+ = p. As µ+ ≥ η is needed for the
principal to choose sP = (D,C), this equilibrium can only exist if p ≥ η. Furthermore,
this equilibrium can only be sustained if w(p) + u−b + u+b ≥ w(µ−) + u+b + u0b , which is
equivalent to
∆b ≤ w(p) + u+b − u0b ,
since we restrict the analysis to rational beliefs and hence µ− = 0. In an equilibrium
where the biased agent mixes between xl and xb with probability λ, 1 − λ, respectively,
we have µ− = 0 as the loyal agent always chooses xl. The biased agent’s indifference
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condition is thus given by w(µ+) + u−b + u+b = w(µ−) + u+b + u0b , or
∆b = w(µ+) + u+b − u0b .
The randomization parameter λ is then implicitly given by µ+ = pp+(1−p)λ . Furthermore,
if p ≤ η, we always have µ+ ∈ [η, 1] or, equivalently, λ ∈ [0, p(1−η)η(1−p) ]. If instead p ≥ η,
µ+ ∈ [p, 1] or, equivalently, λ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, there exists some mixed strategy (λ, 1 − λ)
by the biased agent fulfilling his indifference condition whenever
• w(η) ≤ u0b − u−b ≤ w(1) if p ≤ η or
• w(p) ≤ u0b − u−b ≤ w(1) if p ≥ η.
Hence, if sP = (D,C), there are three types of equilibria depending on ∆b and u+b − u0b :
separating, pooling on xl and one where the biased agent randomizes.
Case 2: sP = (D,D)⇒ µ− ≥ η, µ+ ≥ η
In this case, we have µ− ≥ η and µ+ ≥ η, so there cannot be a separating equilibrium. In
a pooling equilibrium with sl = sb = xl, rational beliefs are given if µ− = 0, which is not
possible either. Finally, an equilibrium where one of the types mixes and the other type
plays a pure strategy can only appear if the loyal agent mixes (in which case either µ+ = 1
or µ− = 1), which occurs if and only if u+l − u−l = w(µ−) − w(µ+), thus µ− ≥ µ+. But
in this case the biased agent chooses xb, which yields µ+ = 1 and µ− < 1. Thus, there
is no equilibrium where one of the types mixes. Accordingly, the only possible mixed
equilibrium in this case is the one where both types mix between their pure strategies.
This equilibrium requires u+b − u−b = −(u+l − u−l ) = w(µ+)−w(µ−), which is not possible
as we assumed uniqueness of the preferred project, thus u+i > u−i for i ∈ {l, b}. Hence,
there is no equilibrium with sP = (D,D).
Case 3: sP = (C,C)⇒ µ− ≤ η, µ+ ≤ η
In this case, µ− ≤ η and µ+ ≤ η, so there is no separating equilibrium. Moreover, in any
pooling equilibrium with sl = sb = xl, we conclude µ+ = p and hence p ≤ η is required.
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Then, the biased agent chooses xl if w(p) + u−b + u0b ≥ w(µ−) + u+b + u0b , or
u+b − u−b ≤ w(p),
assuming rational beliefs, i.e. µ− = 0. The loyal type also prefers xl in this case. Fur-
thermore, an equilibrium where one of the types mixes and the other type plays a pure
strategy can only occur if the biased agent mixes (in which case either µ+ = 0 or µ− = 0).
The biased agent is indifferent in this case if and only if u+b − u−b = w(µ+) − w(µ−).
Thus, µ+ > µ−, µ− = 0 and sl = xl. As λ ≤ 1, we have that µ+ ≥ p. On the other
hand, µ+ ≤ η such that the principal centralizes when observing xl. Thus, this mixed
equilibrium is only possible if p ≤ η, in which case we find a randomization λ whenever
w(p) ≤ u+b − u−b ≤ w(η).
Finally, an equilibrium where both types play mixed strategies requires
u+b − u−b = −(u+l − u−l ) = w(µ+)− w(µ−),
which is again not possible. Hence, if p ≤ η, there are two types of equilibria in this case: A
pooling equilibrium if u+b −u−b ≤ w(p) and a mixed equilibrium if w(p) ≤ u+b −u−b ≤ w(η).
Case 4: sP = (C,D)⇒ µ− ≥ η, µ+ ≤ η
In this case, µ− ≥ η and µ+ ≤ η. Thus, the only possible separating equilibrium is one
in which sl = xb and sb = xl is played. However, if µ− = 1 and µ+ = 0, the biased
agent strictly prefers xb. So there is no separating equilibrium in this case. In any pooling
equilibrium with sl = sb = xl and rational beliefs, we have µ− = 0, which is not possible.
Hence, there is no pooling equilibrium. Furthermore, an equilibrium where the biased
agent mixes is only possible if he is indifferent, i.e. w(µ−) + 2u+b = w(µ+) + u−b + u0b , or
w(µ−) − w(µ+) = u−b + u0b − 2u+b < 0, which is not possible if µ− ≥ µ+. Thus, we can
exclude such an equilibrium where the biased agent randomizes. On the other hand, if
only the loyal agent mixes, the requirement µ− ≥ η can only be achieved if the biased
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agent chooses xl, thus µ− = 1. But if µ− = 1, the biased agent strictly prefers xb. Hence,
there is no equilibrium in case sP = (C,D) where one of the types mixes. Finally, an
equilibrium where both types mix is only possible if u+i = u−i for i ∈ {l, b}, which is ruled
out by assumption. Thus, there is no equilibrium if sP = (C,D).
Case 5: sP = λPD + (1− λP )C
The principal randomizes between D and C with probabilities (λP , 1−λP ) after observing
xl if and only if η = µ+. Consider the case where the biased agent plays xl with probability
λ and xb with probability 1 − λ and the loyal agent chooses xl. Then, µ− = 0 and
sP (xb) = C. The principal randomizes in order to make the biased agent indifferent,
which occurs if w(µ−) + u+b + u0b = w(µ+) + λP (u−b + u+b ) + (1− λP )(u−b + u0b), or
λP =
u+b − u−b − w(η)
u+b − u0b
,
using η = µ+ and µ− = 0. Then, λP ∈ [0, 1] if and only if w(η) ≤ ∆b ≤ w(η) + u+b − u0b .
By contrast, the principal is indifferent between C and D if and only if µ+ = η. However,
if the biased agent randomizes with probabilities (λ, 1−λ), µ+ is given by µ+ = pp+(1−p)λ ,
which is equivalent to λ = p(1−η)
η(1−p) . Thus, λ ≤ 1 if and only if p ≤ η and there is no equilib-
rium for p > η. Furthermore, λP ∈ (0, 1) if and only if ∆b ∈ (w(η), w(η) + u+b − u−b ). All
other strategies by the biased and the loyal agent are ruled out in equilibrium by applying
similar arguments as before. Hence, in an equilibrium where the principal randomizes
between C and D, the loyal agent chooses xl, while the biased agent randomizes between
xl and xb. This equilibrium is possible only if p ≤ η and ∆b ∈ (w(η), w(η) + u+b − u−b ).
Proof of Proposition 2. Here, we compare the principal’s payoff in case he delegates
in Period 1 with the payoff he could guarantee by centralization, as given in Section 1.1.4.
If p > η and the principal delegates in Period 1, the principal delegates in Period 2
upon observing xl and centralizes otherwise. The biased agent plays a mixed strategy
(λ, 1− λ) with λ ∈ [0, 1], i.e. also accounting for pure strategies. The principal’s payoff if
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he delegates in Period 1 is given by
E[UP |D] = 2pu+P + (1− p)[λ(u+P + u−P ) + (1− λ)(u−P + u0P )]− w(p),
where we omit first-period wages. Thus, the principal delegates in Period 1 if
E[UP |D] ≥ u0P + pu+P + (1− p)u−P − w(p) ⇔ [p+ (1− p)λ](u+P − u0P ) ≥ 0,
which is always the case. Thus, the principal delegates at least for all p > η.
If p ≤ η and ∆b ≥ u+b −u0b , the biased agent mixes between strategies with λ ≤ 1−ηη
p
1−p and
the principal delegates upon observing xl and centralizes otherwise (in case the decision
was delegated in Period 1). This also covers the separating equilibrium, in which case
λ = 0. The principal’s payoff in case of delegation in Period 1 is then given by
E[UP |D] = u0P + u−P + p(u+P − u−P ) +
p
µ+
(u+P − u0P )− w(p),
using λ = 1−µ+
µ+
p
1−p and omitting first-period wages. The principal delegates in Period 1
if E[UP |D] ≥ 2u0P − w(p), or
p ≥ µ+(u
0
P − u−P )
µ+(u+P − u−P ) + (u+P − u0P )
∈ [η2, η2− η ],
since µ+ ∈ [η, 1]. In particular, if ∆b > u+b − u0b , µ+ = 1 and the threshold is given by
η
2−η .
If p ≤ η and ∆b < u+b − u0b , both the biased agent and the principal randomize, where
the biased agent’s strategy (λ, 1−λ) is given by λ = 1−η
η
p
1−p and the principal’s delegates
with probability λP upon observing xl, and centralizes if x = xb. The principal’s payoff
in case of delegation in Period 1 is then given by
E[UP |D] = u0P + u−P + pλP (u+P − u−P ) +
p
η
[(u+P − u−P )− λP (u0p − u−P )]− w(p),
again omitting first-period wages. The principal delegates in Period 1 if E[UP |D] ≥
2u0P − w(p), which is equivalent to p ≥ η2.
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Proof of Proposition 3. As in the Proof of Proposition 2, we compare the principal’s
payoff in case he delegates in Period 1 with the payoff he could guarantee by centralization,
as given in Section 1.1.4.
If p > η and the principal delegates in Period 1, he delegates in Period 2 upon observing
xl and centralizes otherwise. In turn, if he centralizes in Period 1, he does not update his
belief and delegates in Period 2 as p > η. Thus, delegation in Period 1 is preferred by the
principal if
p[2u+P − w(µ+)] + (1− p)[λ(u+P + u−P − w(µ+)) + (1− λ)(u−P + u0P )]
≥ u0P + pu+P + (1− p)u−P − w(p)
⇔ w(p) + [p+ (1− p)λ][u+P − u0P − w(µ+)] ≥ 0,
which holds for all λ ∈ [0, 1] as w(µ+) ≤ u+P − u0P . Thus, the principal delegates at least
for all p > η, as in the case without evaluation.
If p ≤ η and the principal centralizes in Period 1, he does not update his prior belief
and centralizes again in Period 2 as p ≤ η. Now we consider all possible equilibria of the
signaling game for the case p ≤ η and determine the delegation decision of the principal
in Period 1.24
Case 1: ∆b ≤ w(η)
In this case, the biased agent chooses xl or a mixed strategy, while the principal centralizes
in any case. Thus, the principal delegates in this case if
p[u+P + u0P − w(µ+)] + (1− p)[λ(u+P + u0P − w(µ+)) + (1− λ)(u−P + u0P )]
≥ 2u0P − w(p)
⇔ p
µ+
[u+P − u−P − w(µ+)] ≥ u0P − u−P − w(p),
where we used λ = p1−p
1−µ+
µ+
. As u+P − u−P ≥ w(µ+), it follows that the principal delegates
24Here, we neglect the null-set {p = η} ∩
{
∆b ≤ w(η) + u+b − u0b
}
.
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if
p ≥ [u
0
P − u−P − w(p)]µ+
u+P − u−P − w(µ+)
= [u
0
P − u−P − w(p)]µ+
(u+P − u−P )η + (u+P − u0P )− w(µ+)
.
The latter equals δw,µ+(p) because max {µ+, η} = η.
In the pooling equilibrium, µ+ = p, and the principal delegates if p ≥ [u
0
P−u
−
P−w(p)]p
u+P−u
−
P−w(p)
, which
is always the case. In order not to have to distinguish the case of a pooling equilibrium
from the other cases, it remains to show that δw,µ(p) ≤ p for all ∆b ≤ w(p), such that
in this area of ∆b we have p∗O(∆b) = 0. Then we can use the definition of δw,µ(p) with
µ(∆b) := w−1(∆b) for all ∆b ≤ w(η). Indeed, for ∆b ≤ w(p) and hence µ(∆b) ≤ p, we
have
δw,µ(p) =
[u0P − u−P − w(p)]µ
u+P − u−P − w(µ)
≤ [u
0
P − u−P − w(p)]p
u+P − u−P − w(p)
≤ p.
Case 2: ∆b > w(η)
In this case, three equilibria are possible: sep(D,C), mix1(D,C) or mix2(λP ,C). In general,
the principal delegates if
p[λP (2u+P − w(µ+)) + (1− λP )(u+P + u0P − w(µ+))] + (1− p)(1− λ)(u−P + u0P )
+ (1− p)λ[λP (u+P + u−P − w(µ+)) + (1− λP )(u+P + u0P − w(µ+))] ≥ 2u0P − w(p)
⇔ p[u+P − u−P − w(µ+)] + pλP [µ+(u+P − u−P )− (u0P − u−P )] ≥ [u0P − u−P − w(p)]µ+,
where we used λ = p1−p
1−µ+
µ+
. If λP 6= 1, i.e. in the mix2 equilibrium, it has to hold that
µ+ = η in order to make the principal indifferent between his choices. Thus, in this case,
µ+(u+P − u−P )− (u0P − u−P ) = 0 and the principal delegates if
p ≥ [u
0
P − u−P − w(p)]η
u+P − u−P − w(η)
= [u
0
P − u−P − w(p)]η
(u+P − u−P )η + (u+P − u0P )− w(η)
= δw,η(p)
because µ+ = η. In all other cases, λP = 1 and the principal delegates if
p ≥ [u
0
P − u−P − w(p)]µ+
(u+P − u−P )µ+ + (u+P − u0P )− w(µ+)
= δw,µ+(p)
because µ+ ≥ η in these cases. Note that, apart from the pooling equilibrium, µ(∆b) = µ+.
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Furthermore, as w(µ+) ≤ u+P − u0P , we have
δw,µ+(p) ≤
[u0P − u−P − w(p)]µ+
(u+P − u−P ) max {µ+, η}
≤ u
0
P − u−P − w(p)
u+P − u−P
≤ η
for all p ∈ [0, 1], hence p∗O < η for all ∆b. Thus, we have shown that the principal delegates
more often with public evaluation than if no evaluation takes place.
Proof of Proposition 4. We define
f(µ, p) := δw,µ(p)− p.
Then, f is continuously differentiable in p ∈ [0, 1] and piecewise continuously differentiable
on {µ < η} and {µ > η}. Furthermore, f(µ, 0) = δw,µ(0) > 0 and f is strictly decreasing
in p:
∂f
∂p
(µ, p) = − µw
′(p)
(u+P − u−P ) max {µ, η}+ (u+P − u0P )− w(µ)
− 1 < 0
Thus, for every µ ≥ 0 there exists a unique p∗(µ) > 0 with f(µ, p∗(µ)) = 0. Fix such a
point (µ∗, p∗) with f(µ∗, p∗) = 0. Then we know that ∂f
∂p
(µ∗, p∗) 6= 0 for all (µ∗, p∗). Hence,
by the Implicit Function Theorem, p∗(µ) can be locally represented by a continuously
differentiable function. Accordingly, there exists a continuously differentiable function
g : U → V from an environment U of µ∗ to an environment V of p∗ such that g(µ) = p∗(µ)
for all µ ∈ U . Furthermore,
∂g
∂µ
(µ∗) = −
(
∂f
∂p
(µ∗, p∗)
)−1
∂f
∂µ
(µ∗, p∗).
As we have seen, ∂f
∂p
(µ∗, p∗) < 0 for all (µ∗, p∗), thus the sign of ∂g
∂µ
(µ∗) is given by the
sign of ∂f
∂µ
(µ∗, p∗).
Let µ∗ < η. Then, p∗ = p(µ∗) is given by [u0P − u−P − w(p∗)]µ∗ = p∗[u+P − u−P − w(µ∗)].
As the right-hand side is strictly positive for p∗ > 0, we have u0P − u−P − w(p∗) > 0
for all p∗ > 0 in this case. If µ∗ > η, p∗ = p(µ∗) is given by [u0P − u−P − w(p∗)]µ∗ =
p∗[(u+P −u−P )µ∗+ (u+P −u0P )−w(µ∗)]. Applying the same reasoning as before, we conclude
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u0P − u−P − w(p∗) > 0 for all p∗ > 0. Thus, for µ∗ < η we have
∂f
∂µ
(µ∗, p∗) = [u
0
P − u−P − w(p∗)][u+P − u−P − w(µ∗) + µ∗w′(µ∗)]
[u+P − u−P − w(µ∗)]2
,
and for µ∗ > η
∂f
∂µ
(µ∗, p∗) = [u
0
P − u−P − w(p∗)][u+P − u0P − w(µ∗) + µ∗w′(µ∗)]
[(u+P − u−P )µ∗ + (u+P − u0P )− w(µ∗)]2
.
In both cases, the derivative is non-negative, thus ∂g
∂µ
(µ∗) > 0 for all µ∗ 6= η. As µ weakly
increases in ∆b, we conclude that the delegation threshold weakly increases in ∆b.
Proof of Corollary 1. Corollary 1 represents a special case of Proposition 3. Hence,
let’s assume that the delegation threshold is implicitly defined by
p∗O =
[u0P − u−P − w(p∗O)]µ
(u+P − u−P ) max {µ, η}+ (u+P − u0P )− w(µ)
.
Using w(µ) = µW for all µ ∈ [0, 1], the above expression is equivalent to
[(u+P − u−P ) max {µ, η}+ (u+P − u0P )− µW ]p∗O = (u0P − u−P )µ− p∗OµW,
thus
p∗O(µ) =
(u0P − u−P )µ
(u+P − u−P ) max {µ, η}+ (u+P − u0P )
.
Inserting µ(∆b) as defined in Proposition 3 yields the result.
Proof of Proposition 5. Now we compare the delegation decision for public and private
evaluation. In order to do so, we determine conditions such that p∗O lies above or below
the step function p∗U for those ∆b where p∗O is constant. In the following considerations,
we use that for all x ∈ [0, 1]
p∗O(∆b) ≤ x ⇔ δw,µ(∆b)(x) ≤ x.
This equivalence is illustrated in Figure A1.1.
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Figure A1.1: Illustration of the equivalence of p∗O(∆b) ≤ x and δw,µ(∆b)(x) ≤ x.
Case 1: ∆b ≥ w(1) + u+b − u0b
In this case, a separating equilibrium is played, both with public and private evaluation.
Delegation is more likely when the evaluation is public if p∗O(∆b), with µ(∆b) = 1, lies
below η2−η = p
∗
U(∆b). Then p∗O(∆b) ≤ η2−η is equivalent to δw,1
(
η
2−η
)
≤ η2−η , which yields
η
2− ηw(1)− w
(
η
2− η
)
≤ 0.
As w is (weakly) convex, the above inequality does not hold and p∗O(∆b) lies above η2−η =
p∗U(∆b) for ∆b ≥ w(1) + u+b − u0b . Thus, delegation is weakly more likely with private
evaluation. As p∗O(∆b) is continuous and weakly increasing from zero, this result implies
that p∗O(∆b) cuts p∗U(∆b) at some point ρ ≤ w(1) +u+b −u0b . Thus, the proposition follows
immediately. In case 2, we describe the relation between p∗O(∆b) and p∗U(∆b) in further
detail.
Case 2: w(η) < ∆b < w(η) + u+b − u0b
In this case, µ(∆b) = η if the evaluation is public, and p∗U(∆b) is given by η2 for ∆b <
u+b − u0b , and by η2−η if ∆b > u
+
b − u0b . Now, three cases are possible: either p∗O(∆b) lies
below or above any of these thresholds, or in between. On the one hand, p∗O(∆b) ≤ η2 if
and only if δw,η(η2) ≤ η2, or ηw(η)− w(η2) ≤ 0, which is not the case if w is convex.
57
Delegation and Interim Performance Evaluation
On the other hand, p∗O(∆b) ≤ η2−η if and only if δw,η
(
η
2−η
)
≤ η2−η , which is equivalent to
η
2− ηw(η)− ηw
(
η
2− η
)
≤ (1− η) η2− η (u
+
P − u0P ).
Hence, p∗O(∆b) lies between η2 and η2−η for w(η) < ∆b < w(η) + u
+
b − u0b if w is “not too
convex”, and above η2−η if w is “very convex”.
Proof of Corollary 2. In order to prove Corollary 2, we use the proof of Proposition 3.
A linear wage schedule implies that p∗O(∆b) = η2−η = p
∗
U(∆b) for ∆b ≥ w(1) + u+b − u0b .
Furthermore, p∗O(∆b) = η2 ≤ p∗U(∆b) if w(η) < ∆b < w(η) +u+b −u0b . Taken together, this
implies that p∗O(∆b) lies weakly below the step function p∗U(∆b), hence there is weakly
more delegation when the evaluation is public.
Proof of Proposition 6. If p > η and the principal privately evaluates the agent, he
receives a payoff of
E[ΠU ] = 2pu+P + (1− p)λ(u+P + u−P ) + (1− p)(1− λ)(u−P + u0P )− w(p),
where λ ∈ [0, 1], covering both the pooling and the separating equilibrium. On the other
hand, if p > η, the principal delegates in Period 1 if there is no evaluation. In this case,
his expected payoff is given by
E[ΠN ] = 2[pu+P + (1− p)u−P ]− w(p),
where we omit the first-period wage w(p) in all cases. Thus, evaluating the agent is
preferred whenever E[ΠU ] ≥ E[ΠN ], or
(1− p)λ(u+P − u0P ) + (1− p)(u0P − u−P ) ≥ 0,
which is true for all λ ∈ [0, 1].
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Alternatively, if p ≤ η, the principal does not delegate if no evaluation takes place. Hence,
comparing the principal’s payoffs with and without evaluation yields the same analysis
as comparing his payoffs after a delegation decision in Period 1 and after centralization,
given that a private evaluation takes place. Hence, the principal prefers to evaluate the
agent whenever p lies above the delegation threshold, and he is indifferent if there is no
delegation in any case.
Proof of Proposition 7. As in the Proof of Proposition 6, if p > η, the principal’s
expected payoff without evaluation is given by E[ΠN ] = 2[pu+P +(1−p)u−P ]−w(p), omitting
the first-period wage. With public evaluation, the principal’s payoff is given by
E[ΠO] = p[2u+P − w(µ+)] + (1− p)λ[u+P + u−P − w(µ+)] + (1− p)(1− λ)(u−P + u0P ),
where λ ∈ [0, 1] (including the pooling and the separating equilibrium) and again omitting
first-period wages. Using µ+ = pp+(1−p)λ , this yields for the net expected payoff
E[ΠO − ΠN ] = p
1− µ+
µ+
(u+P − u0P ) + (1− p)(u0P − u−P ) + w(p)−
p
µ+
w(µ+),
which is non-negative if and only if
pw(µ+)− µ+w(p) ≤ p(1− µ+)(u+P − u0P ) + (1− p)µ+(u0P − u−P ).
The above inequality holds for µ+ = p. Furthermore, for all µ+ ≥ p, the non-negative
left-hand side, pw(µ+)−µ+w(p), increases in µ+ because w is convex, while the right-hand
side, p(1−µ+)(u+P −u0P )+(1−p)µ+(u0P −u−P ), is decreasing in µ+ as p > η. Knowing that
µ+ weakly increases in ∆b, we conclude that there is a threshold ρ > 0 (possibly infinity)
such that a public evaluation is preferred to no evaluation for all ∆b ≤ ρ.
If p ≤ η, the principal centralizes without evaluation which yields an expected payoff of
E[ΠN ] = 2u0P − w(p) (omitting first-period wages). Comparing the principal’s expected
payoffs in case of evaluation vs. no evaluation yields the same analysis as comparing dele-
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gation in Period 1 to centralization in Period 1 in case of public evaluation. Hence, public
evaluation is preferred by the principal whenever p lies above the delegation threshold,
and he is indifferent if there is no delegation in any case.
Proof of Proposition 8. Let’s first assume p > η. If ∆b ≤ w(p) + u+b − u0b , the biased
agent pools in case the evaluation is public, whereas any mixed strategy by the biased
agent is possible in the private case. Thus, the principle prefers to reveal the evaluation
whenever
2pu+P + (1− p)(u+P + u−P )− w(p)
≥ 2pu+P + (1− p)λ(u+P + u−P ) + (1− p)(1− λ)(u−P + u0P )− w(p),
which is true for all λ ∈ [0, 1]. If w(p) + u+b − u0b ≤ ∆b, the biased agent randomizes
between strategies in case the evaluation is public, with λ ∈ [0, 1], covering the pooling
and the separating case. On the other hand, a separating equilibrium is played in the
private case. Thus, the principle prefers to reveal the evaluation whenever
2pu+P + p
1− µ+
µ+
(u+P + u−P ) +
µ+ − p
µ+
(u−P + u0P )−
p
µ+
w(µ+)
≥ 2pu+P + (1− p)(u−P + u0P )− w(p),
using λ = p1−p
1−µ+
µ+
. This is equivalent to
pw(µ+)− µ+w(p) ≤ p(1− µ+)(u+P − u0P ).
Note that the above inequality is fulfilled for ∆b = w(p) + u+b − u0b , where µ+ = p. On
the other hand, it does not hold for µ+ = 1 because w is convex. As the left-hand side
is increasing in µ+ ≥ p, while the right-hand side decreases in µ+, we conclude that for
all p > η, there exists a threshold ρ(p) ∈ [w(p) + u+b − u0b , w(1) + u+b − u0b ] such that the
principal prefers to reveal the evaluation for ∆b < ρ(p) and to conceal it if ∆b > ρ(p).
Now we assume p ≤ η and consider the case where the decision is delegated both in case
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of private and public evaluation. If ∆b ≤ w(η) ≤ u+b − u0b , a mix2(λP ,C) equilibrium is
played in the private case, whereas pool(C,C) or mix1(C,C) occurs with public evaluation.
Hence, public evaluation is preferred if
E[ΠO] =
p
µ+
(u+P − u−P ) + u0P + u−P −
p
µ+
w(µ+) ≥
p
η
(u+P − u−P ) + u0P + u−P − w(p) = E[ΠU ],
where µ+ = p for ∆b ≤ w(p) and µ+ = w−1(∆b) if ∆b ∈ [w(p), w(η)]. This is equivalent
to
pw(µ+)− µ+w(p) ≤ p
(
1− µ+
η
)
(u+P − u−P ).
The above inequality holds for µ+ = p, but not for µ+ = η. As the left-hand side
increases in µ+ ≥ p, while the right-hand side decreases in µ+, there is a threshold
ρ1(p) ∈ [w(p), w(η)] such that the principal reveals the evaluation for ∆b < ρ1(p).
On the other hand, if ∆b ≤ u+b − u0b ≤ w(η), we face the same situation. Hence, for
the case u+b − u0b ≤ w(η), we see that public evaluation is preferred at least up to some
threshold ρ1(p) ∈ [w(p), w(η)]. In order to determine ρ2(p), we distinguish two cases: w
being “not too convex” and “very convex”.
Case 1: pw(η)− ηw(p) ≤ p(1− η)(u+P − u0P )
If ∆b ≥ w(η) + u+b − u0b , a mix1(D,C) or sep(D,C) equilibrium is played if the evaluation
is public, while the biased agent always separates in the private case. Some algebra shows
that the principal reveals the evaluation if
pw(µ+)− µ+w(p) ≤ p(1− µ+)(u+P − u0P )
for µ+ ∈ [η, 1]. While the above inequality never holds if µ+ = 1, it holds for µ+ = η
given that w is “not too convex”. Applying the same reasoning as above, we conclude
that there is a threshold ρ2(p) ∈ [w(η) + u+b − u0b , w(1) + u+b − u0b ] such that the principal
reveals the evaluation for ∆b ∈ [w(η) + u+b − u0b , ρ2(p)) and conceals it for ∆b > ρ2(p).
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Case 2: pw(η)− ηw(p) ≥ p(1− η)(u+P − u0P )
From case 1 we conclude that the principal prefers to conceal the evaluation for all ∆b ≥
w(η) + u+b − u0b if w is “very convex”. Furthermore, if max
{
w(η), u+b − u0b
}
≤ ∆b ≤
w(η) + u+b − u0b ], both the principal and the biased agent randomize between strategies
if the evaluation is public, while a separating equilibrium is played in the private case.
Comparing the equilibria, it turns out that the principal prefers to conceal the evaluation
if and only if w is “very convex”, i.e. pw(η) − ηw(p) ≥ p(1 − η)(u+P − u0P ). If u+b − u0b ≤
∆b ≤ w(η), a pool(C,C) or mix1(C,C) equilibrium is played in the public case, while the
biased agent separates if the evaluation is private. Here, the principal prefers to reveal
the evaluation if
pw(µ+)− µ+w(p) ≤ p[1− µ+(2− η)](u+P − u−P )
with µ+ ∈ [max
{
w−1(u+b − u0b), p
}
, η]. The above inequality does not hold for µ+ = η,
as w is “very convex”, and it holds for µ+ = p because p ≤ η < 12−η . Applying the same
arguments as before, there exists a threshold ρ2(p) ∈ [ρ1(p), w(η)] such that the principal
conceals the evaluation for ∆b > ρ2(p). On the other hand, if w(η) ≤ ∆b ≤ u+b − u0b ,
a mix2(λP ,C) equilibrium is played in both cases and the principal prefers to conceal
the evaluation as wages are convex. Together with the result on ρ1(p), we can conclude
that ρ2(p) = ρ1(p) in this case and the principal conceals the evaluation if and only if
∆b > ρ2(p) = ρ1(p) ∈ [w(p), w(η)].
Proof of Corollary 4. If wages are linear, the expected wage if the evaluation is public
equals the one in the private case. Hence, replacing pw(µ+)− µ+w(p) = 0 in the proof of
Proposition 8 yields that the principal prefers to reveal the evaluation to the market for
any of the considered cases.
Proof of Proposition 9. If p > η, expected aggregate welfare without evaluation is
given by
E[WN ] = 2p(u+P + u+l ) + 2(1− p)(u+b + u−P ).
When evaluation takes place and p > η (regardless of whether it is public or private), the
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principal’s strategy is sP = (D,C) in all equilibria and the loyal agent always chooses
sl = xl. The biased agent’s strategy is given by (λ, 1 − λ) with λ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, we can
calculate the expected aggregate welfare with evaluation,
E[WE] = 2p(u+P + u+l ) + (1− p)λ[(u+P + u−P ) + (u−b + u+b )]
+ (1− p)(1− λ)[(u−P + u0P ) + (u+b + u0b)].
Accordingly, expected net aggregate welfare is given by
E[WE −WN ] = (1− p)λ[(u+P − u0P )− (u0b − u−b )] + (1− p)[(u0P − u−P )− (u+b − u0b)].
If u0P − u−P ≥ u+b − u0b , the second summand is non-negative. Hence, if λ = 0 (separating
equilibrium), we have E[WE − WN ] ≥ 0. Second, whenever λ ∈ (0, 1), it has to hold
that u0b − u−b ≤ w(1) ≤ u+P − u0P in the public case, or u0b − u−b = 0 if the evaluation
is private. Thus, in this case, the first summand is also non-negative which again yields
E[WE −WN ] ≥ 0. Finally, if λ = 1 (pooling equilibrium), E[WE −WN ] ≥ 0 if and only if
u+P −u−P ≥ u+b −u−b , which holds by assumption. On the other hand, if u0P −u−P ≤ u+b −u0b ,
aggregate welfare is weakly increased if and only if
λ[(u+P − u0P )− (u0b − u−b )] ≥ (u+b − u0b)− (u0P − u−P ) ≥ 0.
Obviously, in a separating equilibrium (λ = 0), this inequality does not hold, while
for λ = 1, it is fulfilled as u+P − u−P ≥ u+b − u−b . In intermediate cases, we know that
u+P − u0P ≥ u0b − u−b , thus welfare is weakly increased if and only if
λ ≥ (u
+
b − u0b)− (u0P − u−P )
(u+P − u0P )− (u0b − u−b )
∈ [0, 1].
Hence, there exists a threshold ρ ∈ [w(η) + u+b − u0b , w(1) + u+b − u0b ] if the evaluation is
public, or ρ = u+b − u0b in the private case, such that welfare is increased for ∆b < ρ and
decreased for ∆b > ρ.
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Proof of Lemma 4. If p > η, the derivative of the expected aggregate welfare in case
of evaluation with regard to λ is given by
∂E[WE]
∂λ
= (1− p)[(u+P − u0P )− (u0b − u−b )].
If the biased agent does not separate in the public case, we have u0b−u−b ≤ w(1) ≤ u+P−u0P ,
thus ∂E[WE ]
∂λ
≥ 0 for all λ > 0. Furthermore, in this case we have that the randomization
factor λ is always at least as large in the public case as in the private case, for a given
(p,∆b). Thus, public evaluation yields a (weakly) higher aggregate welfare. If the biased
agent separates in the public case, he also does so with private evaluation and aggregate
welfare is the same in both cases.
Proof of Proposition 10.
As E[WN ] is constant in λ, we conclude from the proof of Lemma 4 that ∂E[WE−WN ]∂λ =
∂E[WE ]
∂λ
≥ 0. As the wage schedule influences the played equilibrium, increasing w(p)
increases the region for values of ∆b where a pooling equilibrium is played if the evaluation
is public. In turn, rising w(1) reduces the region for values of ∆b where a separating
equilibrium is played. Furthermore, if w(p)+u+b −u0b < ∆b < w(1)+u+b −u0b , λ decreases in
µ+, where µ+ = w−1(∆b−(u+b −u0b)). Thus, for a given ∆b ∈ (w(p)+u+b −u0b , w(1)+u+b −u0b),
welfare is maximal if w(µ+(∆b)) is maximal. Hence, high wages for µ ∈ [p, 1] (weakly)
increase expected welfare in case of public evaluation.
Proof of Proposition 11. If p ≤ η, expected aggregate welfare without evaluation is
given by E[WN ] = 2[u0P + pu0l + (1 − p)u0b ]. If ∆b ≥ w(η) + u+b − u0b if the evaluation is
public, or ∆b ≥ u+b −u0b in the private case, either a mix1(D,C) or a sep(D,C) equilibrium
is played. Using the result for E[WE] from Proposition 9 and p + (1 − p)λ = pµ+ , we
conclude that the net expected welfare is given by
E[WE −WN ] = [(u+b − u0b)− (u0P − u−P )] +
p
µ+
[(u+P − u0P )− (u0b − u−b )]
+ p[2(u+l − u0l ) + (u0b − u−b ) + (u+P − u−P )− (u+b − u0b)],
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where µ+ ∈ (η, 1]. We assume throughout the proof that
u+b − u0b ≥ u0P − u−P . (A1.1)
Condition A1.1 ensures that the first of the three summands in E[WE − WN ] is non-
negative. If µ+ < 1, we have u0b−u−b = 0 in the private case and u0b−u−b ≤ w(1) ≤ u+P−u0P
if the evaluation is public. Hence, also the second summand is non-negative in this case.
Finally, we have u+b − u0b ≤ ∆b < u+b − u−b ≤ u+P − u−P , which yields non-negativity for the
third summand. If µ+ = 1, net expected welfare is given by
E[WE−WN ] = [(u+b −u0b)− (u0P −u−P )]+p[2(u+l −u0l )+(u+P −u−P )+(u+P −u0P )− (u+b −u0b)].
The second summand is non-negative because u+b − u0b ≤ u+P − u−P as above.
Proof of Lemma 5. If p ≤ η and ∆b ≥ w(η) +u+b −u0b , the mix1(D,C) or the sep(D,C)
equilibrium is played in case of public evaluation, whereas the separating equilibrium
is played if the evaluation is private. Following the same argument as in the proof of
Lemma 4, it is immediate that the aggregate welfare is weakly increased by revealing the
evaluation.
Proofs of Section 1.2
Proof of Lemma 6. If the evaluation is private and p > η, the equilibrium analysis is
analogous to Lemma 1. Here, we only briefly discuss the resulting equilibria.
In all equilibria, the principal delegates after observing xl and centralizes otherwise. The
biased agent then strictly prefers xl if αu−b + (1 − α)u+b > αu+b + (1 − α)u0b , which is
equivalent to
α <
u+b − u0b
(u+b − u0b) + (u+b − u−b )
= αb(0) =: αb.
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Otherwise, he plays a separating equilibrium, and he mixes between strategies in case of
equality. The principal’s payoff in the pooling equilibrium is given by
E[ΠU |α < αb] = pu+P + (1− p)[αu+P + (1− α)u−P ]− w(p),
which increases in α. On the other hand, the principal’s payoff in the separating equilib-
rium is given by
E[ΠU |α > αb] = pu+P + (1− p)[αu−P + (1− α)u0P ]− w(p),
which decreases in α. Thus, it is optimal for the principal to choose α = αb, in which case
his payoff is given by
E[ΠU |α = αb] = pu+P + (1− p)λ[αbu+P + (1− αb)u−P ]
+ (1− p)(1− λ)[αbu−P + (1− αb)u0P ]− w(p).
Proof of Lemma 7. If the evaluation is public and p > η, the equilibrium analysis is
analogous to Lemma 2. Here, we only briefly discuss the resulting equilibria.
In all equilibria, the principal delegates after observing xl and centralizes otherwise. In a
pooling equilibrium, for the biased agent to strictly prefer xl, it has to hold that
αu−b + (1− α)u+b + (1− α)w(p) > αu+b + (1− α)u0b
⇔ α < w(p) + (u
+
b − u0b)
w(p) + (u+b − u0b) + (u+b − u−b )
= αb(p).
On the other hand, a separating equilibrium is played if
αu−b + (1− α)u+b + (1− α)w(1) < αu+b + (1− α)u0b
⇔ α > w(1) + (u
+
b − u0b)
w(1) + (u+b − u0b) + (u+b − u−b )
= αb(1).
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Finally, the biased agent randomizes between strategies if
αu−b + (1− α)u+b + (1− α)w(µ+) = αu+b + (1− α)u0b
⇔ α = w(µ+) + (u
+
b − u0b)
w(µ+) + (u+b − u0b) + (u+b − u−b )
= αb(µ+) (A1.2)
and µ+ ∈ [p, 1] if and only if α ∈ [αb(p), αb(1)]. The principal’s payoff in the pooling
equilibrium is given by
E[ΠO|α < αb(p)] = pu+P + (1− p)[αu+P + (1− α)u−P ]− w(p),
which increases in α. On the other hand, the principal’s payoff in the separating equilib-
rium is given by
E[ΠO|α > αb(1)] = pu+P + (1− p)[αu−P + (1− α)u0P ]− αw(p)− (1− α)pw(1),
which decreases in α if pw(1)−w(p) ≤ (1− p)(u0P − u−P ). Thus, in this case it is optimal
for the principal to choose α ∈ [αb(p), αb(1)], in which case his payoff is given by
E[ΠO|α] = pu+P + (1− p)λ[αu+P + (1− α)u−P ] + (1− p)(1− λ)[αu−P + (1− α)u0P ]
− αw(p)− (1− α)[p+ (1− p)λ]w(µ+).
Furthermore, from (A1.2) we conclude that w(µ+) = α1−α(u
+
b − u−b )− (u+b − u0b).
Proof of Lemma 8.
If u0b > u−b , the biased agent chooses xb in the penultimate period. He chooses xb again
in the period before if u+b + δu0b + δ2u0b ≥ u−b + δu+b + δ2u0b , or δ ≤
u+
b
−u−
b
u+
b
−u0
b
, which is always
the case as u0b > u−b and hence
u+
b
−u−
b
u+
b
−u0
b
> 1. So the biased agent chooses xb again in period
N − 2. By induction, we see that the biased agent chooses xb in period N −n, given that
67
Delegation and Interim Performance Evaluation
he has chosen xb in period N − (n− 1) if
u+b +
n∑
k=1
δku0b︸ ︷︷ ︸
C after xb
≥ u−b + δu+b +
n∑
k=2
δku0b︸ ︷︷ ︸
xb in N − (n− 1), then C
,
or δ ≤ u
+
b
−u−
b
u+
b
−u0
b
. If u0b = u−b , the biased agent plays a mixed strategy in the penultimate
period. He chooses xb in the period before if
u+b + δu0b + δ2u0b ≥ u−b + δ[λ(u−b + δu+b ) + (1− λ)(u+b + δu0b)],
which is equivalent to δ ≤ 1, where we used u−b = u0b . For all prior periods, the same
argument applies as in case u0b > u−b . Furthermore, if the principal observes xl, he knows
that the agent is loyal, thus his best reply is to delegate the decision again. However, if
he observes xb, the agent is biased with certainty and the principal maximizes his future
payoff by centralizing until the last period.
Proof of Lemma 9.
If u0b < u−b , the biased agent chooses xl in the penultimate period. If we add a period,
the biased agent again chooses xl if and only if u−b + δu−b + δ2u+b ≥ u+b + δu0b + δ2u0b , or,
equivalently, δ ≥ u
+
b
−u−
b
u+
b
−u0
b
. Now u
+
b
−u−
b
u+
b
−u0
b
< 1 as u0b < u−b and the biased agent pools if δ is
large enough. By induction, the biased agent pools in period N −n given that he chooses
xl in period N − (n− 1) if and only if
u−b +
n−1∑
k=1
δku−b + δnu+b︸ ︷︷ ︸
xl until last period
≥ u+b +
n∑
k=1
δku0b︸ ︷︷ ︸
C after xb
,
or δ ≥ u
+
b
−u−
b
u+
b
−u0
b
, which gives us the same constraint as before. Moreover, if the principal
observes xl, he does not update his prior belief. But as we assume p ≥ η, his best reply
is to delegate the decision. If he observed the off-equilibrium outcome xb, the rational
beliefs assumption requests that the principal infers that the agent is biased. Thus, his
best reply is to centralize in all future periods if he observes xb.
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Proof of Lemma 10.
If ∆b ≥ w(1) + u+b − u0b , that is, u0b − u−b ≥ w(1), the biased agent chooses xb in the
penultimate period. He chooses xb again in the period before if
u+b + δu0b + δ2u0b ≥ u−b + δ(u+b + w(p)) + δ2u0b ,
which is equivalent to δ ≤ u
+
b
−u−
b
u+
b
−u0
b
+w(p) , which is always the case as w(p) < w(1) ≤ u
0
b − u−b
in the separating equilibrium and hence u
+
b
−u−
b
u+
b
−u0
b
+w(p) > 1. So the biased agent chooses xb
again in period t = N − 2 – recall that Period N is the last one. By induction, we see
that the biased agent chooses xb in period N − n, given that he has chosen xb in period
N − (n− 1) if
u+b +
n∑
k=1
δku0b︸ ︷︷ ︸
C after xb
≥ u−b + δ(u+b + w(p)) +
n∑
k=2
δku0b︸ ︷︷ ︸
xb in T − (n− 1), then C
,
which again yields δ ≤ u
+
b
−u−
b
u+
b
−u0
b
+w(p) . If ∆b ∈ (w(p) + u
+
b − u−b , w(1) + u+b − u−b ), the biased
agent plays a mixed strategy in the penultimate period. He chooses xb before if
u+b + δu0b + δ2u0b > u−b + δ[w(p) + λ(u−b + δ(u+b + w(µ+))) + (1− λ)(u+b + δu0b)]
⇔ δ[w(p) + δλw(µ+)] > (1 + δλ)[(u+b − u−b )− δ(u+b − u0b)].
The latter inequality holds because w(p) < w(µ+) = u0b − u−b , thus
δ[w(p) + δλw(µ+)] < δ(1 + δλ)w(µ+) = δ(1 + δλ)(u0b − u−b )
≤ (1 + δλ)[(u+b − u−b )− δ(u+b − u0b)].
With regard to the principal’s equilibrium strategy, the same argument as in the proof of
Lemma 8 applies and the grim-trigger strategy is the principal’s unique subgame perfect
best reply.
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Proof of Lemma 11.
If ∆b ≤ w(p) + u+b − u0b , the biased agent chooses xl in the penultimate period. If we add
a period, the biased agent again chooses xl if and only if
u−b + δ(u−b + w(p)) + δ2(u+b + w(p)) ≥ u+b + δu0b + δ2u0b ,
or δ ≥ u
+
b
−u−
b
u+
b
−u0
b
+w(p) . Now
u+
b
−u−
b
u+
b
−u0
b
+w(p) ≤ 1 as w(p) ≥ u
0
b − u−b and the biased agent pools if
δ is large enough. By induction, the biased agent pools in Period N − n given that he
chooses xl in Period N − (n− 1) if and only if
u−b +
n−1∑
k=1
δk(u−b + w(p)) + δn(u+b + w(p))︸ ︷︷ ︸
xl until last period
≥ u+b +
n∑
k=1
δku0b︸ ︷︷ ︸
C after xb
,
which yields again δ ≥ u
+
b
−u−
b
u+
b
−u0
b
+w(p) . With the same argument as in Lemma 9, the grim-
trigger strategy is the principal’s unique subgame perfect best reply consistent with the
Intuitive Criterion.
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Chapter 2
Communicating with Extreme or
Conservative Agents
A central challenge organizations face is that information is often dispersed across hierar-
chies, yielding a lack of relevant factual knowledge among decision makers. Subordinate
managers, for example, are often much better informed about consumer needs, competitive
pressure, or market opportunities than their superiors. However, sharing this information,
even if communication is costless, turns out to be difficult if the informed agent follows
a private agenda. While the agent has some incentive to steer the uninformed principal
into the right direction by disclosing relevant information, she conveys her knowledge to
a certain extent only, in order to prevent the principal from overruling her preferences.
This imperfect transmission of information due to conflicts of interest might cause the
organization to take erroneous project decisions or allocate resources inefficiently, thereby
reducing firm value. In this chapter, we first analyze how effective strategic communica-
tion can be in a general setting, where the preference divergence between principal and
agent might depend on the environment the organization faces. Second, we study delega-
tion as an alternative to strategic communication and analyze the optimal allocation of
authority.
Starting from the seminal paper by Crawford and Sobel (1982; henceforth: [CS]), a vast
majority of the literature on cheap talk has so far focused on situations where the prin-
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cipal and the agent disagree about the right course of action in all states of the world.
In other words, the agent exhibits a systematic bias, independent of the actual state of
the world, implying that his preference constantly differs from the principal’s. Examples
for such systematic biases include status-quo biases or empire building, that is, managers
are inclined to cause their division or department to grow beyond the optimal size (see
Jensen, 1986). In fact, there exists ample empirical evidence for empire building in com-
panies (e.g. Shin and Kim, 2002; Chen at al., 2008; Hope and Thomas, 2008; Mortal and
Reisel, 2012; Du et al., 2013) and governments (Levinson, 2005). Similarly, Dessein (2002;
henceforth: [D]) assumes the agent to exhibit a purely systematic bias when comparing
communication to delegation in order to characterize the optimal allocation of decision
rights by the principal.
In contrast, Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2008; henceforth: [ADM]) analyze a sit-
uation where the agent has no systematic bias, but the preference divergence between
principal and agent depends on some state of the world. In their model, two division
managers need to coordinate and adapt to specific local circumstances. Hence, if both di-
visions operate in some status quo, adaptation is not an issue and both division managers
coordinate on the same project. However, if local conditions change, their preferences
increasingly differ from each other. Generally speaking, the principal and the agent agree
on the preferred project choice as long as the state of the world represents some status
quo, and they increasingly disagree in more extreme situations. However, [ADM] assume
that the agent prefers more extreme projects than the principal, in the sense that he
exaggerates extreme states relative to the principal.
In reality, it is likely that a manager exhibits both a state-dependent and a systematic
bias. Imagine for example a production manager who on the one hand exaggerates the
need for investment into a new plant in times of increasing demand if his preferences are
extreme, or understates deconstruction exigences in a shrinking market if he is rather
conservative. On the other hand, he requests a minimum investment level independent of
the demand situation in order to maintain or strengthen his position in the organization.
In our model, we thus combine and generalize the above approaches by allowing the
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agent to exhibit both a systematic and a state-dependent bias, such that the preference
divergence is an arbitrary linear function of the state of the world.1 In particular, we allow
for the possibility that the agent prefers more conservative choices than the principal.
Furthermore, the agent might exhibit reversed preferences with regard to the principal’s,
that is, his preferred project decreases in the state of the world while the principal’s
preference increases.
In line with [CS], [D] and [ADM], we assume that information is soft in the sense that
it cannot be verified by the principal. Furthermore, the principal is not able to credibly
condition his decision on the received information, thus communication takes the form of
cheap talk (see [CS]). The only formal mechanism the principal is able to commit to is
the ex ante allocation of decision rights. In this setting, assuming that the state of the
world is uniformly distributed, we first characterize the equilibria of the communication
game for an arbitrary linear preference divergence between principal and agent. Second,
we compare the principal’s payoff from retaining authority and communicating with the
agent to his utility from delegating the agent decision rights.
Our first major finding is that communication can be infinitely informative in equilibrium,
in the sense that the agent can send one out of countably infinitely many messages, if
and only if the state of agreement between the principal and the agent is realized with
positive probability – provided that the agent prefers more extreme projects than the
principal. This finding implies the respective results by both [CS] and [ADM] as limiting
cases. While [CS] shows that the agent can only choose between finitely many messages
in equilibrium if the principal and the agent never agree about the right course of action,
[ADM] assume that the agreement state coincides with the expected state of the world
and find that communication can be infinitely informative. However, if the agent is
conservative in the sense that he understates the impact of extreme states, we show that
communication can never be infinitely informative. Finally, if the agent’s preference is
even reversed, communication does not reveal any information.
1To the best of our knowledge, the only paper considering general linear biases, like the present
analysis, is Melumad and Shibano (1991). However, they focus on finite equilibrium partitions, while we
characterize when infinitely informative communication is feasible.
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Essential for these findings is that the agent’s incentive to misrepresent his private in-
formation is qualitatively different depending on whether he is more extreme or more
conservative than the principal. If the agent is extreme, messages far away from the
agreement state have to be very noisy in equilibrium in order to make the exaggeration
of private information costly for the agent. In contrast, if the state of the world is close
to the agreement state, the agent has only slight incentives to distend it and the noise
in communication becomes infinitesimally small, yielding an infinitely fine choice set of
messages in equilibrium. On the other hand, a conservative agent tends to distort the
report about the actual situation towards the agreement state, hence messages around
the agreement state are very noisy in equilibrium. While this noisiness decreases if the
realized state becomes more extreme, it never reduces to zero as the preference divergence
increases in the extremeness of the state. Hence, a conservative agent chooses between
finitely many different messages in equilibrium.
Our second major result is that communication may be informative and dominate delega-
tion from the principal’s point of view if the agent’s bias is sufficiently large. This stands
in contrast to [D], who shows that in case the agent exhibits a purely systematic bias,
delegation is the principal’s preferred policy as soon as communication is informative,
rendering informative communication impossible from an ex ante perspective.
Finally, we test the robustness of these two major findings with regard to general dis-
tributions of the state of the world. In this context, we provide necessary and sufficient
conditions for communication to be informative and for communication to be infinitely
informative. Comparing the performance of delegation and communication for symmetric
distributions with compact support, we find that the principal’s expected utility loss
incurred by communication is an infinite times larger than his loss from delegation if the
preference divergence vanishes – which is in line with [D]. If the agent’s bias is large,
however, we show that the principal prefers communication to delegation as soon as
the agent’s preference is extreme enough with regard to the principal’s, independent
of the distribution of the state of the world. Hence, it is always possible to find a
bias such that communication is informative and dominates delegation. This is in
74
Communicating with Extreme or Conservative Agents
contrast to [D], as his result implies that communication is uninformative whenever it
is the preferred policy, given that the variance of the state of the world is sufficiently large.
Further Related Literature.
Allowing for the preference divergence to depend on the state of the world, we first see
that communication can become more informative than assuming a purely systematic bias.
Building on the seminal paper by [CS], several articles propose other remedies to improve
the precision of information transmission, such as including noise into the agent’s signal
(Blume et al., 2007), repeated communication (Farrell and Gibbons, 1989; Krishna and
Morgan, 2004), multiple receivers (Battaglini, 2002), or multi-dimensional action spaces
(Chakraborty and Harbaugh, 2007, 2010). Goltsman et al. (2009) analyze the efficiency
bounds of communication by comparing different institutional arrangements. In fact, a
fully revealing communication equilibrium can be achieved if the sender incurs lying cost
or the receiver is credulous (Kartik et al., 2007), or if the receiver has private information
while the sender suffers honesty concerns (Olszewski, 2004). However, a vast majority
of the literature following [CS] assumes the agent’s bias to be purely systematic. We
are aware of two exceptions, Alonso et al. (2008, 2010), who explicitly consider strategic
communication with a state-dependent bias.
Second, our model is based on the assumption that the principal cannot commit to
message-contingent project choices, following [D]. In contrast, a recent strand of the
delegation literature assumes that the principal can credibly commit to a mechanism
selecting a predefined project for any given message by the agent (e.g. Alonso and Ma-
touschek, 2008; Kováč and Mylovanov, 2009; Koessler and Martimort, 2012). The optimal
mechanism from the principal’s point of view then mostly takes the form of a partly
separating equilibrium, that is, the principal rubber-stamps the agent’s recommendation
in a predefined range of the state of the world. It is worth noting that the principal
chooses menu delegation in this framework if his commitment power is reduced, which
is equivalent to a partition equilibrium in the analysis of strategic communication (see
Melumad and Shibano, 1991, or Alonso and Matouschek, 2007). An alternative perspec-
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tive on delegation is that it might provide incentives for the agent to acquire relevant
information (Aghion and Tirole, 1997) or to exert project implementation effort (Bester
and Krähmer, 2008). However, we assume the information structure to be exogenous and
refrain from modeling the project implementation stage.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.1 introduces the model for
uniformly distributed states of the world. Communication equilibria are characterized in
Section 2.1.1, while Section 2.1.2 analyzes the optimal allocation of authority. Section 2.2
generalizes the analysis to arbitrary distributions and Section 2.3 concludes. All technical
proofs are gathered in the appendix.
2.1 The Model
We consider an organization which has to decide about the implementation of a project
x ∈ X ⊂ R. A principal, such as the owner of the firm or the group of shareholders, hires
an agent (e.g. a manager) to implement the project, however the principal has the formal
authority to decide which project shall be implemented – for instance because he controls
firm assets or other resources needed for the implementation. Projects are assumed to
differ only in one dimension.2 A common way to interpret this dimension is to think of
investment sizes or the allocation of (human) resources to a specific project. While there
is an infinity of potential project choices, only one of them can be implemented.
Preferences. Each project choice is associated with a monetary gain or a personal benefit
UP (x, θ) for the principal and UA(x, θ, b) for the agent, where θ ∈ Θ := [−L,L] denotes
a randomly drawn state of the world and b ∈ R2 parametrizes the dissonance between
principal and agent. Without loss of generality, we assume that the state of the world
reflects the principal’s optimal project choice, for example the optimal investment level
2Alternatively, projects differ along several qualitative dimensions, but only one dimension causes
disagreement between the principal and the agent.
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for a new plant from the perspective of the firm. Hence, the principal wants to match the
state of the world and his preferred project, conditional on the realization of θ, is given
by xP (θ) = θ.
The agent, in turn, exhibits deviating preferences. We assume that the agent might
exhibit both a systematic and a state-dependent bias. In other words, we allow for
a general linear bias b(θ) := ba + (bm + 1)θ, such that the agent’s preferred project
is given by xA(θ) = b(θ), with bm, ba ∈ R. Thus, preferences are everywhere aligned
if and only if ba = bm = 0. Slightly abusing notation, we often refer to the bias as
b = (bm, ba) ∈ R2, which parametrizes the preference divergence by its multiplicative part
(the agent’s relative sensitivity to changes in θ), bm, and its additive part (the agent’s
systematic bias), ba. Note that the agent either reacts stronger (bm > 0) or weaker
(bm < 0) to changes in θ than the principal. In particular, his preference might even be
reversed with regard to the principal’s (bm < −1).
By allowing for a general linear preference divergence between the principal and the agent,
our setup embeds the models of [CS], [D] and [ADM]. Indeed, if bm = 0, the agent exhibits
a purely systematic bias towards larger (smaller) projects, such that his optimal project
choice differs from the principal’s preference by some constant ba ∈ R and is given by
θ + ba. In our investment example, this is reminiscent of a production manager willing
to undertake inefficiently high investments into a new plant, independent of the market
situation, thereby growing his division beyond the optimal size in order to strengthen his
position in the organization (see, for instance, Jensen, 1986). This kind of systematic bias
is at the heart of both [CS] and [D]. On the other hand, if we fix ba = 0 and assume bm > 0,
the model setup is applicable to the situation in [ADM], where two division managers in
an organization need to coordinate and adapt their strategy to local conditions, yielding
a natural multiplicative structure. In their model, the agent prefers project (bm + 1)θ
with bm > 0 in any given state of the world. Hence, both principal and agent agree on
the optimal project choice in state θ0 = 0, but increasingly disagree the more θ deviates
from there. Table 2.1 illustrates the extended scope our model covers.
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bm < 0 bm = 0 bm > 0
ba < 0
[CS]*
[D]**ba = 0 [ADM]*
ba > 0
*Characterization of communication equilibria
**Optimal allocation of authority
Table 2.1: Illustration how the special cases of [CS], [D] and [ADM] are embedded in
our model. Communication equilibria have been analyzed for bm = 0 ([CS]) and ba = 0,
bm > 0 ([ADM]). [D] investigates the optimal allocation of authority in case bm = 0. We
analyze both aspects for all b = (bm, ba) ∈ R2.
We assume that utility functions are strictly concave in x for a given θ, such that the
optimal project choice for any given state of the world is unique. For simplicity, we assume
a quadratic functional form, that is
UP (x, θ) = −(x− θ)2
UA(x, θ, b) = −(x− b(θ))2.
Information Structure. The state of the world, θ, is assumed to be uniformly dis-
tributed on Θ = [−L,L], where L > 0. The variance of the distribution is denoted by
σ2 with σ2 = L23 for the uniform distribution.
3 While the agent fully learns the state
of the world, the principal stays uninformed. The superior information of the agent can
be interpreted as a manager having deeper knowledge of the market environment, while
shareholders do not have business insights. However, we assume that the agent’s infor-
mation is soft in the sense that it cannot be verified by the principal. All other aspects of
the relationship, such as the agent’s bias b(θ) and the maximal size of his informational
advantage due to the uncertainty of the environment, L, are common knowledge.
3Though the uniform distribution exhibits very special properties, it is conventional to use it in this
kind of problems. We relax this assumption and consider general distributions in Section 2.2.
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Contracts. We assume that the principal has the formal right to decide about the project,
for instance because he controls the assets or human resources of the organization, or,
referring to our investment example, he is in charge of its budget. We follow the literature
on incomplete contracts (e.g. Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990) and
assume that the project choice itself is not contractible. The principal can only commit
to the ex ante allocation of decision rights, for example by granting the agent the formal
right to underwrite investment contracts.4 Once this decision right is allocated, it cannot
be transferred before the project decision is made. If the principal delegates the formal
authority to the agent, the agent can initiate a project without the principal’s support.
On the other hand, if the principal retains decision authority, he initiates a project which
is then implemented by the agent and cannot be changed. In the latter case, the principal
can communicate with the better informed agent. However, the principal can neither
commit to message-contingent monetary transfers, nor to a mechanism conditioning the
project choice on the received information. Thus, communication takes the form of cheap
talk.
The timing of the model is as follows. (i) The principal decides whether or not to delegate
the formal decision right about the project to the agent. (ii) The agent learns the state
of the world θ and initiates her preferred project if he has decision authority. If the
principal has retained the decision rights, he may ask the agent for a recommendation
and then initiates a project. (iii) The agent implements the project.
The following section consists of two parts. In Section 2.1.1, we consider the case where
the principal keeps the decision right and characterize the communication equilibria for
all b := (bm, ba) ∈ R2, thereby generalizing the leading example in [CS] and the model
by [ADM]. Section 2.1.2 considers delegation as an alternative to communication and
analyzes the optimal allocation of decision rights.
4Similar to [D], we consider delegation a binary decision and abstain from analyzing optimal (partial)
delegation mechanisms.
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2.1.1 Communication Equilibria
The following characterization of communication equilibria for a general linear bias derives
from [CS], who analyzed the case where the principal and the agent disagree about the
preferred project in all states of the world.
We assume that the principal retains authority, but communication of soft information
between principal and agent is feasible. Since the project choice is not contractible, the
principal chooses his preferred project given his belief about the state of the world, µ,
where µ is a distribution on Θ. Communication is cheap in the sense that it can only
influence the principal’s belief, thus µ may depend on the message m ∈ Θ sent by the
agent. The agent, in turn, strategically transmits a possibly noisy message in order to
manipulate the principal’s belief.
Formally, a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the communication game is given by a mixed-
strategy communication rule p(m|θ) of the agent, a decision rule x(m) for the principal,5
and belief functions µ(θ|m) for the principal such that
• The agent’s communication rule is optimal given the principal’s decision rule.
For all θ ∈ Θ, if m∗ is in the support of p(·|θ), then m∗ solves
max
m∈Θ
UA(x(m), θ, b).
• The principal’s decision rule is optimal given his belief function.
For each message m, x(m) solves
max
x
∫
Θ
UP (x, θ)µ(θ|m)dθ.
• The belief functions are derived by Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
µ(θ|m) = p(m|θ)∫
Θ p(m|t)dt
.
5Since UP (x, θ) is strictly concave in x, the principal never uses mixed strategies in equilibrium;
see [CS].
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Following the argument by [CS], all equilibria in this communication game are given by
a partition of Θ, where the agent introduces noise to his signal by only specifying the
partition interval containing θ. Correspondingly, the principal implements his preferred
project given that θ lies in the specified partition interval.
In their leading example, [CS] consider the case bm = 0 and ba 6= 0, that is, xA(θ) 6= xP (θ)
for all θ ∈ Θ. In this case, any equilibrium partition consists of at most finitely many
intervals. Considering a general linear bias, the principal’s and the agent’s preferences are
aligned in θ0 := − babm , which realizes with positive probability if θ0 ∈ Θ = [−L,L]. In the
following, we show that Θ can be partitioned into countably infinitely many intervals in
the most informative equilibrium of the communication game if and only if this agreement
state θ0 lies in Θ and bm > 0. This is in line with an analysis by [ADM], who consider a
purely multiplicative positive bias, i.e. ba = 0 and bm > 0. Here, the agreement state is
θ0 = 0, which is contained in Θ = [−L,L], thus the most informative equilibrium partition
consists of infinitely many intervals.
The Case bm > 0
We first analyze communication equilibria for the case bm > 0, indicating that the agent
is extreme in the sense that xA(θ) reacts stronger to a change in θ than xP (θ).
Let aN := (a0, a1, . . . , aN−1, aN) denote a partition of [−L,L] in N intervals, where −L =
a0 < a1 < . . . < aN−1 < aN = L. If the principal believes that θ is uniformly distributed
on [ai−1, ai] for some i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, he implements
xi = arg max
x
∫ ai
ai−1
UP (x, θ)dθ = E[θ|θ ∈ [ai−1, ai]] =
ai−1 + ai
2 .
In equilibrium, given that the agent truthfully reports the interval containing θ by sending
a message m ∈ [ai−1, ai], the principal’s best response is to implement x(m) = xi.
On the other hand, if θ ∈ [ai−1, ai], the agent sends a truthful message m ∈ [ai−1, ai] if
UA(xi, θ, b) ≥ UA(xj, θ, b) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. As xA(θ) is increasing in θ for bm > 0,
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this requirement is equivalent to the agent being indifferent between implementing xi and
xi+1 if θ = ai, which yields the arbitrage condition
UA(xi+1, ai) = UA(xi, ai) ∀i ∈ {1 . . . N − 1} . (A)
As ai < ai+1, (A) is equivalent to
ai+1 − ai = ai − ai−1 + 4(ba + bmai).
Condition (A) illustrates the “screening” resulting in equilibrium. The agent is induced
to tell the truth by the fact that messages are noisy if they are “large” (“small”) whenever
the agent exhibits a positive (negative) systematic bias, or if the realized state of the
world is far away from θ0. Intuitively, the agent’s message contains more noise, and is
therefore less credible, if the agent recommends a project which lies in the direction of his
bias.
More precisely, the size of the partition intervals increase by the difference between the
agent’s and the principal’s preferred project in the cutoff point ai between two partition
intervals. It turns out that the size of the partition intervals decreases up to the interval
I0 3 θ0, which includes the intersection of the principal’s and the agent’s preferences,
and increases thereafter. The smallest interval I0 lies further to the left (right) the larger
(smaller) ba is, and if |ba| > bmL, I0 is the first or last interval, thus interval lengths
increase (decrease) from left to right, resulting in a finite partition. The partition is
symmetric in the sense that the ith interval is of equal size as the (N − i + 1)th one if
and only if ba = 0.
Note that, if bm = 0, we obtain the standard result by [CS]. In this case, interval lengths
in an equilibrium partition constantly increase from left to right (right to left) by 4|ba| if
ba > 0 (ba < 0), thus inducing a finite partition of the compact set [−L,L]. If ba = 0, the
relation between the sizes of partition intervals in equilibrium can be found in [ADM].
This yields Proposition 1, where we characterize the maximum number of partition inter-
vals in equilibrium, N(b), for any bias b = (bm, ba) with bm > 0.
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Proposition 1 (Communication Equilibria). If bm > 0, there exists a positive integer
N(b) ≤ ∞ such that, for every integer N with 1 ≤ N ≤ N(b), there exists at least one
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (p(m|θ), x(m), µ(θ|m)) of the communication game, where
1. x(m) = ai−1+ai2 if m ∈ (ai−1, ai)
2. p(m|θ) is uniform on [ai−1, ai] if θ ∈ (ai−1, ai)
3. µ(θ|m)) is uniform on [ai−1, ai] if m ∈ (ai−1, ai)
4. ai+1 − ai = ai − ai−1 + 4(ba + bmai) for all i ∈ {1 . . . N − 1}
5. −L = a0 < a1 < . . . < aN−1 < aN = L.
Moreover, N(b) is implicitly given by the largest positive integer N such that
|ba| <
(cN + 1)(cN−1 + 1)
(cN − 1)(cN−1 − 1)bmL, (M)
where c := 1 + 2bm +
√
(1 + 2bm)2 − 1. In particular, N(b) =∞ if and only if
|ba| ≤ bmL.
In the following, we say that communication is informative if there exists a Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium of the communication game with N ≥ 2. Moreover, we define
communication in b1 to be more (less) informative than communication in b2 if and only
if N(b1) > (<)N(b2). If N(b) = ∞, we say that communication is infinitely informative.
Note that in this case, communication is still noisy because [−L,L] is partitioned into
countably infinitely many intervals, where the agent truthfully reveals the interval which
contains θ. In contrast, if the agent directly communicates θ, which is the case if and only
if bm = ba = 0, we refer to communication as being perfect.
Proposition 1 shows in particular that the number of partition intervals in equilibrium
is not bounded above if and only if the state where the principal and the agent agree
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about the project choice, θ0 = − babm , realizes with positive probability. In that case, the
agent’s incentive to add noise to his message is rather weak as θ approaches θ0 because
the principal’s preferred project does not deviate too much from the agent’s preference.
This result generalizes both the analysis by [CS] and by [ADM].
First, if bm = 0 as in [CS], the preferences of principal and agent do not intersect, and the
number of partition intervals is finite in equilibrium since interval lengths are constantly
increasing. Indeed, taking the limit of the right-hand side in (M) as bm vanishes, or
equivalently, as c approaches 1, yields the corresponding result in [CS], as summarized in
Corollary 1.
Corollary 1. If bm = 0, the number of partition intervals in equilibrium is finite,
i.e. N(b) <∞, and N(b) is given by the maximum N such that
|ba| <
L
N(N − 1) .
Second, [ADM] consider the case ba = 0 and bm > 0, thus the preferences of the principal
and the agent intersect in θ0 = 0, which realizes with positive probability for any bm > 0.
In this case, we can find a partition equilibrium for any N ∈ N, such that interval lengths
decrease up to θ0 = 0, and symmetrically increase thereafter. The status quo, θ0, either
lies in the middle of the centered partition interval (if N odd) or constitutes the interval
border between the two middle intervals (if N even). Their result is obtained by assuming
ba = 0 in Proposition 1, which yields N(b) =∞ for all b = (0, bm) with bm > 0.
Corollary 2. If ba = 0, for all N ∈ N there exists an equilibrium of the communication
game with N partition intervals, that is, N(b) =∞ for all bm > 0.
Comparative Statics. Qualitatively analogous to [CS], if we fix the state-dependent
part bm > 0 of the bias, a reduction in the systematic preference divergence, |ba|, results in
a more informative communication equilibrium. In fact, N(b) increases up to infinity for
small values of |ba|. In other words, reducing the systematic bias of the agent eventually
yields a communication equilibrium with infinitely many partition intervals. On the other
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hand, if we set the systematic bias ba to some non-zero value, reducing the slope difference
between the preferences, bm, eventually renders communication less informative, where
the number of partition intervals in the most informative equilibrium depends on the
size of |ba| if bm vanishes. Intuitively, if the slopes of both preferences become more
and more aligned, the potential state of agreement moves further to the border of the
support of θ until it is not realized any more with positive probability and N(b) < ∞.
The further this agreement state moves away from the possibility of being realized, the
larger is the minimal preference divergence between principal and agent in the support of
θ and the less informative is the communication equilibrium. Finally, considering a fixed
bias b = (bm, ba) with bm > 0, increasing the agent’s informational advantage, L, results
in more informative communication because the minimal preference divergence within
the relevant range of θ decreases.
Equilibrium Selection. It remains to argue which of the equilibria will be played by
the agent and the principal. In an equilibrium with N partition intervals, the principal’s
ex ante expected utility is given by
E[UP (x, θ)] = −σ2N ,
where σ2N := E[(θ − E[θ|m])2] denotes the residual variance of θ in an equilibrium with
N partition intervals. Since σ2N decreases in N if bm > 0, as we will show in Lemma 2,
the principal prefers the equilibrium with the maximum number of partition intervals.
Following the argument in [ADM], we assume that the organization is able to coordinate
on the equilibrium that maximizes corporate profits, represented by the principal’s utility.
Thus, we focus on the equilibrium with the largest number of partition intervals if bm > 0.
It is worth noting that in case the preference divergence depends on the state of the world,
the agent’s ex ante expected utility is not necessarily increasing in the number of intervals
in the equilibrium partition. In fact, the interaction of the project implemented by the
principal after communication and the state of the world enters the agent’s expected
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utility, thus it depends on the particular bias b = (bm, ba) whether the agent is better off
with a finer equilibrium partition. In contrast, if the dissonance is independent of the state
of the world, as in [CS], the agent’s expected loss equals the residual variance plus the
square of the systematic bias, thus the more informative equilibrium Pareto-dominates
the less informative one.
It remains to confirm that the construction in Proposition 1 continues to constitute a
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium if the number of partition intervals is countably infinite.
The according result in [ADM] turns out to hold for the general context considered here.
Proposition 2. Let |ba| ≤ bmL. Then the limit of strategy profiles (p(m|θ), x(m)) and
beliefs µ(θ|m) for N →∞ is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
The proof of Proposition 2 follows closely the proof of Proposition 2 in [ADM]. Figure
2.1 illustrates the number of partition intervals in the most informative equilibrium of the
communication game, for any given b = (bm, ba) with bm > 0.
0.2 0.4
bm
-0.5L
0
0.5L
ba
NHbL= ¥
4<NHbL< ¥
NHbL=4
NHbL=3
NHbL=2
NHbL=1
Figure 2.1: Maximum number of partition intervals in an equilibrium of the communica-
tion game for a given b = (bm, ba) with bm > 0.
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The Case bm < 0
If the multiplicative part of the agent’s bias, bm, is negative, we distinguish two cases.
First, if bm < −1, the agent’s preference is reversed with regard to the principal’s preferred
project. Hence, in order to induce the agent to reveal the interval containing θ, the project
implemented by the principal has to decrease in θ. But such a decreasing pattern can never
be a best response of the principal to a truthful message by the agent, thus communication
is not informative in equilibrium.
Second, if bm ∈ (−1, 0), the agent is conservative in the sense that his preference reacts
weaker to a deviation of θ from the agreement state than the principal’s. Though this
is not obvious at first glance, it turns out that the direction of the preference divergence
has a fundamental impact on the informativeness of communication. In fact, in Section
2.1.1, we considered an extreme agent who has an incentive to exaggerate the deviation
of θ from the agreement state. In order to induce truth telling, the agent’s message thus
has to be rather noisy in equilibrium for states far away from the agreement state θ0. As
θ approaches θ0, however, truth telling is a negligible issue and communication can be
infinitely informative.
In contrast, if bm ∈ (−1, 0), the agent is conservative, hence he underestimates deviations
of the state of the world from the agreement state. In this case, the agent has an incentive
to bias his report towards θ0, thus an equilibrium has to induce more noise on messages
around the agreement state. However, for states near the borders of [−L,L], the preference
divergence between principal and agent is bounded away from zero, thus communication
has to include some minimum noise in order to induce truth telling by the agent. Hence,
communication cannot be infinitely informative in this case, as opposed to the case of an
extreme agent.
From a technical point of view, while the expression for ai in terms of c in the proof
of Proposition 1 continues to hold, the main monotonicity results are no longer true.
Indeed, if bm < −1, it is not clear whether c is positive or negative, and for bm ∈ (−1, 0),
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c is no longer a real number.6 Hence, communication equilibria have to be calculated
recursively on a case-by-case basis. Still, we obtain a clear result for when communication
is informative.
Proposition 3 (Communication Equilibria). If bm < 0, there exists a positive integer
N(b) < ∞ such that, for every integer N with 1 ≤ N ≤ N(b), there exists at least one
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (p(m|θ), x(m), µ(θ|m)) of the communication game satisfy-
ing conditions 1 to 5 in Proposition 1.
In particular, communication is informative (N(b) ≥ 2) if and only if bm ≥ −1 and
|ba| <
|2bm + 1|
2 L.
Furthermore, N(b) > 2 is only possible if bm > −12 .
Note that, if the agent and the principal never agree about the project choice, the agent’s
systematic bias has to be small enough relative to his informational advantage in order
to render communication informative. Corollary 3 derives the respective result by [CS].
Corollary 3. If bm = 0, communication is informative (N(b) ≥ 2) if and only if
|ba| <
L
2 .
In contrast to the case bm > 0, the length of partition intervals increases up to the interval
I0 3 θ0, and decreases thereafter. Due to its compactness, the support [−L,L] thus can
not contain an accumulation point of {ai}, hence N(b) < ∞. Figure 2.2 provides an
intuition for the informativeness of communication for any bias b = (bm, ba) with bm < 0.
Comparative Statics. Analogous to [CS], we find that reducing the systematic bias |ba|
for a given bm < 0 increases the informativeness of communication up to a finite number,
which depends on bm. However, if we fix the systematic bias ba, the informativeness of
6Of course, we still have ai ∈ R.
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Figure 2.2: Maximum number of partition intervals in an equilibrium of the communica-
tion game for a given b = (bm, ba) with bm < 0.
communication is no longer monotone in |bm|. Still, the most informative equilibrium is
reached if |bm| vanishes. In contrast to the case bm > 0, aligning the sensitivity of the
agent’s and the principal’s preference with regard to deviations in θ eventually results in
more informative communication. The reason here is that the agent’s incentive to bias
his report towards the agreement state decreases in |bm|, hence the noisiness of messages
in equilibrium is reduced for states near θ0 and the equilibrium partition can be finer.
Finally, if the agent’s informational advantage, L, increases, communication is more likely
to be informative (N(b) ≥ 2).
Equilibrium Selection. In addition to the non-monotonicity of the informativeness of
communication, we find that, if the agent reacts weaker to changes in θ than the principal
(bm ∈ (−1, 0)), the residual variance in an equilibrium with N partition intervals, σ2N ,
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is no longer monotone in N . Hence, the most informative equilibrium is not necessarily
preferred to the remaining ones from the principal’s point of view, and we cannot apply
the equilibrium selection criterion as in the case bm > 0. Still, we are able to state that
whenever communication is informative, the principal prefers the coarsest communication
equilibrium with N = 2 to taking an uninformed decision.
Remark 1. The principal prefers communication with two intervals in the equilibrium
partition to uninformative communication, i.e. σ22 < σ21 = σ2 = L
2
3 .
Yet, we will see in Section 2.1.2 that the analysis of the optimal allocation of authority
does not rely on equilibrium selection if bm ∈ (−1, 0).
2.1.2 Communication Versus Delegation
After having characterized communication equilibria for all b ∈ R2, we now consider
delegation as an alternative to communication. By comparing the principal’s expected
utilities of both alternatives, we analyze the optimal allocation of authority from the
principal’s perspective.
If the principal formally delegates decision authority to the agent, he expects a disutility,
or loss, of
δ2 := E
[
(ba + (bm + 1)θ − θ)2
]
= b2a + b2mσ2 = b2a + b2m
L2
3 .
In contrast, his respective expected loss if he retains authority and communicates with
the agent, is given by the residual variance of θ, conditional on receiving a message m ∈ Θ
in an equilibrium with N partition intervals,
σ2N = E[(θ − E[θ|m])2] =
1
2L
N∑
i=1
∫ ai
ai−1
(θ − E[θ|m ∈ [ai−1, ai]])2dθ.
Lemma 1 determines the residual variance depending on the number of partition intervals
for any b ∈ R2.
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Lemma 1. The residual variance in an equilibrium with N partition intervals is given by
σ2N =
L2
12
(c− 1)2
(cN − 1)2
[
c2N + cN + 1
c2 + c+ 1 + 3c
N−1
]
+ 4c
2b2a
(c− 1)2(cN + 1)2
[
c2N + cN + 1
c2 + c+ 1 − c
N−1
]
,
with c = 1 + 2bm +
√
(1 + 2bm)2 − 1. Furthermore, σ2N ∈ R for all b ∈ R2.
The latter remark ensures that, even if c ∈ C for bm ∈ (−1, 0), the residual variance
is always a real number. In particular, if the agent’s and the principal’s preferences
have the same slope, i.e. bm = 0, the residual variance coincides with the result in [CS].
Furthermore, the residual variance in case ba = 0 can be found in [ADM].
Corollary 4. If bm vanishes, the residual variance in an equilibrium with N partition
intervals is given by
lim
bm→0
σ2N =
L2
3N2 +
N2 − 1
3 b
2
a.
In the following, we will say that communication dominates delegation if the principal’s
expected disutility from communication is smaller than his expected disutility from dele-
gation, and vice versa.
The Case bm > 0
In order to compare the expected loss incurred by delegation to the expected loss from
communication, we first show that the quality of communication increases in the number
of partition intervals up to the maximally possible number, N(b), if bm > 0.
Lemma 2. For any b ∈ R2 with bm > 0, the residual variance σ2N decreases in N up to
N(b). Furthermore, if |ba| ≤ bmL, σ2N decreases for all N ∈ N, with
lim
N→∞
σ2N =
bm
4bm + 3
L2
3 +
b2a
bm(4bm + 3)
.
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It is worth noting that the residual variance increases in N for N > N(b). Hence, the
maximum number of partition intervals can also be derived from the maximum N such
that σ2N decreases. Proposition 4 implicitly defines curves in the (bm, ba)-plane for any
N(b) ∈ N, such that the principal prefers to communicate for biases to the right of the
respective curve, and delegates otherwise. It turns out that these curves converge to the
vertical line bm = 14 for N →∞, which delimits the area where communication performs
better than delegation if an equilibrium partition with infinitely many intervals is possible.
Proposition 4. Let bm > 0. Then communication dominates delegation in b ∈ R2 if and
only if
δ2 > σ2N(b).
If |ba| ≤ bmL, communication dominates delegation if and only if bm > 14 .
Figure 2.3 illustrates the curves limiting the area where communication outperforms dele-
gation for some N(b). We see that communication yields the highest payoffs, as indicated
by the most inner curve, exactly in an equilibrium with N(b) partition intervals for the
respective b ∈ R2. Connecting the segments of these inner curves for the respective N(b)
yields a separation between the inner area, where the principal delegates, and the area
outside the thick line, where communication is preferred.
In particular, we show that the case bm = 0, as considered in [D], is a limiting case.
[D] finds that communication is uninformative if it yields higher payoffs to the principal
than delegation, which is the case for large |ba|. Indeed, considering only the vertical
axis, we see that N(b) = 1 if bm = 0 and |ba| is larger than some value indicated by the
thick line. However, if we allow for a general linear bias, we find that communication can
outperform delegation and be informative if b = (bm, ba) is outside the thick-bordered area.
Comparative Statics. If bm = 0, we find in line with [D], that increasing the agent’s
informational advantage, L, renders delegation more likely. This is due to the fact that
the principal incurs a constant utility loss of b2a by delegating, while his minimal loss by
communicating is given by L23N(b)2 +
N(b)2−1
3 b
2
a. Since N(b) increases weakly (step-wise) in
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Figure 2.3: Comparison of the principal’s expected payoffs from delegation and communi-
cation in case bm > 0. Black curves indicate that for |ba| larger than the respective curve,
communication performs better than delegation in an equilibrium with N(b) partition
intervals, where N(b) is given by the integer attached to the respective curve. Assuming
that the most informative equilibrium is played, communication performs better than
delegation outside of the area limited by the thick line.
L, the principal’s minimal loss of communication increases, thus delegation becomes more
likely for large L. In contrast, if we consider bm > 0, we observe that an increase in L
can promote the likeliness of either communication or delegation, depending on bm. The
reason for this qualitative change is that the principal risks to incur a relatively huge utility
loss from delegation if the realized state is far away from the agreement state and bm > 0.
Hence, increasing the support [−L,L] of θ increases the principal’s expected utility loss
from delegation. In turn, the informativeness of communication eventually reaches infinity
as L increases. Furthermore, the expected utility loss from both communication and
delegation are of second order in L, thus the size of bm determines whether the loss of
communication or delegation increases faster with the agent’s informational advantage.
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The Case bm < 0
Considering negative biases, delegation is detrimental to the principal if preferences are
reversed, i.e. bm < −1. In this case, he retains authority and takes an uninformed decision
as communicating with the agent does not convey any information. On the other hand, if
bm ∈ (−1, 0) and communication is informative, it is preferred to delegation if ‖b‖ is large
enough. In particular, it turns out that whenever an equilibrium with N > 2 partition
intervals is possible, ‖b‖ is so small that delegation performs better than communication.
Hence, communication can only outperform delegation if it is not too informative.
Proposition 5. If bm < 0, communication dominates delegation if and only if
|ba| >
L√
3
√
1− b2m
or
|ba| <
L
4
√
3
|2bm + 1|
√√√√ 1− 4b2m
bm(bm + 1)
.
Furthermore, if communication dominates delegation, then N(b) ≤ 2.
It is worth noting that we do not need any monotonicity result nor an equilibrium selec-
tion device in order to characterize the area where communication dominates delegation.
Figure 2.4 summarizes the analysis of Section 2.1 for positive and negative bm. For biases
outside the thick-bordered area, communication performs better than delegation from the
principal’s point of view and colors indicate how informative a communication equilibrium
can maximally be.
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Figure 2.4: Comparison of delegation and communication and the maximum number of
partition intervals in equilibrium for any given b ∈ R2. Outside the area limited by the
thick curve, communication dominates delegation.
2.2 General Distributions
In this section, we test the robustness of our findings if we consider general distributions.
Let thus θ be distributed according to F (θ), with f(θ) denoting its density. We assume
that f is continuous and twice differentiable on its support supp(f) = (θL, θH), with
−∞ ≤ θL < θH ≤ +∞, thereby allowing for unbounded supports. Throughout this
section, we assume that bm > −1, such that b(θ) = ba + (bm + 1)θ is strictly increasing
in θ.
In Section 2.2.1, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for communication to
be informative for arbitrary distributions of θ. Moreover, we find a necessary condition
95
Communicating with Extreme or Conservative Agents
for the existence of communication equilibria with more than two partition intervals and
derive a condition for communication to be infinitely informative. Hence, our analysis
is complementary to [CS], who show that an equilibrium partition cannot contain an
accumulation point for any distribution of θ if bm = 0.
Considering symmetric distributions with compact support, Section 2.2.2 compares com-
munication to delegation and analyzes the optimal allocation of authority from the prin-
cipal’s point of view. In line with [D], we observe that communication performs badly
compared to delegation if ‖b‖ is small. If the preference divergence is large enough, how-
ever, we show that the principal prefers communication to delegation, independent of the
distribution of θ. This differs from the result in [D], which implies that for distributions
with large variance, communication is uninformative if it dominates delegation from the
principal’s point of view.
2.2.1 General Properties of Communication Equilibria
Let θL = a0 < a1 < . . . < aN−1 < aN = θH denote a partition of [θL, θH ].7 Then,
given that the agent truthfully signals the partition interval containing θ, the principal
implements xi = E[θ|θ ∈ (ai−1, ai)] if m ∈ (ai−1, ai). As xA(θ) = b(θ) is strictly increasing
in θ, the agent has an incentive to truthfully report [ai−1, ai] 3 θ if and only if the partition
satisfies the arbitrage condition
xi + xi+1 = 2b(ai). (A)
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}.8 If we assumeN = 2, and define h(a) := E[θ|θ < a]+E[θ|θ > a]
for a ∈ supp(f), the above condition is equivalent to
h(a1) = 2b(a1).
7If θL = −∞ and θH = +∞, we have a partition of the set of real numbers, where a0 and aN are
usually omitted.
8This holds independent of the distribution of θ.
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This yields the following lemma, providing a necessary and sufficient condition for com-
munication to be informative for arbitrary distributions of θ.
Lemma 3. Let supp(f) = (θL, θH) with −∞ ≤ θL < θH ≤ +∞ and bm > −1. For
a ∈ supp(f), we define
h(a) := E[θ|θ < a] + E[θ|θ > a].
Then communication is informative (N(b) ≥ 2) if and only if one of the following two
cases holds:
1. lima→θL h(a) > lima→θL 2b(a) and lima→θH h(a) < lima→θH 2b(a), or
2. lima→θL h(a) < lima→θL 2b(a) and lima→θH h(a) > lima→θH 2b(a).
Indeed, if we take a step back to the example where f is the uniform distribution on
[−L,L], the above two cases are equivalent to
1. bm > −12 and |ba| <
2bm+1
2 L, or
2. bm < −12 and |ba| < −
2bm+1
2 L, respectively,
yielding exactly the condition for communication to be informative if θ is uniformly dis-
tributed, as shown in Section 2.1.1. Furthermore, this same condition continues to char-
acterize informative communication if we generalize f to a symmetric and compactly
supported distribution. Lemma 3 illustrates this finding, which is akin to a result by [D].
Corollary 5. If f(θ) is symmetric and supported on [−L,L], then communication is
informative (N(b) ≥ 2) if and only if
|ba| <
|2bm + 1|
2 L.
Finally, for the uniform distribution we have seen that bm > −12 is a necessary condition
for N(b) > 2. In other words, a communication equilibrium with more than two partition
intervals can only exist in case 1 of Proposition 3 if θ is uniformly distributed. An
analogous condition for general distributions is derived in Lemma 4.
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Lemma 4. In an equilibrium with N > 2 partition intervals, it has to hold that
1. lima→θL h(a) > lima→θL 2b(a) and lima→θH h(a) < lima→θH 2b(a).
According to [CS], if xP (θ) 6= xA(θ) for all θ ∈ supp(f), the sequence {ai}∞i=0 represent-
ing an equilibrium partition cannot have an accumulation point (though it is infinite if
supp(f) = R). However, if xP (θ0) = xA(θ0) for some θ0 ∈ supp(f), it is possible that
θ0 is an accumulation point for {ai}∞i=0, in which case communication becomes infinitely
informative near θ0. Proposition 6 provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the
existence of a communication equilibrium with infinitely many partition intervals.
Proposition 6. Let a1 < . . . < ai < θ0 be a sequence in supp(f) satisfying the arbitrage
condition (A). Then there exists exactly one ai+1 satisfying (A) with ai < ai+1 < θ0 if
and only if
2b(ai)− E[θ|θ ∈ (ai, θ0)] < xai < 2b(ai)− ai,
where xai := E[θ|θ ∈ (ai−1, ai)].
Analogously, let A1 > . . . > Ai > θ0 be a sequence in supp(f) satisfying the arbitrage
condition (A). Then there exists exactly one Ai+1 satisfying (A) with Ai > Ai+1 > θ0 if
and only if
2b(Ai)− Ai < xAi < 2b(Ai)− E[θ|θ ∈ (θ0, Ai)],
where xAi := E[θ|θ ∈ (Ai, Ai−1)].
Proposition 6 imposes a geometrical constraint on the choice of the sequence {ai}∞i=1,
depending on the distribution of θ. Figure 2.5 illustrates this constraint.
Note that, in the uniform case, the conditions for an ascending sequence {ai}∞i=0 in Propo-
sition 6 are equivalent to
4ba < ai−1 − (4bm + 2)ai + θ0 and
4ba > ai−1 − (4bm + 1)ai.
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Figure 2.5: Illustration of Proposition 6. Depending on ai−1 < θ0, there exists a ai+1 < θ0
with ai+1 > ai > ai−1 if and only if ai lies in the bracketed line segment.
Applying the recursive formula for ai based on a1, and assuming bm > 0, we retrieve
the known condition for communication to be infinitely informative if θ is uniformly
distributed.
Corollary 6. If θ is uniformly distributed on [−L,L] and bm > 0, applying Proposition
6 yields that {ai}∞i=0 has an accumulation point if and only if
|ba| < bmL.
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2.2.2 Communication Versus Delegation
In this section, we compare the principal’s expected utility from delegation and communi-
cation for an arbitrary symmetric and compactly supported distribution of θ. Though we
have seen that the nature of communication equilibria changes substantially by allowing
for a state of agreement between the principal and the agent, this is not necessarily
the case if we consider its performance compared to delegation. Indeed, for “small”
biases, we obtain the same result as in [D], namely that the principal prefers delegation to
communication. For “large” biases, however, we find that the threshold above which com-
munication dominates delegation is independent of the distribution of θ. This indicates
that, in contrast to [D], it is possible to find a bias for any distribution of θ, such that
communication is informative and dominates delegation from the principal’s point of view.
Small Biases. Before analyzing general distributions, we first have a look at the uniform
one. Lemma 5 shows that, in line with the result in [D], the expected noisiness of the
project choice is an infinite times larger with communication than with delegation if the
bias is infinitesimally small and the state of the world is uniformly distributed – even in
the most informative equilibrium.
Lemma 5. If θ is uniformly distributed and N(b) =∞, the principal’s expected loss from
retaining authority and communicating, as given by the residual variance, is an infinite
times larger than his expected loss from delegating the project choice:
lim
(bm,ba)→(0,0)
σ2∞
b2a + b2mσ2
= lim
(bm,ba)→(0,0)
L2b2m + 3b2a
(4bm + 3)bm(b2a + L2b2m)
= +∞.
We will show in Proposition 7 that the above result continues to hold for general symmetric
distributions with compact support.9 In other words, we find that the analogous result for
bm = 0, as proven by [D], can be generalized to linear biases b = (bm, ba). In the following,
we denote by x∗(θ) the project implemented by the principal in the most informative
9In fact, we do not require symmetry, but just E[θ] = 0.
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equilibrium of the communication game, given that the state θ is realized and the agent
plays the equilibrium communication strategy.
Proposition 7. Consider the most informative equilibrium given b = (bm, ba). For any
symmetric distribution f(θ) with compact support, in the limit as b = (bm, ba) tends to zero,
the principal’s expected loss from retaining authority and communicating is an infinite
times larger than his expected loss from delegating the project choice:
lim
(bm,ba)→(0,0)
E[(x∗(θ)− θ)2]
b2a + b2mσ2
= +∞.
Large Biases. On the other hand, if we consider large biases, communication is at least
as profitable for the principal as taking an uninformed decision. In the latter case, he
chooses x = E[θ] and his expected loss is given by σ2 = σ21. Comparing this to the
expected loss incurred by delegation, b2a+ b2mσ2, we can provide a sufficient condition such
that communication dominates delegation.
Lemma 6. For any distribution F (θ), communication dominates delegation at least if
|bm| > 1, independent of σ.
In the limiting case bm = 0, that is, the principal and the agent disagree about the project
choice in all states of the world, [D] shows that the principal prefers communication to
delegation at least if ba > σ. At the same time, communication is informative only if
ba <
L
2 . Consequently, if the distribution of θ exhibits a large variance, it might be the
case that for all biases allowing for informative communication, the principal prefers to
delegate the project choice.
In contrast, we show that the threshold above which communication dominates delegation
does not depend on the distribution of θ. Hence, for any distribution F (θ), irrespective
of its variance, there is a bias b = (bm, ba) such that communication is informative and
dominates delegation.
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2.3 Conclusion
In this paper, we have generalized the models of [CS], [D], and [ADM] by considering a
general linear preference divergence between principal and agent. If the state of the world
is uniformly distributed, we have shown that communication can be infinitely informative
in equilibrium if and only if the state of agreement between the principal and the agent
realizes with positive probability, which includes the results by [CS] and [ADM] as limiting
cases. Based on this analysis, in line with [D], we have found that the principal prefers
to delegate formal decision rights to the agent instead of retaining authority and commu-
nicating if the preference divergence is “small”. However, in our model with uniformly
distributed states, communication can be informative and dominate delegation from the
principal’s point of view, in contrast to [D]. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
paper characterizing communication equilibria for a general linear preference divergence
between the principal and the agent, and analyzing the optimal allocation of authority in
this generality.
The present analysis sheds light on the optimal structure of organizations, indicating
whether decision making should be centralized or delegated, depending on the preference
divergence between a principal and a subordinate agent. If the agent exhibits a purely
systematic bias, such as empire building, the principal delegates decision making if the
agent’s informational advantage is large relative to his bias. Following [D], we conclude
that for a given bias centralization is only optimal if the corporate management has
some important information, as reflected by firms focusing on their core activities while
outsourcing others. In the same vein, operating in a rapidly changing environment favors
decentralization, since top management information rapidly becomes obsolete.
Our results put this interpretation into a broader perspective by allowing the agent to
react stronger or weaker to changes in the environment than the principal. In fact, as
long as the agent’s preference is not too extreme nor too conservative with regard to the
principal’s, it is true that decentralization is optimal in rather uncertain environments, as
indicated by a large L. However, if the agent excessively under- or overreacts to changes in
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the state of the world, our results suggest that it is optimal to centralize decision making,
no matter how unstable the market situation is.
Consider for example an organization entering an emerging market, where large external
shocks influencing the local economy are relatively likely. On the one hand, if experience
in the local market is the key for success, the firm might want to deploy local people
with a profound market knowledge, who react adequately to changes in the environment.
However, these agents are likely to exhibit a systematic bias, since they have no experience
with the foreign organization, thus might prefer to build up their own empire. In case
of centralization, communication is therefore rather imprecise if the environmental risks
are large. Hence, in line with [D], headquarters is likely to delegate decision rights to the
local managers in order to maximally profit from their local knowledge (while incurring
a constant and predictable loss due to the systematic bias). This situation is reminiscent
of organizations entering a new market via contracting with local firms, for example in
procurement or sales.
On the other hand, imagine a business where the application of core competences is crucial
for success in a new market, as for example for a consultancy with specific experience in
supply chain management across several industries. In this case, the organization might
prefer to install own employees in the new market who are familiar with the firm and
its specific know-how. While these agents are unlikely to exhibit a large systematic bias,
they might however overstate market distortions since they lack experience in the new
environment. In that case, delegating project decisions is rather risky as overreactions
to external shocks might cause huge organizational losses, which favors centralization.
In line with this reasoning, consultancies tend to enter a new market by installing a
subsidiary which is hierarchically subordinated to an organizational entity operating in
the core market.
Our analysis indicates that the optimal design of organizational structures should take
into account whether agents tend to react extremely or conservatively to a changing en-
vironment. In that sense, companies should be sensitive to differences in manager types
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within the organization when defining hierarchies. In an organization with multiple func-
tional divisions, for instance, natural differences in the conservativeness of the respective
business might thus induce the organization to impose different organizational structures,
ceteris paribus. However, to the extent that managerial conservatism is rather individ-
ual, our results also provide a rationale for contracts to be incomplete. Whether formal
decision rights should be granted or not can only be decided after learning the manager’s
type, hence it might be rational to omit such clauses from the employment contract.
Finally, the present analysis is based on two simplifying assumptions. First, there are no
technical or intellectual constraints to communication, potentially inducing some cost of
information transmission. Second, we assume that formal decision rights can be allocated
to either the principal or the agent, but the allocation of authority cannot be made
contingent on the message received by the agent. Allowing for costly communication and
optimal delegation mechanisms will work in favor of delegation relative to communication.
Hence, the question to what extent centralization of decision rights is an option for the
principal in more general situations would be an interesting avenue for future research.
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A2 Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Let −L = a0 < a1 < . . . < aN−1 < aN = L be a partition
of Θ = [−L,L]. Given that the agent truthfully signals the interval Ii := [ai−1, ai] which
includes θ, the principal implements E[θ|θ ∈ Ii] = ai−1+ai2 =: xi if m ∈ Ii. The agent, in
turn, reveals the interval containing θ if (xi − b(θ))2 ≤ (xj − b(θ))2 for all j 6= i, or
xi + xj ≤ 2b(θ) ∀j < i and
xi + xj ≥ 2b(θ) ∀j > i.
Given that xi increases in i and b(θ) increases in θ, the above condition is fulfilled if and
only if b(ai) = xi+xi+12 or
ai+1 = 2ai − ai−1 + 4(ba + bmai)
for all i ∈ {1 . . . N − 1}. Let v := 4bm + 2 and Ui(v, 1) denote the Lucas sequence of the
first kind, that is, U0(v, 1) = 0, U1(v, 1) = 1, and Ui(v, 1) = vUi−1(v, 1)−Ui−2(v, 1). Then
an induction shows that ai is given by
ai = Ui(v, 1)a1 + Ui−1(v, 1)L+ 4ba
i−1∑
j=1
Uj(v, 1).
Note that for ba = 0, this yields ai = Ui(v, 1)a1 +Ui−1(v, 1)L. Furthermore, if bm = 0, we
have v = 2 and Ui(2, 1) = i. Thus, for an additive bias we have ai = ia1 + (i − 1)L +
2bai(i− 1), which coincides with the result by [CS] for uniform distributions on [−L,L].
For the Lucas sequence, it is known that Ui(v, 1) = c
i−di
c−d , where
c := 12[v +
√
v2 − 4] = 1 + 2bm +
√
(1 + 2bm)2 − 1 and
d := 12[v −
√
v2 − 4] = 1− 2bm +
√
(1 + 2bm)2 − 1.
Note that cd = 1, c+ d = v and c− d =
√
v2 − 4. Since bm > 0, the square root is a real
number.
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Using the terminal condition aN = L, we can solve for a1 and get
a1 =
1− UN−1(v, 1)
UN(v, 1)
L− 4ba
UN(v, 1)
N−1∑
j=1
Uj(v, 1)
= 1
cN − dN
[[
c(1 + dN)− d(cN + 1)
]
L− 4ba
[
cN − 1
c− 1 −
1− dN
1− d
]]
.
In turn, we have
ai =
L
cN − dN
[
ci(1 + dN)− di(1 + cN)
]
+ 4ba
cN − dN
(1− di)(1− dN−i)− (ci − 1)(cN−i − 1)
(c− 1)(1− d) .
Note that, if ba = 0, we have ai = 1cN−dN
[
ci(1 + dN)− di(1 + cN)
]
L, which coincides
with [ADM]. In order to ensure that the partition exists in equilibrium, we have to check
whether {ai}i=0...N is an ascending sequence. For i ∈ {0 . . . N − 1}, using the relation
cd = 1, we have
ai+1 − ai =
(c− 1)(ci + cN−i−1)
cN − 1 L+
4c(ci − cN−i−1)
(cN + 1)(c− 1)ba.
Note that the factor of L is always positive, whereas this is not necessarily the case for
the factor of ba. We see that ci − cN−i−1 is positive if i > N−12 and negative if i <
N−1
2 .
If N is odd and i = N−12 , the length of the interval does not depend on ba. In order to
ensure that all intervals have a positive measure, we have to distinguish two cases:
• ba > 0: The second summand 4c(c
i−cN−i−1)
(cN +1)(c−1) ba is negative if and only if i <
N
2 , hence
ai+1 − ai > 0 for all i ∈ {0 . . . N − 1} if and only if
ba <
(c− 1)2(cN + 1)
4c(cN − 1)
cN−i−1 + ci
cN−i−1 − ci
L
for all i < N2 . In that case, the right hand side is positive and
cN−i−1+ci
cN−i−1−ci increases in
i, hence the inequality has to be satisfied for i = 0, or ba < (c−1)
2(cN +1)(cN−1+1)
4c(cN−1)(cN−1−1) L.
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• ba < 0: The second summand 4c(c
i−cN−i−1)
(cN +1)(c−1) ba is negative if and only if i >
N
2 , hence
we have to ensure that
ba >
(c− 1)2(cN + 1)
4c(cN − 1)
cN−i−1 + ci
cN−i−1 − ci
L
for all i > N2 . In that case, the right hand side is negative and
cN−i−1+ci
cN−i−1−ci in-
creases in i, hence the inequality has to be satisfied for i = imax = N − 1, or
ba > − (c−1)
2(cN +1)(cN−1+1)
4c(cN−1)(cN−1−1) L.
Summarizing the two cases, a partition with N intervals is possible in equilibrium if
|ba| <
(cN + 1)(cN−1 + 1)
(cN − 1)(cN−1 − 1)bmL,
using (c − 1)2 = 4bmc. Furthermore, the sequence yN := (c
N +1)(cN−1+1)
(cN−1)(cN−1−1) decreases in N ,
thus the larger the absolute value of the additive part of the bias, |ba|, the smaller is the
possible number of intervals. It turns out that limN→∞ yN = 1, thus
lim
N→∞
(cN + 1)(cN−1 + 1)
(cN − 1)(cN−1 − 1)bmL = bmL.
That means that any number of partition intervals is possible if and only if |ba| < bmL.
If |ba| = bmL, we have
ai+1 − ai =
2(c− 1)(c2N−i−1 + ci)
c2N − 1 if ba < 0 and
ai+1 − ai =
2(c− 1)(cN+i + cN−i−1)
c2N − 1 if ba > 0,
which is positive for all i ∈ {0 . . . N − 1}. Hence, if the preferred projects of the principal
and the agent intersect within the range of consideration, [−L,L], there is a communica-
tion equilibrium for any N ∈ N.
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Geometrical notes. Taking a closer look at whether the length of partition intervals
increases or decreases, we have for i ∈ {1 . . . N − 1}
l(Ii+1)− l(Ii) = ai+1 − 2ai + ai−1 =
(c− 1)2(ci−1 − cN−i−1)
(cN − 1) L+
4c(ci−1 + cN−i−1)
(cN + 1) ba.
If ba > 0, the length of intervals is hence increasing for i ≥ N2 . It is decreasing if and only
if
c2i < cN
(c− 1)2(cN + 1)L− 4c(cN − 1)ba
(c− 1)2(cN + 1)L+ 4c(cN − 1)ba
< cN .
Hence, interval lengths decrease up to some interval and then increase again. The smallest
interval is some Ii with i ≤ N2 . It is precisely when ba > bmL that the smallest interval
is the first, which means that interval lengths increase from left to right and only finitely
many intervals are possible. In general, the smallest interval is further to the left the
larger ba is. Finally, c2i < cN (c−1)
2(cN +1)L−4c(cN−1)ba
(c−1)2(cN +1)L+4c(cN−1)ba if and only if ai < −
ba
bm
, which means
that the agreement state lies in the smallest interval. The analysis for ba < 0 is vice-versa.
If ba = 0, we have l(Ii) = l(IN−i+1), that is, interval lengths are symmetric. Further,
θ = 0 is either the midpoint of the smallest interval (if N odd) or it is the border of the
two smallest intervals (if N even, see [ADM]). In contrast, if ba 6= 0, there is generically
no symmetry, there are no two intervals with the same lengths, and the agreement state
is not the border of an interval.
Proof of Corollary 1. We determine the threshold for |ba| in Proposition 1 if bm
approaches zero, or, equivalently, if c↘ 1. Applying L’Hôpital’s rule, we find
lim
c→1
(c− 1)2
(cN − 1)(cN−1 − 1) = limc→1
2(c− 1)
(2N − 1)c2N−2 −NcN−1 − (N − 1)cN−2
= lim
c→1
2
(2N − 1)(2N − 2)c2N−3 −N(N − 1)cN−2 − (N − 1)(N − 2)cN−3 =
1
N(N − 1) .
Hence,
lim
c→1
(cN + 1)(cN−1 + 1)
(cN − 1)(cN−1 − 1)bmL = limc→1
(cN + 1)(cN−1 + 1)(c− 1)2
4c(cN − 1)(cN−1 − 1) L =
L
N(N − 1) .
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Proof of Proposition 2. Similar to the Proof of Proposition 2 in [ADM], if there was
a profitable deviation for the agent in an equilibrium with infinitely many intervals, this
deviation would also be profitable in an equilibrium with N intervals, for some N < ∞,
contradicting the assumption that communication rules, decision functions and belief
functions constitute an equilibrium for all finite N .
Proof of Proposition 3. Let bm ∈ (−1, 0). Since xA(θ) = b(θ) is increasing in θ, we
obtain the same constraints on the equilibrium partition as in the proof of Proposition
1 and the formulas for ai − ai−1 continue to hold. However, monotonicity is no longer
guaranteed since c ∈ C \ R. Considering a partition with two intervals, N(b) ≥ 2 if and
only if |a1| < L, where a1 is given by a1 = − 2ba2bm+1 , using the arbitrage condition (A).
Hence, N(b) ≥ 2 if and only if |ba| < L2 |2bm + 1|.
Similarly, in an equilibrium with N ≥ 3 partition intervals, (A) is equivalent to
a2 = 2a1 + L+ 4(ba + bma1) and
L = 2a2 − a1 + 4(ba + bma2),
which is equivalent to
a1 = −
L
4bm + 3
− 4ba4bm + 1
a2 =
L
4bm + 3
− 4ba4bm + 1
.
Hence, a1 < a2 if and only if bm > −34 , which we assume in the following. Furthermore,
a1 > −L if and only if 4bm+24bm+3L >
4
4bm+1ba and a2 < L if and only if
4bm+2
4bm+3L > −
4
4bm+1ba. In
particular, it has to hold that 4bm+24bm+3 > 0. Since bm > −
3
4 , this is equivalent to bm > −
1
2 .
Next, we show that N(b) < ∞ if bm ∈ (−1, 0). In that case, we find that c ∈ C \ R is a
root of unity. Indeed, if bm ∈ (−1, 0) we have
c = 1 + 2bm + i
√
1− (1 + 2bm)2,
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where i =
√
−1 denotes the imaginary unit in the upper half plane, and |c| = (1+2bm)2 +
1− (1 + 2bm)2 = 1. Hence, we can write
c = eiα = cosα + i sinα
for some α ∈ (0, π). Now we define
rk :=
(ck − 1)2
ck
= 2 (cos(kα)− 1) ∈ [−4, 0],
and see that rk is a real number for any k ∈ {0, . . . , N}. Furthermore, r0 = 0 and
r1 = 4bm. Thus, for all k ∈ {0, . . . , N}, we have
ak =
rk − rN−k
rN
L− ba
bm
rN − rk − rN−k
rN + 4
,
and accordingly
ak − ak−1 =
rk − rk−1 + rN+1−k − rN−k
rN
L− ba
bm
−rk + rk−1 + rN+1−k − rN−k
rN + 4
.
Hence, if N is odd, we have
aN+1
2
− aN−1
2
= 2
rN+1
2
− rN−1
2
rN
L = 2
cos[N+12 α]− cos[
N−1
2 α]
cos[Nα]− 1 L =
sin[N2 α] sinα
1− cos[N2 α]
L.
Let α ∈ (0, π) such that if α = qπ, we have q /∈ Q, which means that there is no s ∈ N
with cos(sα) = 1. Then α2 ∈ (0,
π
2 ) and we can find N0 odd such that
α
2N0 ∈ (π, 2π).
10
For this N0, we have sin[N02 α] < 0. Since 1 − cos[
N
2 α] > 0 for any N and sinα > 0 for
α ∈ (0, π), we conclude that ak − ak−1 < 0 for k = N0+12 . Hence, for any given α ∈ (0, π)
which is no rational multiple of π, there is a N0 such that there is no equilibrium with N0
partition intervals.
10More precisely, α2N0 ∈ (π, 2π) is equivalent to N0 ∈ (
2π
α ,
4π
α ). Since
2π
α > 2, this interval includes
two consecutive natural numbers, thus also an odd one.
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If α ∈ (0, π) is such that cos(sα) = 1 for some s ∈ N, we have rs = 0 and the division by
rs is invalid. For N = s, the condition for ak − ak−1 is redundant and there is a partition
equilibrium with s intervals for any ba. However, if we consider s + 1, the first partition
interval has to satisfy
a1 − a0 =
r1 − r0 + rs+1 − rs
rs+1
L− ba
bm
−r1 + r0 + rs+1 − rs
rs+1 + 4
= 2 cosα− 2cosα− 1 L+ 2ba · 0 = 2L.
Hence, an equilibrium with s+ 1 ≥ 2 partition intervals is not possible and N(b) <∞ if
bm ∈ (−1, 0).
If bm < −1, the agent’s preference is reversed, i.e. b(θ) decreases in θ. Hence, the agent
has an incentive to truthfully reveal the state of the world (see proof of Proposition 1) if
and only if
xi + xi−1 ≤ 2b(ai) ∀i ∈ {2 . . . N} and
xi + xi+1 ≥ 2b(ai−1) ∀i ∈ {1 . . . N − 1} .
Thus, for all i ∈ {0 . . . N − 2} we conclude b(ai) ≤ b(ai+2), which contradicts the assump-
tion bm < −1 and ai strictly increasing. Consequently, communication is not informative
for bm < −1.
For bm = −1, we similarly conclude xi + xi+1 = 2ba for all i ∈ {1 . . . N − 1}, which yields
x1 = x2 = . . . = xN if N > 2. For N = 2, we have x1 + x2 = 2ba, which is equivalent to
a1 = 2ba. Hence, an equilibrium with two intervals is possible if |ba| < L2 =
L
2 |2bm + 1|.
Proof of Remark 1. From Lemma 1, we conclude
σ22 =
L2
12 +
4c2
(c2 + 1)2 b
2
a =
L2
12 +
b2a
(2bm + 1)2
.
Since |ba| < |2bm+1|2 L if N(b) ≥ 2, we have σ
2
2 <
L2
12 +
L2
4 =
L2
3 = σ
2.
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Proof of Lemma 1. The residual variance of θ given a messagem ∈ Θ in an equilibrium
with N partition intervals, is given by
σ2N =
1
2L
N∑
i=1
∫ ai
ai−1
[
θ − ai−1 + ai2
]2
dθ
= 124L
N∑
i=1
(ai − ai−1)3
= 124
(c− 1)3
(cN − 1)3L
2
N∑
i=1
(
c3i−3 + c3N−3i + 3cN+i−2 + 3c2N−i−1
)
+ 83
c3
(cN + 1)3(c− 1)3
b3a
L
N∑
i=1
(
c3i−3 − c3N−3i − 3cN+i−2 + 3c2N−i−1
)
+ 12
c(c− 1)
(cN − 1)2(cN + 1)Lba
N∑
i=1
(
c3i−3 − c3N−3i + cN+i−2 − c2N−i−1
)
+ 2 c
2
(cN + 1)2(c− 1)(cN − 1)b
2
a
N∑
i=1
(
c3i−3 + c3N−3i − cN+i−2 − c2N−i−1
)
.
As ∑Ni=1 c3i−3 = c3N−1c3−1 = ∑Ni=1 c3N−3i and ∑Ni=1 cN+i−2 = cN−1 cN−1c−1 = ∑Ni=1 c2N−i−1, the
above expression is equivalent to
σ2N =
L2
12
(c− 1)2
(cN − 1)2
(
c2N + cN + 1
c2 + c+ 1 + 3c
N−1
)
+ 4b
2
ac
2
(cN + 1)2(c− 1)2
(
c2N + cN + 1
c2 + c+ 1 − c
N−1
)
.
Using the definition of rk as in the proof of Proposition 3, we find that
σ2N =
L2
12
(c− 1)2
c
cN
(cN − 1)2
(
c
c2 + c+ 1
[
(cN + 1)2
cN
− 1
]
+ 3
)
+ 4b2a
c
(c− 1)2
cN
(cN + 1)2
(
c
c2 + c+ 1
[
(cN + 1)2
cN
− 1
]
− 1
)
= L
2
3
bm
rN
(
rN + 3
4bm + 3
+ 3
)
+ b2a
1
bm
1
rN + 4
(
rN + 3
4bm + 3
− 1
)
∈ R.
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Proof of Corollary 4. A vanishing bm is equivalent to c → 1. Applying L’Hôpital’s
rule, we obtain
lim
c→1
(c− 1)2
(cN − 1)2 = limc→1
2(c− 1)
2N(cN − 1)cN−1
= lim
c→1
2
2N2c2(N−1) + 2N(N − 1)(cN − 1)cN−2 =
1
N2
.
This yields
lim
c→1
L2
12
(c− 1)2
(cN − 1)2
[
c2N + cN + 1
c2 + c+ 1 + 3c
N−1
]
= L
2
12
1
N2
· 4 = L
2
3N2 .
Again using L’Hôpital’s rule, we find
lim
c→1
1
(c− 1)2
[
c2N + cN + 1
c2 + c+ 1 − c
N−1
]
= lim
c→1
1
2(c− 1)
[
2Nc2N−1 +NcN−1
c2 + c+ 1 −
(c2N + cN + 1)(2c+ 1)
(c2 + c+ 1)2 − (N − 1)c
N−2
]
= 12 limc→1
2N(2N − 1)c2N−2 +N(N − 1)cN−2
c2 + c+ 1
− lim
c→1
(2Nc2N−1 +NcN−1)(2c+ 1) + (c2N + cN + 1)
(c2 + c+ 1)2
+ lim
c→1
(c2N + cN + 1)(2c+ 1)2
(c2 + c+ 1)3 − (N − 1)(N − 2)c
N−3
= 12
[
2N(2N − 1) +N(N − 1)
3 − 2
3N + 1
3 + 2− (N − 1)(N − 2)
]
= N
2 − 1
3 .
Hence,
lim
c→1
4b2ac2
(cN + 1)2(c− 1)2
[
c2N + cN + 1
c2 + c+ 1 − c
N−1
]
= N
2 − 1
3 b
2
a
and
lim
c→1
σ2N =
L2
3N2 +
N2 − 1
3 b
2
a.
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Proof of Lemma 2. The residual variance, σ2N , decreases from N − 1 to N if and only
if
L2
12 (c− 1)
2
(
c2N + cN + 1
(cN − 1)2(c2 + c+ 1) −
c2N−2 + cN−1 + 1
(cN−1 − 1)2(c2 + c+ 1)
)
+ L
2
4 (c− 1)
2
(
cN−1
(cN − 1)2 −
cN−2
(cN−1 − 1)2
)
+ 4b
2
ac
2
(c− 1)2
(
c2N + cN + 1
(cN + 1)2(c2 + c+ 1) −
c2N−2 + cN−1 + 1
(cN−1 + 1)2(c2 + c+ 1)
)
− 4b
2
ac
2
(c− 1)2
(
cN−1
(cN + 1)2) −
cN−2
(cN−1 + 1)2)
)
< 0.
Some lengthy calculations show that the left-hand side is equal to
(c+ 1)2(c3N−3 − cN−2)
c2 + c+ 1
[
4b2ac2
(c− 1)(cN + 1)2(cN−1 + 1)2 −
L2(c− 1)3
4(cN − 1)2(cN−1 − 1)2
]
.
This term is negative if and only if
b2a <
L2
16
(c− 1)4
c2
(cN + 1)2
(cN − 1)2
(cN−1 + 1)2
(cN−1 − 1)2 ,
which is exactly the case if an equilibrium with N partition intervals exists. If an equi-
librium exists for all N ∈ N, we know that c > 1, thus limN→∞ (c−1)
2
(cN−1)2
c2N +cN +1
c2+c+1 =
(c−1)2
c2+c+1 , limN→∞
(c−1)2
(cN−1)2 c
N−1 = 0, limN→∞ c
2(c2N +cN +1)
(c−1)2(cN +1)2(c2+c+1) =
c2
(c−1)2(c2+c+1) and
limN→∞ c
N+1
(c−1)2(cN +1)2 = 0. Hence,
lim
N→∞
σ2N =
L2
12
(c− 1)2
c2 + c+ 1 + 4b
2
a
c2
(c− 1)2(c2 + c+ 1) =
bm
4bm + 3
L2
3 +
b2a
bm(4bm + 3)
.
Proof of Proposition 4. If N =∞ (thus bm > 0), we have
σ2N =
bm
4bm + 3
L2
3 +
b2a
bm(4bm + 3)
,
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which is smaller than δ2 := b2a + b2mL
2
3 if and only if
[
bm −
1
4bm + 3
]
bm
L2
3 +
[
1− 1
bm(4bm + 3)
]
b2a > 0
⇔ (4b2m + 3bm − 1)(b2mL2 + 3b2a) > 0
⇔ (4bm − 1)(bm + 1) > 0⇔ bm >
1
4 ,
given that bm is positive.
Proof of Proposition 5. If bm < 0 and N = 1, communication dominates delegation
if and only if L23 < b
2
a + b2mL
2
3 , which is equivalent to b
2
a >
L2
3 (1 − b
2
m). In particular,
communication always dominates delegation if bm < −1.
In an equilibrium with N = 2 intervals, we have bm ∈ (−1, 0) and communication domi-
nates delegation if
L2
12 +
4c2b2a
(c2 + 1)2 < b
2
a + b2m
L2
3 ⇔ b
2
a <
L2
48
(1− 4b2m)(1 + 2bm)2
bm(bm + 1)
.
In particular, communication can only dominate delegation if 1− 4b2m < 0 or bm < −12 in
the area where N(b) ≥ 2.
If communication improves, i.e. N ≥ 3, we have bm ∈ (−12 , 0) and b
2
a <
L2
4 (1 + 2bm)
2.
We now show that in this parameter range delegation always dominates communication.
Indeed, using the definition of rk as in the proof of Proposition 3, we obtain for the
difference between the residual variance and the loss from delegation,
σ2N − b2a − b2m
L2
3 = L
2 bm(bm + 1)
3
rN(1− 4bm) + 12
(4bm + 3)rN
+ b2a(bm + 1)
rN(1− 4bm)− 16bm
bm(4bm + 3)(rN + 4)
.
Multiplication with 3bm(4bm+3)rN (rN +4)
bm+1 > 0 yields that the above term is positive, and
hence delegation performs better than communication, if and only if
3b2a
[
r2N(1− 4bm)− 16rNbm
]
+ L2b2m
[
r2N(1− 4bm) + 16rN(1− bm) + 48
]
≥ 0. (A2.1)
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The second summand in (A2.1) is non-negative given that rN ∈ [−4, 0] and bm > −12 . In
order to see this, note that
r2N(1− 4bm) + 16rN(1− bm) + 48 ≥ 0 ⇔
∣∣∣∣∣rN + 8(1− bm)1− 4bm
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 4(2bm + 1)1− 4bm .
Then, 8(1−bm)1−4bm > 4 if bm > −
1
2 , thus rN +
8(1−bm)
1−4bm > 0 if rN ∈ [−4, 0] and the above
expression is equivalent to rN ≥ −4, which holds for all N ∈ N. Hence, condition (A2.1)
is satisfied if r2N(1− 4bm)− 16rNbm ≥ 0.
Now we assume that r2N(1− 4bm)− 16rNbm < 0. In this case, we have
3b2a
[
r2N(1− 4bm)− 16rNbm
]
+ L2b2m
[
r2N(1− 4bm) + 16rN(1− bm) + 48
]
>
L2
4
[
r2N(1− 4bm)(16b2m + 12bm + 3)− 16rNbm(16b2m + 8bm + 3) + 192b2m
]
,
using b2a < L
2
4 (1 + 2bm)
2. This term is non-negative if and only if
∣∣∣∣∣rN − 8bm(16b2m + 8bm + 3)(1− 4bm)(16b2m + 12bm + 3)
∣∣∣∣∣
≥ 64b
2
m(16b2m + 8bm + 3)2 − 192b2m(1− 4bm)(16b2m + 12bm + 3)
(1− 4bm)2(16b2m + 12bm + 3)2
.
It turns out that 64b2m(16b2m+8bm+3)2−192b2m(1−4bm)(16b2m+12bm+3) < 0 if bm > −12 ,
which completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 3. An equilibrium with N = 2 partition intervals exists if the
arbitrage condition
x1 + x2 = 2b(a1)
is fulfilled. In this case, x1+x2 = h(a1). Since both h(a1) and 2b(a1) are strictly increasing
in a1, the functions intersect in some a ∈ supp(f) if and only if
1. lima→θL h(a) > 2 lima→θL b(a) and lima→θH h(a) < 2 lima→θH b(a), or
2. lima→θL h(a) < 2 lima→θL b(a) and lima→θH h(a) > 2 lima→θH b(a).
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Proof of Corollary 5. For a general symmetric distribution F (θ) supported on [−L,L],
we have E[θ] = 0. Hence, h(L) = L, h(−L) = −L and 2b(L) = 2ba + 2(bm + 1)L,
2b(−L) = 2ba−2(bm+1)L. Considering both cases in Lemma 3 together is thus equivalent
to
|ba| <
|2bm + 1|
2 L.
Proof of Lemma 4. Let a1 ∈ supp(f) be given. If we consider x1 + x2 = 2b(a1) as a
continuous function in a2 for a given a1, there exists an a2 ∈ supp(f) with a2 > a1 and
x1 + x2 = 2b(a1) if and only if
x1 + a1 < 2b(a1) and
x1 + E[θ|θ > a1] > 2b(a1). (A2.2)
Since h(a1) = x1 + E[θ|θ > a1], an equilibrium with N = 3 partition intervals is only
possible if h(a1) > 2b(a1). Analogously, if a2 ∈ supp(f) is given, there exists a1 ∈ supp(f)
with a1 < a2 and x2 + x3 = 2b(a2) if and only if
E[θ|θ < a2] + x3 < 2b(a2) and (A2.3)
a2 + x3 > 2b(a2).
Hence, an equilibrium with N = 3 partition intervals requires h(a2) < 2b(a2). Since
a1 < a2 and h(a) is strictly increasing in a ∈ supp(f), (A2.2) and (A2.3) can only be
satisfied if
lim
a→θL
h(a) > lim
a→θL
2b(a) and lim
a→θH
h(a) < lim
a→θH
2b(a),
representing case 1 in the description.
Proof of Proposition 6. Let a1 < . . . < ai < θ0 be a sequence in supp(f) satisfying the
arbitrage condition. Then there exists exactly one ai+1 with ai < ai+1 < θ0, if xi + xi+1
(which increases in ai+1) lies below 2b(ai) for ai+1 = ai, and above 2b(ai) for ai = θ0.
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Formally, this yields
xi + ai < 2b(ai) and
xi + E[θ|θ ∈ (ai, θ0)] > 2b(ai).
The argument for a sequence A1 > . . . > Ai > θ0 follows analogously.
Proof of Corollary 6. Let f be the uniform distribution on [−L,L] for some L > 0.
Then the conditions for an ascending sequence in Proposition 6 are equivalent to
4ba < ai−1 − (4bm + 2)ai + θ0 and
4ba > ai−1 − (4bm + 1)ai.
Using the recursive formula
ai = Ui(v, 1)a1 + Ui−1(v, 1)L+ 4ba
i−1∑
j=1
Uj(v, 1),
as in the proof of Proposition 1, this yields
Ui+1(v, 1)a1 + Ui(v, 1)L+ 4ba
i∑
j=1
Uj(v, 1) < θ0 and
(Ui+1(v, 1)− Ui(v, 1))a1 + (Ui(v, 1)− Ui−1(v, 1))L+ 4baUi(v, 1) > 0.
Substituting Ui(v, 1) = c
i−di
c−d and θ0 = −
ba
bm
= − 4bac(c−1)2 yields
ba < −
c− 1
4c
[
c(c2i − 1)
c2i+1 + 1 L+
c2i+2 − 1
c2i+1 + 1a1
]
and
ba > −
c− 1
4c
[
c(c2i−1 + 1)
c2i − 1 L+
c2i+1 + 1
c2i − 1 a1
]
.
In the limit, as i → ∞, the right-hand sides of both inequality conditions converge to
− c−14c [L+ ca1], using c > 1. As the above conditions have to hold for some a1 ∈ (−L, θ0)
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in the limit, this yields on the one hand
ba < −
c− 1
4c [L+ ca1] <
(c− 1)2
4c L = bmL,
since a1 > −L. On the other hand, we have ba > − c−14c [L+ ca1] > −
c−1
4c L +
bac
c−1 , since
a1 < θ0 = − 4bac(c−1)2 . This is equivalent to
ba <
(c− 1)2
4c L = bmL.
The respective conditions for a descending sequence yield ba > −bmL, hence |ba| < bmL
has to be satisfied in order to obtain infinitely many partition intervals.
Proof of Lemma 5. From N(ba, bm) = ∞ we conclude that bm > 0. In the following,
we show that for any R > 0, there exists a δR > 0 such that for any (bm, ba) with
‖(bm, ba)‖ =
√
b2m + b2a < δR we have
L2b2m + 3b2a
(4bm + 3)bm(b2a + L2b2m)
> R.
Let thus R > 0 be given. We choose δR > 0 small enough such that (4δR + 3)δR < 1R .
Then b2m ≤ b2a + b2m < δ2R, thus bm < δR, and we have
L2b2m + 3b2a
(4bm + 3)bm(b2a + L2b2m)
= 2b
2
a
(4bm + 3)bm(b2a + L2b2m)
+ 1(4bm + 3)bm
> 0 + 1(4δR + 3)δR
> R.
Proof of Proposition 7. The proof of Proposition 7 proceeds largely analogous to the
proof of Proposition 3 in [D].
We focus on the most informative partition equilibrium given b = (bm, ba). Let hi :=
ai − ai−1 be the length of the ith partition element and let h̄ be the largest partition
element. The proof of Proposition 7 follows directly from the following three lemmata.
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Lemma A2.1. As h̄ tends to zero,
hi+1 = hi + 4(ba + bmai)− [h2i + h2i+1]
f
′(ai)
6f(ai)
where we have neglected all terms in the 3rd or higher order of hi and hi+1.
Proof. The proof proceeds as in [D]. In our case, the agent’s indifference condition is
given by
xi+1 − (ba + (bm + 1)ai) = ba + (bm + 1)ai − xi,
which yields the result.
In the following, we assume that the convergence path of b = (bm, ba) stays in one quadrant
if ‖b‖ is small enough.
Lemma A2.2. If limb→0 h̄ = 0, then
lim
b→0
E[(x∗(θ)− θ)2]
b2a + b2mσ2
= +∞.
Proof. If θ0 = − babm < 0, we fix two arbitrary points σ < y1 < y2 in supp(f), and
if θ0 > 0, we choose [y1, y2] ∈ supp(f) with −σ < y1 < y2. Since θ0 /∈ [y1, y2], [y1, y2]
contains only finitely many partition intervals in equilibrium for all b = (bm, ba). Moreover,
E[(x∗(θ)−θ)2|θ ∈ (y1, y2)] ≤ 1F (y2)−F (y1)E[(x
∗(θ)−θ)2] and 0 < F (y2)−F (y1) <∞, hence
it is sufficient to show that
lim
b→0
E[(x∗(θ)− θ)2|θ ∈ (y1, y2)]
b2a + b2mσ2
= +∞ (A2.4)
in order to prove Lemma A2.2. Slightly abusing notation, we denote by N(b) < ∞ the
number of partition elements fully contained in [y1, y2] for a given b = (bm, ba) and by hi
the length of the ith partition interval fully included in [y1, y2].
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We define µ := maxθ∈(y1,y2)
f
′ (θ)
6f(θ) and µ := minθ∈(y1,y2)
f
′ (θ)
6f(θ) . Furthermore, we denote
µ :=

µ, if ba > 0
−µ, if ba < 0.
In the following, we first show that
lim
b→0
E[h2i ]
b2a + b2mσ2
= +∞ (A2.5)
holds (Part A and B), and then that the latter implies (A2.4) (Part C).
Let q(b) denote the number of partition intervals in [y1, y2] with µh2i ≤ |ba| + |bm|σ and
Q(b) the number of partition intervals in [y1, y2] with µh2i > |ba| + |bm|σ. Then we have
q(b) +Q(b) = N(b). By assumption, if ‖b‖ goes to zero, h̄ vanishes and q(b) +Q(b) goes
to infinity. We consider two cases:
(A) First, assume that
lim
b→0
Q(b)
N(b) =: Φ > 0.
This implies that Q(b) > 0 for some b and thus µ > 0. Then we have
lim
b→0
E[h2i ]
b2a + b2mσ2
≥ lim
b→0
1
b2a + b2mσ2
Q(b)E[h2i |µh2i > |ba|+ |bm|σ]
N(b)
= lim
b→0
ΦE[h
2
i |µh2i > |ba|+ |bm|σ]
b2a + b2mσ2
≥ lim
b→0
Φ 1
b2a + b2mσ2
|ba|+ |bm|σ
µ
= +∞,
since limba→0
|ba|
b2a+b2mσ2
= +∞ for all bm ∈ R, and limbm→0
|bm|
b2a+b2mσ2
= +∞ for all
ba ∈ R.
(B) Second, assume that
lim
b→0
Q(b)
N(b) = 0.
Let us denote by n̄(b) < ∞ the average number of partition intervals of a series
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of adjacent partition elements for which µh2i ≤ |ba| + |bm|σ. For any two adjacent
partition elements hi and hi+1 in such a series, from Lemma A2.1 we estimate the
minimal increase in interval lengths if ba > 0, and the maximal decrease if ba < 0,
respectively. For ba > 0 it follows that
hi+1 ≥ hi + 4(ba + bmai)− µ[h2i + h2i+1]
≥ hi + 4(ba + bmai)− 2(ba + |bm|σ)
≥ hi + 2(ba + |bm|σ),
since bmai > σ|bm| by the choice of the interval [y1, y2]. If ba < 0, we have
hi+1 ≤ hi + 4(ba + bmai)− µ[h2i + h2i+1]
≤ hi + 4(ba + bmai) + 2(−ba + |bm|σ)
≤ hi + 2(ba − |bm|σ),
since bmai < −σ|bm| by the choice of the interval [y1, y2]. It follows for ba < 0 that
hi ≥ hi+1 − 2(ba − |bm|σ), thus in general, the minimal increase from left to right
(ba > 0), or from right to left (ba < 0), is given by 2(|ba|+ |bm|σ). Hence, we have
n̄(b)∑
i=1
h2i ≥
n̄(b)−1∑
i=1
[2(|ba|+ |bm|σ)i]2 =
2
3(|ba|+ |bm|σ)
2n̄(b)[n̄(b)− 1][2n̄(b)− 1],
and consequently,
E[h2i |µh2i ≤ |ba|+ |bm|σ] ≥
1
n̄(b)
n̄(b)−1∑
i=1
[2(|ba|+ |bm|σ)i]2
= 23(|ba|+ |bm|σ)
2[n̄(b)− 1][2n̄(b)− 1]. (A2.6)
If limb→0 Q(b)N(b) = 0 holds, then limb→0E[h
2
i ] = limb→0E[h2i |µh2i ≤ |ba| + |bm|σ]. Sec-
ond, we have limb→0 n̄(b) =∞. In order to see that, note that the number of series
of adjacent partition elements for which µh2i ≤ |ba|+ |bm|σ is at most Q(b). Hence,
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N(b) = Q(b) + q(b) ≤ Q(b) +Q(b)n̄(b). Thus, if we suppose limb→0 n̄(b) = n∗ <∞,
then limb→0 Q(b)N(b) ≥ limb→0
Q(b)
Q(b)+Q(b)n̄(b) =
1
1+n∗ > 0, a contradiction. Finally, we have
lim
b→0
2
3(|ba|+ |bm|σ)
2
b2a + b2mσ2
= lim
b→0
2
3 +
4
3
|ba||bm|σ
b2a + b2mσ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
∈
[2
3 ,
4
3
]
,
since (|ba| − |bm|σ)2 = b2a− 2|ba||bm|σ+ b2mσ2 ≥ 0 and hence
|ba||bm|σ
b2a+b2mσ2
≤ 12 . Taking all
these facts together, it follows from (A2.6) that
lim
b→0
E[h2i ]
b2a + b2mσ2
= lim
b→0
E[h2i |µh2i ≤ |ba|+ |bm|σ]
b2a + b2mσ2
≥ lim
b→0
[n̄(b)− 1][2n̄(b)− 1]2(|ba|+ |bm|σ)
2
3(b2a + b2mσ2)
= +∞.
(C) Completely analogous to [D], we find that (A2.5) implies (A2.4).
Lemma A2.3. If limb→0 h̄ > 0, then limb→0 E[(x
∗(θ)−θ)2]
b2a+b2mσ2
= +∞.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma A3 in [D].
Proof of Lemma 6. Communication performs at least as good as if the principal takes
an uninformed decision. In this case, the principal chooses x = E[θ] and his loss is given
by E[E[θ]− θ)2] = σ2. On the other hand, if he delegates the project choice to the agent,
the principal incurs a loss of E[(ba + bmθ)2] = b2a + b2m(E[θ]2 + σ2). Thus, communication
dominates delegation at least if
σ2 < b2a + b2m(E[θ]2 + σ2)
⇔ b2a + b2mE[θ]2 + (b2m − 1)σ2 > 0,
which is at least the case if |bm| > 1.
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Promises and Image Concerns∗
Cooperation among interacting partners is essential for economic success in many situ-
ations, as joint value creation often exceeds individual achievements. These situations
become challenging as soon as cooperation cannot be contractually enforced, but relies
on mutual trust by the interacting partners. Among a large literature focusing on how to
improve cooperation, various experimental studies show that communication can be an
effective tool to enhance it (see, e.g. Cooper et al., 1992; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004;
Bochet and Putterman, 2009). While several articles analyze whether cheap talk can be
effective and how this depends on the communication protocol and the game structure
(see, for instance, Blume and Ortmann, 2007; Mohlin and Johanneson, 2008; Ellingsen
and Östling, 2010; Camera et. al., 2011; Kriss et al., 2011), we contribute to the litera-
ture focusing on why individuals stick to a commitment, given that rationality predicts
a deviating behavior. In particular, we analyze whether and to what extent social image
concerns motivate people to stick to a promise. More precisely, as reneging on a promise is
deemed negatively in society, avoiding the image of being a promise breaker might induce
individuals to keep their word. Consequently, we study whether an individual is more
likely to deliver on a promise if its violation is more obvious to its receiver.
In order to test whether social image concerns influence promise keeping behavior, we
conduct a controlled laboratory experiment. Here, subjects are randomly matched in
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Carmen Thoma.
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pairs of two and play a one-shot sequential trust game similar to the one used in Charness
and Dufwenberg (2006). A first mover (A) decides whether to enter the game or to opt
out, the latter choice inducing a low outside option for both players. If A enters the game,
a second mover (B) chooses between a selfish option, yielding a payoff of zero for A, and
cooperation, in which case a chance move determines whether A gets a positive payoff or
0.1 Prior to the strategic decisions, B sends one out of three pre-defined messages to A,
one of which is a promise to cooperate. In order to test for social image concerns, we
vary the ex-post observability of the second mover’s action. While in condition Rev A
learns B’s action choice, in condition NoRev she cannot infer whether a payoff of zero is
due to B behaving selfish or just to bad luck.2 We hypothesize that a higher share of Bs
cooperate if B’s action is revealed to A (Rev) than if it is concealed (NoRev), assuming
that a fraction of Bs has a preference for avoiding the image to be a promise breaker.
By the choice of our experimental design, we attempt to differentiate social image con-
cerns from other possible reasons for promise keeping by second movers. Up to now, the
literature mainly provides two motivations why individuals might stick to their promises.
First, Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) explain promise keeping by simple guilt, i.e. the
aversion to disappoint other people’s expectations, as introduced by Batigalli and Dufwen-
berg (2007). If B promises cooperation, A expects a higher payoff, which increases B’s guilt
in case he refuses to cooperate. However, in our experiment only the game structure and
the payoffs are common knowledge, but Bs are privately informed about the revelation
condition. In contrast, As are not even aware that different conditions exist. Thus, As’
first-order beliefs, and consequently Bs’ second-order beliefs should not vary across condi-
tions, inducing the same amount of guilt for non-cooperation in both conditions.3 Second,
Vanberg (2008) claims that subjects have a preference for keeping their promises per se,
independent of others’ expectations. This assumption cannot explain a difference in Bs’
1While rational behavior predicts the second mover to behave selfish, and therefore the first mover
not to enter the game, mutual cooperation is the unique Pareto-optimal outcome, which generates the
highest joint payoff.
2Conditions are assigned randomly to pairs.
3Otherwise A might expect B to choose Roll with a higher probability if his choice is revealed, inducing
higher simple guilt in Rev than in NoRev (if we assume consistent beliefs).
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behavior across conditions either, as the preference for keeping a promise should be inde-
pendent of As’ ex-post information.
Yet, as the revelation of B’s action choice might also induce a concern of being perceived
as selfish (Tadelis, 2011), we conduct a control treatment without communication (No-
Com). We claim that the effect of revelation on behavior in treatment Com is larger than
the respective effect in NoCom, indicating that the differential effect is due to the mere
aversion of being perceived as a promise breaker, additional to the aversion to an egoistic
image.
With pre-play communication, we observe marginally significantly more cooperation in
Rev than in NoRev. This effect does not seem to be driven by shame to be selfish
alone, as without communication revelation even marginally decreases cooperation rates
in Rev compared to NoRev. However, although conditions are identical at the pre-play
communication stage, the number of promises sent is significantly higher in Rev than
in NoRev. Thus, the higher Roll rate in Rev might only be driven by a higher number
of promises and not by image concerns of being perceived as a promise breaker. When
comparing the share of promises kept, we do observe a slightly higher rate in Rev (85%)
than in NoRev (81%), however the difference is not significant. Thus, we fail to prove
our hypothesis that avoiding the image of being perceived as a promise breaker plays a
significant role in the individual decision to keep a given promise.
It is worth noting that the high promise keeping rate without revelation (81%) limits the
scope for further increase. In treatment Com1, where Bs can choose between a promise to
cooperate, a statement of intent, and an empty message, this high promise keeping rate
might be partly due to the fact that Bs who attempt to influence their interaction partner
without planning to cooperate have the possibility to send a statement of intent. In order
to reduce the promise keeping rate without revelation by forcing this type of subjects to
either break a promise or refrain from influencing the interaction partner, we exclude the
opportunity of stating an intention in a further treatment, Com2. However, we do not
observe a significant effect of revelation in Com2 either.
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Still, this design variation provides another interesting finding. The menu of messages
available to B seems to play a significant role for the effectiveness of communication as
Bs are significantly more likely to keep a promise than to stick to a statement of intent.
Hence, intentions seem to be less costly to break than promises. In contrast, As who
are unaware of the available messages, seem to trust intentions to the same amount as
promises.
Literature.
This chapter is mainly related to two strands of the economic literature. First, there is
an expanding literature analyzing the effect of non-binding communication on behavior.
Experimental studies show that communication can increase coordination (Blume and
Ortmann, 2007; Ellingsen and Östling, 2010; Kriss et al., 2011), generosity in a dicta-
tor game (Mohlin and Johannesson, 2008; Andreoni and Rao, 2011), and, most relevant
for our study, cooperation (Cooper et al., 1992; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004; Char-
ness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Vanberg, 2008; Bochet and Putterman, 2009; Charness and
Dufwenberg, 2010). So far, mainly two reasons for the effectiveness of communication have
been identified. On the one hand, guilt aversion in the sense of Batigalli and Dufwenberg
(2007) has been found to induce promise keeping (see, for instance, Charness and Dufwen-
berg, 2006, or Beck et al., 2013).4 On the other hand, individuals can exhibit a preference
for promise keeping per se, that is, promises have a commitment value (Vanberg, 2008;
Ismayilov and Potters, 2012). Likewise, individuals might face costs of lying (Fischbacher
and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Mazar et al., 2008; Hurkens and Kartik, 2009; Lundquist et al.,
2009). However, none of these papers consider social image concerns as a reason why
people stick to their promises.
A second related strand in the behavioral economics literature studies the effect of so-
cial image concerns on behavior. Following Ariely et al. (2009), “image motivation [. . . ]
refers to an individual’s tendency to be motivated partly by others’ perceptions.” That
is, individuals dislike to publicly violate a social norm, such as altruism or modesty. Cor-
4However, the effect of guilt aversion has been found to be relatively small (Ellingsen et al., 2010).
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respondingly, evidence for individuals behaving more selfishly or greedily if their action
is less likely to be observed, has for example been found in experimental dictator games
(Dana et al., 2006; Broberg et al. 2007; Dana et al., 2007; Koch and Normann, 2008;
Larson and Capra, 2009; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Grossman, 2010a, 2010b), and
in the context of volunteering (e.g. Linardi and McConnell, 2008; Carpenter and Myers,
2010) or donations (Ariely et al., 2009; Lacetera and Macis, 2010; DellaVigna et al., 2012).
Similar to our experimental design, Tadelis (2011) builds on the framework by Charness
and Dufwenberg (2006) and varies the ex post information of the first mover. He shows
that image concerns to appear selfish (the “shame” effect) exist and increase cooperation,
especially if anonymity is lifted by announcing the second mover’s action choice to all
participants in the room. However, subjects in his setting are not able to communicate.
In our study, we combine these two strands of literature and investigate whether social
image concerns are even more pronounced with communication, due to the aversion of
being perceived as a promise breaker. Bracht and Regner (2011) also analyze social
image concerns in a similar trust game with communication, however, they focus on
the correlation of behavior to proneness to shame and guilt, which they elicit via a
psychological test.5 While Bracht and Regner (2011) analyze the effect of transparency
and communication separately, we focus on how communication interacts with the effect
of revelation on behavior. To the best of our knowledge, social image concerns have
rarely been analyzed in the context of communication.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.1 introduces the exper-
imental design and the leading hypotheses. In Section 3.2, we analyze and discuss the
experimental results. We compare our results to previous research in Section 3.3 and
Section 3.4 concludes.
5Bracht and Regner (2011) find that disposition to guilt predicts behavior, but not disposition to
shame.
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3.1 Experimental Design and Hypotheses
3.1.1 Experimental Design
At the beginning of the experiment, role A is assigned to half of the subjects while the
other half is assigned role B. One subject with role A and one subject with role B are
randomly matched to form a pair.6 Each pair subsequently plays the one-shot trust game
depicted in Figure 3.1, which is akin to the one used by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006),
henceforth CD (2006).7
A (“she”) decides whether to enter the game (In) or not (Out). Without learning A’s
decision, B (“he”) decides whether to keep a payoff of 30 tokens for himself while A receives
nothing (Don’t Roll), or to let a die decide over A’s payoff (Roll). In this case, A receives a
payoff of 24 tokens with probability 56 and a payoff of 0 with probability
1
6 , while B earns
a payoff of 20 tokens in any case. In order to elicit Bs’ action choice we use the strategy
method, i.e. B decides on his action independent of whether A enters the game or not. At
the end of the experiment, one token is converted into 0.25 euros.
We conduct three treatments, called Com1, Com2 and NoCom. In Com1 and Com2 B
sends one out of three predefined messages to A, prior to playing the trust game. Com1
and Com2 differ only in the type of messages that can be sent. In Com1 B can choose
between a promise (“I promise to choose Roll.”), an intention (“I will choose Roll.”) and
an empty message (“Hello, how are you? I’m fine.”). In Com2 B can choose between
the same promise and two empty messages (“Hello!” and “How are you?”), i.e. B cannot
send an intention in Com2. As the design of Com1 and Com2 is the same except for the
message choices, we sometimes refer to the pooling of both communication treatments as
Com. NoCom is a control treatment, which is identical to the other two treatments, but
without pre-play communication.
6In the following, we refer to the player with role A (B) as A (B).
7In comparison to CD (2006), stakes are lower in our set-up, as one session consists of two separate
experiments, which are both paid out (see Section 3.1.3). However, the proportions of the payoffs resulting
from different strategies are similar.
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A	  
B	  
Out	   In	  
Don’t	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Chance	  
⅙	   ⅚	  
10	  
10	  
0	  
30	  
0	  
20	  
24	  
20	  
Figure 3.1: Trust game played by each pair of subjects. The upper number refers to A’s
payoff, the lower one to B’s.
Without any further information, A cannot infer whether B has chosen Roll or Don’t Roll
whenever she experiences a payoff of 0. However, we are interested in the influence of
social image concerns on B’s cooperative behavior (see Section 3.1.2), that is, whether B
cares about how he is perceived by A. Consequently, we vary whether A can observe B’s
action choice at the end of the experiment or not, which yields two conditions within
each treatment. Before playing the trust game, half of the pairs is randomly assigned to
condition “Revelation” (Rev), the other half plays condition “No Revelation” (NoRev).
In condition Rev, B’s choice will be revealed to A at the end of the experiment, whereas A
does not learn B’s behavior in condition NoRev.
B is informed about the condition he plays before choosing between Roll and Don’t Roll,
but after having sent a message to A. Thereby, we ensure that only the action choice and
not the type of message sent is affected by the condition. In other words, when B chooses
the message to be sent, both conditions are exactly equal and Bs’ communication behavior
should not differ across conditions. Hence, any difference in Roll rates across conditions is
then due to the variation of the observability of Bs’ action choices and not to a difference
in messages across conditions.
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A neither learns the condition she is playing in, nor is she aware that two different condi-
tions exist until the end of the experiment. The instructions are the same for As and Bs
and inform the participants only about the course and the payoffs of the game, without
commenting on information structures.8 Bs receive private information about the condi-
tion they play via their screen during the experiment. By not informing A, we ensure that
A’s first-order belief about B’s behavior is constant across conditions. Furthermore, B is
explicitly informed about A’s unawareness that two conditions exist, thus his second-order
belief about A’s expectations should not vary across conditions. Therefore, guilt aversion,
i.e. the aversion to disappoint A’s expectations cannot cause a difference in B’s behavior
across conditions. We explain the concept of guilt aversion in more detail in Section 3.1.2.
As’ first-order and Bs’ second-order beliefs are elicited after the trust game, but before
subjects learn their payoffs. As were asked: “What do you think, how many of the x Bs
in the room have chosen Roll?”, where x was substituted by the number of Bs in the
session. For Bs, eliciting beliefs is a bit more involved. In a sequential game like the one
we consider, B’s choice only becomes relevant for those As who choose In, thus only the
first-order beliefs of those As should matter for B’s behavior and his second-order belief.
Hence, we asked all Bs: “We asked all As: “What do you think, how many of the x Bs in
the room have chosen Roll?” Consider only the As who chose In. What do you think is the
average guess of those As?”9 Subjects earn a supplement of 6 tokens for a guess deviating
by at most +/-1 from the correct answer. This way, we elicit an interim second-order
belief conditional on the event of A choosing In.10 Figure 3.2 provides an overview of the
course of the experiment.
8However, the instructions emphasize that all Bs throw a die such that Bs’ decisions can not be
inferred, which is likely to induce a prior of getting no information among As.
9This procedure is analogous to the one in CD (2006).
10One could argue that observing the actual choice of the A-player is far more influential for beliefs
than a hypothetical choice. However, we think that this effect is negligible given that the results show a
high correlation between second-order beliefs and actual strategy choices.
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[Communication] 
As choose In or Out 
Bs choose Roll  
or Don‘t Roll 
Elicitation  
of beliefs 
Bs learn their condition  
and that As do not know 
that two conditions exist 
Payoff information 
In condition Rev: 
As learn the strategy  
of their partner 
Figure 3.2: The sequence of the experiment.
3.1.2 Hypotheses
In the following, we derive our hypotheses from a notion of social image concerns and
subsequently exclude other possible behavioral explanations for our hypotheses.
Hypotheses
Assuming selfish and risk-neutral players, the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium in the
trust game illustrated in Figure 3.1 is (Out, Don’t Roll). However, while the classical game
theory claims that non-binding communication cannot influence the players’ strategies if
information is symmetric, it has been observed in the laboratory that communication
indeed enhances cooperation in trust games – promises are made, taken as credible and
frequently kept. While CD (2006) argue that subjects keep their promises due to guilt
aversion, that is, to not disappoint the increased expectations of the truster, Vanberg
(2008) claims that people have a tendency to keep their promise per se, independent of
the truster’s expectations. Still, in their experiments a considerable share of trustees
break a given promise.11 We analyze whether a change in the set-up, i.e. introducing
transparency about the trustee’s action induces more trustees to be true on their word.
More precisely, we investigate whether social image concerns of being perceived as a
11CD (2006) observe that 25% of promisors break their promise without revelation, Vanberg 2008
observes a share of 27% (no switch condition).
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promise breaker exist and induce individuals to stick to their word. This yields our main
hypothesis, which we break down to testable hypotheses in the following.
Main Hypothesis. The aversion of being perceived as a promise breaker exists and is
one reason for why people keep a promise.
Indeed, it is frequently observed by economists, sociologists and psychologists that people
care for how they are perceived by others (e.g. Apsler, 1975; Scheff, 1988; Lewis, 1995;
Tangney, 1995; Smith et al., 2002; Grossman, 2010a; Lacetera and Macis, 2010). Applied
to our setting, we hypothesize that the trustee is more likely to cooperate if his action
choice is revealed than if it is concealed, in a situation where communication is possible.12
Hypothesis 1. The revelation of Bs’ action choices induces more cooperation among Bs.
In our setting, the Roll rate in [Com|Rev] is higher than in [Com|NoRev].
However, the presence of social image concerns does not necessarily rely on the possibility
to communicate. In fact, even without communication evidence for social image concerns
has been found, such as the aversion of being perceived as egoistic or greedy (e.g. Güth et
al., 1996; Dana et al., 2006, 2007; Koch and Normann, 2008; Ariely et al., 2009; Tadelis,
2011). From a theoretical point of view, Tadelis (2011) proposes a model of “shame”
inducing disutility of being perceived as a non-cooperator, in order to explain the effect
he observes.13
Besides the social disapproval of egoism, we are interested in another social norm which
condemns promise breaking, thereby inducing additional social image concerns. Accord-
ingly, we hypothesize that the effect of revelation on Roll rates is larger if subjects can
communicate than without communication, indicating that the differential effect has to
be due to an aversion to be regarded as a promise breaker. Hence, we compare the results
of Com to the control treatment NoCom and state the following hypothesis.14
12We are aware that the experimenter always observes whether a promise is kept or not and that this
can also evoke some social image concerns. However, the presence of the experimenter does not vary
across conditions.
13“Guilt from blame” (Batigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007) also accounts for more cooperation in the Rev
condition, based on B facing disutility from A blaming him for a bad outcome.
14We consider the Roll rates of all trustees in Com rather than focusing on those of the promising
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Hypothesis 2. The effect of revelation on cooperation is larger if pre-play communication
takes place. In our setting, the difference between [Com|Rev] and [Com|NoRev] is larger
than the difference between [NoCom|Rev] and [NoCom|NoRev].
Yet, communication might enhance cooperative behavior of Bs independent of the ob-
servability of Bs’ action choice (CD, 2006; Vanberg, 2008). In order to contribute the
hypothesized higher Roll rate in [Com|Rev] compared to [Com|NoRev] to revelation
only, the share of promises has to be equal in both conditions.
Hypothesis 3. The share of promises among all messages in [Com|Rev] is not statisti-
cally different from the share in [Com|NoRev].
Given that Bs do not know the condition they play at the pre-play communication stage,
and Bs are randomly assigned to both conditions, promising behavior should not differ
across conditions. Still, if and only if Hypothesis 3 holds, we can conclude our main
hypothesis from Hypotheses 1 and 2.
Elimination of Alternative Explanations
In the following, we argue that, given that we observe the effect in Hypothesis 1, it can
neither be due to simple guilt nor to promise-keeping per se.
Simple Guilt. If B is subject to simple guilt, in the sense of Batigalli and Dufwenberg
(2007), he is reluctant to cause a lower payoff for A compared to what he believes she
expects to earn. Let thus αA := PrA(Roll) denote A’s belief about the probability that
B cooperates. Then A expects to earn a payoff of 56 · αA · 24 = 20αA upon entering the
game. In turn, B forms a belief about A’s belief about his action choice, given that A
chooses In. This results in B’s interim second-order belief βB := E[αA|In]. By choosing
Don’t Roll conditional on A choosing In, B experiences simple guilt proportional to 20βB,
his belief about the difference between A’s payoff expectation and her experienced payoff.
trustees only, as this allows for a comparison of Roll rates to the behavior in the control treatment,
NoCom.
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In contrast, if B cooperates, any deception by A cannot be due to B’s behavior, thus he
doesn’t feel guilty. Assuming that B’s utility is additively separable in his material payoff
and his experienced simple guilt, this yields
uB(In,Roll) = 20
uB(In,Don′tRoll) = 30− θSG · 20βB,
where θSG denotes B’s sensitivity to simple guilt.
Simple guilt can explain why communication is able to influence behavior. If B makes
a promise, he believes that he influences A’s belief about his behavior, i.e. βB increases.
Ceteris paribus, this induces a lower payoff for choosing Don’t Roll, hence a larger share
of Bs chooses Roll after sending a promise.
While simple guilt delivers an explanation for why communication fosters cooperation,
it cannot explain the effect in Hypothesis 1. As As do not learn the condition they
play, their first-order beliefs cannot depend on whether Bs’ behavior is revealed or not.
Bs know about the unawareness among As and thus their second-order beliefs cannot
depend on the condition either. Thus, ceteris paribus, guilt aversion predicts the same
Roll rates for conditions Rev and NoRev. As the condition is not known to both players
at the time communication takes place, the amount of promises should be the same in
both conditions (Hypothesis 3). Given that Hypothesis 3 holds, guilt aversion predicts
the same Roll rates whether B’s decision is revealed or not, which contradicts Hypothesis 1.
Self-Image Concerns (“Promise Keeping Per Se”). Vanberg (2008) argues that
there exists a preference for promise keeping per se independent of the truster’s expecta-
tions. He shows that in case an individual faces a different player than the one he made
a promise to, his action choice does not depend on whether the new partner has received
a promise by another player before or not. In a similar vein, Ellingsen and Johannesson
(2004) introduce the notion of “lying cost”. They propose a model where inequity averse
players suffer from a fixed personal cost of being inconsistent, l ≥ 0, which in turn leads
to a higher commitment power and credibility of promises.
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However, whether B’s action in the trust game is revealed to A in the end or not does not
make a difference to B if he is a “promise-keeper per se”. Thus, given an equal number
of promises in both conditions (Hypothesis 3), Hypothesis 1 can not be solely induced by
promise-keeping per se.
3.1.3 Experimental Procedure
The experiment was conducted in the Munich Experimental Laboratory for Economic
and Social Sciences (MELESSA). Subjects were recruited using the online recruitment
system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004), and the 406 participants in 17 sessions consisted mainly
of students. Upon entering the laboratory, subjects were randomly assigned to 24 visually
isolated computer terminals. The instructions were distributed and read out loud by one of
the experimenters. Questions were answered individually at the subjects’ seats. Before the
experiment started, subjects filled out a short questionnaire ensuring the comprehension
of the rules.
The experiment was the first of two independent experiments conducted in one session.
Before the experiment started, participants were informed that two independent experi-
ments would be conducted, without any further information about the second experiment.
Both experiments were paid out at the end of the session, where the average earning was
12.6 EUR, including a fixed show-up fee of 4 EUR. In the first experiment, which is re-
ported in this chapter, As received 3.5 EUR on average, while the mean among Bs was
5.2 EUR. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-tree (Fis-
chbacher, 2007). Each session ended with a detailed questionnaire on demographics and
social preferences and lasted about 50 minutes.
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3.2 Experimental Results
In this section we first analyze the effect of revelation on Bs’ behavior (Section 3.2.1),
followed by an investigation of the effects of communication (Section 3.2.2).
3.2.1 The Effect of Revelation on Bs’ Behavior
In the following, we pool the data of Com1 and Com2 to Com in order to analyze the
differences between [Com|Rev] and [Com|NoRev]. This procedure is justified as the effect
of revelation on Bs’ behavior does not differ between the two communication treatments.
Data considering each treatment separately is gathered in Appendix A3. Our first result
provides some evidence for Hypothesis 1.
Result 1. The Roll rate in [Com|Rev] is higher than in [Com|NoRev], with the difference
being marginally significant.
Indeed, while 63% of Bs choose Roll in [Com|Rev], this share amounts to only 51% in
[Com|NoRev] (test of proportions, one-tailed, Z=1.450, p=0.074).15 Thus, Hypothesis 1
is confirmed on a marginally significant level, indicating that subjects in a situation where
communication is possible behave more cooperatively when their action is revealed than
when it is not.
The next step is to take a closer look at the source of this marginally significant effect.
We claim that Bs behave more cooperatively in [Com|Rev] than in [Com|NoRev] as they
do not want to be perceived as a promise breaker. In order to confirm this claim, we have
to verify that the higher Roll rate in [Com|Rev] is not only caused by an image concern
of being perceived as selfish, but rather induced by the combination of communication
and revelation (Hypothesis 2). Therefore, we compare the observed effect of revelation in
15If we consider Com1 and Com2 separately, the effect goes in the same direction, but is no longer
significant (Com1 : 54% vs. 42%, Z=1.062, p=0.144; Com2 : 72% vs. 61%, Z=1.000, p=0.159, one-tailed
test). Throughout this chapter, the Z-Statistics reflect the test of proportions (see Glasnapp and Poggio,
1985) and p-values are on one-tailed tests, because we use our underlying hypotheses, except when
reported otherwise.
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Com to the one in NoCom. Figure 3.3 illustrates the shares of Bs choosing Roll in Com
and NoCom separated by condition.
63%	  
37%	  
51%	  
53%	  
0%	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20%	  
30%	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   NoCom	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NoRev	  
Figure 3.3: Roll rates of Bs.
First, we consider the NoCom treatment separately and find no evidence for an image
concern of being perceived as selfish.
Result 2. The Roll rate in [NoCom|Rev] is marginally significantly lower than the one
in [NoCom|NoRev]. Hence, there is no evidence for the existence of image concerns of
being perceived as selfish.
Indeed, only 37% of Bs choose Roll in [NoCom|Rev] whereas 53% cooperate in
[NoCom|NoRev]. This difference is marginally significant (test of proportions, one-tailed,
Z=1.292, p=0.098). Thus, if revelation changes Bs’ behavior in NoCom, it rather decreases
cooperative behavior.16 This rather unexpected result is unlikely to be a demand effect
as Bs are only informed about their own condition, i.e. that their behavior is revealed or
not revealed to A, but not about the existence of the other condition. The low Roll rate
16This result is in contrast to Tadelis (2011).
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in [NoCom|Rev] might be a sullen behavior due to the sudden announcement that B’s
action will be revealed to A, which was not mentioned in the instructions.
While Result 1 and Result 2 already suggest the confirmation of Hypothesis 2, i.e. that the
effect of revelation on cooperation is larger in Com than in NoCom, we conduct a probit
regression to compare the differences across conditions in Com and NoCom, delivering
the following result (Hypothesis 2).
Result 3. The difference in Roll rates between [Com|Rev] and [Com|NoRev] is signifi-
cantly larger than the one between [NoCom|Rev] and [NoCom|NoRev]. Hence, Hypoth-
esis 2 is confirmed.
The results of the probit regression are reported in Table 3.1. The dependent variable
is 1 if B chooses Roll and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are a dummy for Com,
a dummy for Rev and an interaction of the two.
Table 3.1: Regression of choosing Roll
PROBIT OLS
Coefficient Coefficient
(p-value) (p-value)
Com -0.049 -0.019
(0.770) (0.775)
Rev -0.424 -0.167
(0.105) (0.108)
Com*Rev 0.731 0.287
(0.030) (0.040)
Constant 0.084 0.533
(0.279) (0.000)
We cluster standard errors on sessions (17 sessions). Number of observations is 203. In the probit
regression Pseudo R-squared is 0.023 and log Pseudo Likelihood is -136.961. In the OLS regression
R-squared is 0.031.
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We observe that the only significant coefficient is the one of the interaction term Com*Rev
(p=0.030), which is positive, showing that cooperation among Bs is increased by revelation
only in treatment Com. The negative and almost marginally significant coefficient of Rev
indicates the negative effect of revelation on cooperation without communication. The
results are robust to an OLS regression, which is also reported in Table 3.1. Thus,
Hypothesis 2 is confirmed.
Yet, it remains to show that Bs’ communication behavior does not differ between
[Com|Rev] and [Com|NoRev] (Hypothesis 3). For no apparent reason, we are not able
to confirm Hypothesis 3.
Result 4. The share of promises among messages in [Com|Rev] is significantly higher
than the one in [Com|NoRev]. Hence, Hypothesis 3 is violated and we are not able to
conclude the main hypothesis about the existence of an image concern of being perceived
as a promise breaker.
Table 3.2 provides an overview of the messages sent from B to A in Com.
Table 3.2: An overview of messages sent in Com
Promise Intention Empty
Com
Rev
48/71 6/71 17/71
68% 9% 24%
NoRev
37/72 13/72 22/72
51% 18% 31%
Z stat. 1.975 -1.692 0.888
(p-value) (0.024) (0.045) (0.187)
The Z Stat reflects the test of proportions for the two treatments or conditions (see Glasnapp and
Poggio, 1985). The p-value is on one-tailed tests.
There is neither a difference in the design nor in the instructions of the two conditions. B
does not even know that two different conditions exist when sending his message. Still,
we observe a significantly higher share of Bs sending a promise in [Com|Rev] than in
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[Com|NoRev] (68% vs. 51%, one-tailed test of proportions, Z=1.975, p=0.024).17 On the
other hand, we also observe a significantly smaller share of intentions in [Com|Rev] than
in [Com|NoRev] (Z=1.692, p=0.045), yielding a similar share of intentions and promises
(pooled) in both conditions (76% in [Com|Rev] vs. 70% in [Com|NoRev], p=0.448, two-
tailed test). However, as further analyzed in Section 3.2.2 and already reported in Table
3.3, subjects sending a promise choose Roll significantly more often than subjects send-
ing an intention or an empty message (in Rev Z=5.568, p=0.000, in NoRev Z=5.183,
p=0.000). Thus, we cannot pool intentions and promises, and the communication behav-
ior has to be considered as largely different in both conditions, indicated by a significantly
higher share of promises in Rev than in NoRev.
Therefore, we cannot confirm our main hypothesis via Hypotheses 1 and 2. In order
to further investigate what drives the higher Roll rate in [Com|Rev] in comparison to
[Com|NoRev], we examine the behavior of subjects sending a promise separately and
compare it between conditions, thereby accounting for the different number of promises.
If the combination of revelation and communication drives the higher Roll rate in
[Com|Rev], the share of promise keepers should be higher in condition [Com|Rev] than
in [Com|NoRev]. As shown in Result 2, revelation itself does not lead to a higher Roll
rate in comparison to no revelation, hence image concerns of being perceived as selfish
play a negligible role in our setting. This allows us to conduct a separate analysis on the
set of Bs having sent a promise and attribute a difference in Roll rates among promising
Bs across conditions to the image concern of being perceived as a promise breaker.18
Result 5. The share of Bs keeping their promise among Bs who send a promise is slightly
higher in [Com|Rev] than in [Com|NoRev], however the difference is not significant.
From Result 5, we conclude that the higher Roll rate in [Com|Rev] in comparison to
[Com|NoRev] is mostly driven by the higher number of promises, and not by social
17This difference is not driven by one or two sessions, but occurs in all sessions of both communication
treatments. It is only marginally significant if we consider Com1 and Com2 separately (see Appendix A3).
18If there was a higher Roll rate in [NoCom|Rev] than in [NoCom|NoRev], this analysis would not
be meaningful since we cannot compare the effect of revelation among Bs sending a promise in Com to
the overall effect in NoCom. Therefore, we started off with considering overall Roll rates in Com.
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image concerns of being perceived as a promise breaker. Table 3.3 reports the Roll rates
for each type of message sent in both conditions.
Table 3.3: Roll rates by type of message sent
Promise Intention Empty
Com
Rev
41/48 1/6 3/17
85% 17% 18%
NoRev
30/37 4/13 3/22
81% 31% 14%
Z stat. 0.534 -0.650 0.344
(p-value) (0.270) (0.258) (0.365)
The Z Stat reflects the test of proportions for the two treatments or conditions (see Glasnapp and
Poggio, 1985). The p-value is on one-tailed tests.
In NoRev already 81% of promising Bs stick to their word, which leaves little scope for
further increase by revelation. Still, in Rev the share is even higher with 85%. Although
the effect goes in the predicted direction, the difference is not large enough to be significant
(Z=0.534, p=0.270).
Result 5 is further supported by probit regressions of the decision to choose Roll, which are
reported in Table 3.4. Here, we categorize messages into promises and no promises, where
we categorize intentions as “no promise”, as Bs’ behavior after having sent an intention
is not significantly different from the behavior after having sent an empty message (see
Table 3.3 and Section 3.2.2). Column 1 of Table 3.4 reports the results of Com, Column 2
of NoCom and Column 3 (4) reports the results of a regression including both treatments
with (without) controls.19
In all 4 regressions the dependent variable is B’s decision, represented by a dummy variable
which takes the value 1 if B chooses Roll and 0 otherwise. Promise (NoPromise) is a
dummy variable for sending a (no) promise in Com, Rev is a dummy for the condition
19Due to a lack of controls we excluded one session of Com2. Results for Com and NoCom do not
change when excluding controls and/or including the excluded session. Results in Column 4 do not
change when including this session either. Moreover, the results are robust to OLS regressions.
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Table 3.4: Probit of Bs’ decision to choose Roll
Coefficient (p-value)
Com NoCom All All
Promise 1.742 0.808 0.715
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Rev -0.059 -0.322 -0.382 -0.424
(0.846) (0.157) (0.142) (0.105)
Promise∗Rev 0.216 0.527 0.623
(0.561) (0.158) (0.085)
NoPromise -0.639 -0.535
(0.116) (0.233)
NoPromise∗Rev -0.264 -0.347
(0.464) (0.346)
Risk 0.097 0.205 0.132
(0.064) (0.039) (0.003)
Female 0.486 -0.235 0.259
(0.022) (0.339) (0.150)
# of observations 131 60 191 191
# of sessions 11 5 16 16
Pseudo R-squared 0.314 0.106 0.240 0.212
Log Pseudo Likelihood -61.519 -36.908 -100.433 -104.052
The regressions cluster on sessions. The reference category is NoRev, or [NoCom|NoRev] respectively.
The sample consists of all Bs in all sessions, except of one session of Com2, which we exclude due to a
lack of controls. Results (in column 4) do not change if we include the session. Results for Com and
NoCom (columns 1 and 2) do not change when excluding the controls.
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Rev and Promise*Rev (NoPromise*Rev) is an interaction dummy of the two. In Column
1-3, we also include two controls, a measurement of risk and a female dummy.20
We observe that the probability to choose Roll is significantly higher if B sends a promise
(p=0.000) than if he sends another message or does not communicate.21 However, the coef-
ficient of the interaction dummy Promise*Rev is far away from being significant (p=0.561),
indicating that the probability to choose Roll when having sent a promise is not further
increased by revelation. Moreover, Rev does neither have a general significant effect in
Com (p=0.846), nor in NoCom (p=0.157). As shown by the non-parametric test, if any-
thing revelation without communication even leads to less cooperative behavior as the
coefficient of Rev in Column 2 is negative and the p-value not far from being marginally
significant.
In column 3 we report the results of the probit regression including both treatments. The
reference category is a subject in [NoCom|NoRev]. In order to account for the different
number of promises in the two conditions, we separate the subjects in Com into promisors
and non-promisors and include a dummy for each group. Thus, NoPromise only takes
the value 1 for Bs not promising in Com and it is 0 for subjects in NoCom. Altogether,
we have 6 categories, with [NoCom|NoRev] being the base case including dummies for
all other cases. Similar to Com, we observe that Bs sending a promise have a higher
probability to choose Roll (p=0.000). The coefficients of Rev and and NoPromise*Rev
are not significant, showing that revelation does not change behavior when no promise has
been sent. The coefficient of Promise*Rev is positive, but not significant (p=0.158). Still,
it becomes marginally significant (p=0.085) when excluding the two control variables.22
It seems that Rev marginally increases the probability of choosing Roll conditional on
sending a promise, yet, the effect is very small and not robust. Thus, we are not able to
prove our main hypothesis.
20We elicited risk preferences based on subjects’ self-assessment on a scale from 0 to 10, with 0
indicating that a subject has a very weak willingness to take risks, while a score of 10 means that a
subject has a strong willingness to take risks. Dohmen et al. (2011) show that this general risk question
is a good predictor of actual risk-taking behavior.
21However, the causality is not clear. B might send a promise as he knows he will choose Roll, or he
might choose Roll due to the promise sent.
22Results for column 1 and 2 do not change when excluding risk and female.
144
Promises and Image Concerns
3.2.2 The Effect of Communication on Cooperation
One major reason for our effects being only marginally significant might be that in
[NoCom|NoRev] already 81% of all Bs sending a promise stick to it, restricting the scope
for further increase in promise keeping with revelation.
We started off with conducting treatment Com1, where Bs choose between a promise,
a statement of intent, and an empty message, and observe a very high promise keeping
rate even without revelation. In order to achieve more promise breaking in the baseline
without revelation, we conducted a second communication treatment, Com2, allowing
Bs to choose only between the same promise and two empty messages. Thereby, Bs
attempting to influence As while planning to take the non-cooperative decision are forced
to break a promise.23 However, this change in the set of messages failed to generate a
higher rate of promise breaking in the baseline, such that we are not able to confirm
our main hypothesis in Com2 either.24 Yet, the comparison of Com1 and Com2 reveals
some interesting findings about the the effect of communication on cooperation and the
differences between promises and intentions, which we will address in this section.
Bs’ Behavior and the Choice of Messages
Considering Bs’ behavior, it turns out that the set of messages available to B highly
influences the effectiveness of communication on cooperation. In the following analysis,
we pool the data of Rev and NoRev, as there is no significant difference in Bs’ behavior
between both conditions.
Result 6. While the share of Bs choosing Roll in Com2 is significantly higher than in
NoCom, the share in Com1 is not.
We conclude that the possibility to send an intention in Com1 constrains the effectiveness
of communication on cooperation. Figure 3.4 illustrates the shares of Bs choosing Roll in
all three treatments.
23As are only informed that there are three messages to choose from, but they are unaware of the type
of messages or the wording. This was complete information.
24Note that the unchanged communication behavior of Bs allows us to pool Com1 and Com2 to Com
in the analysis of Section 3.2.1. 145
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Figure 3.4: Roll rates of Bs.
In Com2 67% of Bs choose Roll, which is significantly higher than the share of 45% in
NoCom (Z= 2.502, p=0.006), and than the share of 48% in Com1 (Z=2.270, p=0.012).
In contrast, Bs in Com1 are as likely to cooperate as Bs in NoCom (Z=0.330, p=0.371).
In order to identify the driving forces behind these effects, we analyze the data separated
by types of messages. Table 3.5 reports the shares of Bs sending each of the three types
of message separately and the corresponding shares of Bs choosing Roll.
Result 7. The share of Bs sending a promise is significantly higher in Com2 than in
Com1, where roughly one quarter of Bs choose to send an intention. While the majority
of promises is kept, the majority of intentions is broken.
While 71% of Bs send a promise in Com2, only 48% do so in Com1, with the difference
being highly significant (Z=2.794, p=0.003). In Com1 26% of Bs send an intention,
which is not possible in Com2. In both treatments the majority of promises are kept,
in Com1 77%, in Com2 even 88%. In contrast, only 26% of Bs sending an intention
stick to it. This share is significantly smaller than the share of Bs keeping their promise
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Table 3.5: Overview of messages sent and subsequent behavior
Messages sent
Promise Intention Empty Total
Com1 34/71 (48%) 19/71 (27%) 18/71 (25%) 71 (100%)
Com2 51/72 (71%) – 21/72 (29%) 72 (100%)
Shares choosing Roll
Promise Intention Empty Total
Com1 26/34 (77%) 5/19 (26%) 3/18 (17%) 34/71 (48%)
Com2 45/51 (88%) – 3/21 (14%) 48/72 (67%)
The sample consists of all B-Persons in Com1 and Com2.
(Com1 : Z=3.554, p=0.000; Com: Z=5.083, p=0.000), but not significantly different from
the share of cooperating Bs conditional on sending an empty message (Com1 : Z=0.713,
p=0.238; Com: Z=0.997, p=0.160).
Note that the share of promises being kept in Com2 (88%) is even marginally significantly
higher than in Com1 (77%) (Z=1.433, p=0.076), although more Bs send a promise in
Com2 than in Com1. This observation, together with the fact that most intentions are
broken, yields the following result.
Result 8. Not sticking to an intention seems to be less costly than breaking a promise.25
Result 8 can either be caused by the diction of the message itself or by the comparison
to message alternatives, indicating that breaking an intention is not the strongest lie.
However, such a difference in behavior when sending a promise compared to sending an
intention does not seem to occur in CD (2006), who use free-form messages. Therefore,
we suggest that the latter reason is more likely to explain the observed phenomenon.
Subjects who send an intention might not think “I am indicating to my partner that I
25This result does not follow from the mere observation that promises are kept and intentions are
broken in Com1 as this might be caused by selection into messages (altruistic subjects send a promise
and selfish subjects send an intention). However, the fact that a higher share of promises is sent and kept
in Com2 than in Com1 yields the result.
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will choose Roll”, but more likely “I did not promise anything”. Thus, unused alternatives
seem to play a role, not as a signal to others, but as a self-justification device to behave
selfish.26 To conclude, the set of messages available to subjects in an experimental setting
seem to play a crucial role for their behavior.
Finally, the fact that Roll rates after sending an intention are not significantly different
from Roll rates after sending an empty message, but are significantly different from Roll
rates after sending a promise in Com1 speaks against the relevance of guilt aversion in
our setting. B knows that A is not aware of the different available messages. Therefore, he
should anticipate that both, a promise and an intention message, increase A’s first-order
belief in comparison to receiving an empty message. Guilt aversion would predict a more
cooperative behavior upon sending an intention than upon sending an empty message and
a similar behavior upon sending a promise or an intention.27 In turn, promise keeping per
se, as suggested by Vanberg (2008), is likely to play a role in our experiment, given that
a high share of Bs stick to a given promise even if their action choice is not observable.
As’ Behavior
As As do not know which messages can be sent by Bs, we pool Com1 and Com2 to Com
for the analysis of As’ behavior. We do not differentiate between conditions either, as As
do neither know about the existence of two conditions nor does the experimental design
vary across conditions from A’s point of view.
Table 3.6 gives an overview of As’ behavior in Com and in NoCom. For Com we report
the overall behavior (total) and separated by the message received.
Result 9. The share of As choosing In is increased by communication for all kinds of
messages. Furthermore, As are equally more likely to cooperate after receiving a promise
or an intention than after receiving an empty message.
26It would be interesting to test whether the share of people sticking to an intention, if the only options
are an intention or two empty messages, is similar to the share keeping their promise in Com2.
27We cannot directly test for a difference in second-order beliefs as we ask for averages. We can
only compare second-order beliefs across Com1 and Com2. These are not significantly different (MWU,
2-sided, p=0.995).
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Table 3.6: As’ behavior
NoCom
Com
Total Promise Intention Empty
In 21 / 35% 102 / 71% 67 / 79% 14 / 74% 21 / 54%
Out 39 / 65% 41 / 29% 18 / 21% 5 / 26% 18 / 46%
60 / 100% 143 / 100% 85 / 100% 19 / 100% 39 / 100%
The sample consists of all As.
We observe a large effect of communication on As’ behavior. The share of As choosing
In increases significantly from only 35% in NoCom to 71% in Com (Z=4.833, p=0.000).
This effect is driven by both promises and intentions. After receiving a promise, 79%
of As choose In, and after receiving an intention 74% do so (Z=0.488, p=0.313). These
two shares are (marginally) significantly higher than the share of As choosing In after
receiving an empty message, which amounts to 54% (empty vs. intention: Z=1.450,
p=0.074; empty vs. promise: Z=2.845 p=0.002).
Interestingly, the share of As choosing In after receiving an empty message is significantly
different from the respective share in NoCom (54% vs. 35%, Z=1.854, p=0.032). It seems
as if As receiving an empty message might not have considered the possibility of a promise
or an intention, and react to a friendly, though meaningless message.
The difference in As’ behavior across treatments is reflected by their first-order beliefs
about Bs’ behavior. While without communication As believe that on average 45% of Bs
choose Roll, this belief amounts to 58% with communication (MWU, 2-sided, p=0.001).28
Hence, similar to CD (2006), we observe that communication increases As’ first-order
beliefs, thus enhances trust among As.
28In particular, the average first-order belief is 63% conditional on receiving a promise, 57% conditional
on receiving an intention and 47% conditional on receiving an empty message. The first-order belief is
significantly higher after receiving a promise than after receiving an empty message (MWU, 2-sided,
p=0.001), however not significantly higher than after receiving an intention (MWU, 2-sided, p=0.179).
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Does Communication Enhance Mutual Cooperation?
We observe a significant increase of mutual cooperation in Com compared to NoCom,
represented by the share of pairs choosing (In, Roll) in each treatment (45% vs. 13%,
Z=4.270, p=0.000). These shares, reported by type of message sent, are stated in Ta-
ble 3.7.
Table 3.7: Shares of pairs choosing (In, Roll)
NoCom Com
Total Promise Intention Empty
8/60 64/143 57/85 3/19 4/39
13.3% 44.8% 67.1% 15.8% 10.3%
Result 10. Communication increases mutual cooperation. However, while promises in-
crease the share of pairs choosing (In, Roll), intentions do not.
While promises lead to a very high cooperation rate, intentions do not. This difference is
mainly driven by the fact that Bs keep their promises, but break their intentions, while
As trust both.29 We conclude that the set of messages available to B plays a crucial role
for the effectiveness of communication in experimental settings.
3.3 Comparison to Previous Research
The present experimental design is based on the work by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006),
who analyze the effect of free-form communication on cooperation. While their design
informs A only about her payoffs, we vary the revelation of B’s action choice in order to
test for social image concerns. However, if we restrict our data to the NoRev condition,
29This might have been different if As had been aware of the messages available to B (compare Charness
and Dufwenberg, 2010).
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we find largely different results compared to CD (2006). In this section, we therefore
analyze these discrepancies to the work by Charness and Dufwenberg,30 incorporating
their follow-up treatment with predefined messages (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2008 and
2010; henceforth CD (2010)). In CD (2010), Bs could choose between sending a sheet
saying “I promise to choose Roll.” or an empty sheet, which is closest to our Com2
treatment without revelation. Apart from the communication protocol, our design dif-
fers from CD (2006) and CD (2010) only in B’s relative payoff for choosing Don’t Roll,
which we slightly increased in order to reduce Roll rates without communication (see
Section 3.2.2).31
Considering Bs’ Roll rates, we do not find any difference between NoCom (53%) and
Com (51%) in the NoRev condition (Z=0.179, p=0.429) in our sample. Though slightly
more Bs cooperate if we restrict the sample to Com2 (61%), there is still no significant
difference to NoCom (Z=0.637, p=0.262).32 Similarly, communication fails to significantly
influence Bs’ behavior in CD (2010) either. While in their experiment the average Roll
rate increases from 44% without communication to 58% allowing for predefined messages,
this difference is only marginally significant on a one-tailed test (Z=1.339, p=0.090).33
In contrast, Bs in CD (2006) are significantly more likely to choose Roll after free-form
communication than without communication (44% vs. 67%, Z=2.083, p=0.019). At first
glance, this indicates that Bs feel more committed to a free-form promise than to a prede-
fined one, yielding an increase in Roll rates in CD (2006). However, while in CD (2006)
57% of Bs send a promise in the communication treatment, we only observe 51% in Com
and 39% in Com1, the latter difference being almost marginally significant on a two-tailed
test (Com: 51% vs. 57%, Z=0.594, p=0.552; Com1 : 39% vs. 57%, Z=1.608, p=0.108,
30More precisely, we only use the (5,5) treatment for comparison as it reflects our payoff structure.
31Furthermore, Charness and Dufwenberg (2006 and 2010) conduct a pen-and-pencil experiment in
the classroom while we use the laboratory and computer screens. However, as we can not identify any
idiosyncratic effect of this design feature, we neglect it in the following analysis.
32Note that the difference was significant pooling Rev and NoRev (Section 3.2.2), but we restrict the
sample to NoRev here.
33Results considering the whole sample in the communication treatment are only reported in CD
(2008).
151
Promises and Image Concerns
two-tailed tests).34 Hence, the higher promise rate in CD (2006) might also account for
part of the increased effect on cooperation.
It is striking that, though CD (2010) find that 85% of all Bs send a promise, which differs
statistically from our promise rate in Com2 (64%, Z=2.293, p=0.022, two-tailed test),
their effect of communication on cooperation is only marginally significant. Compared
to our result, it seems that promises in CD (2010) induce less commitment among Bs.
Indeed, while in Com2 87% of all Bs who send a promise keep it, this share is significantly
lower in CD (2010) (61%, Z=2.183, p=0.029, two-tailed test).35 This might be due to the
fact that the messages available to Bs are common knowledge in their design, while we
leave As unaware of message choices, yielding many Bs to send a promise just in order to
avoid the mistrusting signal of an empty sheet.
As to As’ behavior, we do not find any evidence that predefined messages in our design
dampen cooperation compared to free-form communication. In fact, In rates among
As in our experiment achieve similar levels as in CD (2006) with free-form messages
(71% in Com vs. 74% in CD (2006), Z=0.341). Furthermore, as cooperation among
As is relatively low without communication in our setting (33%),36 we observe a highly
significant effect of communication on As’ behavior (71% in Com, Z=3.520, p=0.000),
exceeding the effect with free-form messages in CD (2006) (56% without communication
vs. 74% with communication, Z=1.777, p=0.038). In contrast, predefined messages in
CD (2010) do not induce As to choose In more often, if at all, In rates decrease (56%
without communication vs. 52% with communication, Z=0.336).37
While this finding seems to be unintuitive at first sight, it shows that besides differentiating
between free-form and predefined messages, subtle design differences can account for huge
changes in the credibility of messages. First, while Bs in our experiment choose an empty
34Though in CD (2006), also intentions were classified as promises, we exclude intentions in Com1 from
the comparison. This is reasonable as Bs in our experiment break intentions more often than promises,
and behave similarly after sending an intention as after sending an empty message (see Section 3.2.2).
35In contrast, the promise keeping rate in Com (81%) is similar to the one in CD (2006) (75%, Z=0.567,
p=0.571, two-tailed test).
36Note that we restrict the sample to NoRev only.
37There is no effect despite the higher promise rate in CD (2010).
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message if no promise is made (and can not refuse to send a message), the only alternative
to a promise in CD (2010) is an empty sheet. It might thus be the case that empty talk in
our experiment, though through predefined messages, contains some general pleasantry,
thus inducing As to cooperate more often in the present setting compared to CD (2010).
Second, the explicit announcement in CD (2010) that promises are not binding might
create a social norm reducing both self and social image concerns for non-cooperation
among Bs, which in turn might be anticipated by As. Finally, As in our experiment are not
aware of the kind of possible messages, while the exact wording and procedure is common
knowledge in CD (2010). As an empty message thus signals uncooperative behavior by
B in their setting and might induce As to opt out of the game, it is likely that some Bs
in CD (2010) send a promise who would not have done so in other circumstances. If
As anticipate this cheap-talk nature of promises, the credibility of a promise is reduced,
which is why As seem to trust less in CD (2010) than in our setting. The fact that
communication has a larger influence on Bs in our setting than with free-form messages
in CD (2006) can only be explained by the strong wording of our predefined promise, as
compared to the diverse statements of intent in CD (2006).
To summarize, Bs in our experiment as well as in CD (2010) do not seem to be influ-
enced by communication, while in CD (2006), free-form messages increase Roll rates.
In contrast, In rates in our setting highly increase with communication, with this effect
being even stronger than in CD (2006), while messages do not influence As’ behavior in
CD (2010). Hence, starting from a slightly lower cooperation level without communica-
tion than CD (2006), we obtain a similar effect of communication on (In, Roll) rates,
which is also highly significant (13% in NoCom vs. 40% in Com, 50% in Com2, p<0.01 in
both cases, two-tailed test). In general, while messages are most influential when they are
free-form, predefined messages have a larger impact in our experiment than in CD (2010).
This might be due to very subtle changes in the communication protocol, such as A’s
unawareness of message wording or the possibility of empty talk. We conclude that the
effect of communication is not robust to slight changes in the experimental design.
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3.4 Conclusion
Non-binding communication is at the heart of many economic interactions, especially if
cooperation cannot be contractually enforced, for example because writing fully contingent
contracts is impossible or too costly, or because cooperation is not verifiable. Hence, we
contribute to the literature exploring why and in which environments “cheap talk” can
be influential in two-player trust games.
In this chapter, we experimentally analyze whether individuals stick to their promised
action, in contrast to the rational prediction, due to the aversion of being perceived as a
promise breaker. While we observe slightly more cooperation of the promising party if the
receiver of the promise can observe its compliance, the results are not significant. We find
that 81% of subjects stick to their promise even if their action is not observable to their
interaction partners.38 On the one hand, this result limits the scope for a further increase
in cooperation with revelation. On the other hand, it highlights subjects’ preference for
promise keeping per se (Vanberg, 2008), which in our experiment seems to play a more
important role than social image concerns. Still, we find that the preference for sticking
to one’s word does only exist for promises and not for statements of intent. While most
of the promises are kept, statements of intent tend to be broken. In line with this result,
we find that the set of available predefined messages yields different results regarding
cooperation by the communicating party, the second mover. While the possibility to
communicate increases cooperation by second movers if they can only choose between
sending a promise or an empty message, communication has no effect on second movers’
behavior if they have the additional option of sending a statement of intent. However,
the receivers of messages trust both a promise and a statement of intent in the same way.
This finding allows us to exclude guilt aversion as an explanation for promise keeping, as
the communicating party seems to be aware that a statement of intent does influence his
partner the same way as a promise, but still does not stick to it.
38This even exceeds the shares reported in CD (2006) and Vanberg (2008).
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To the best of our knowledge, our study belongs to one of the first economic studies
analyzing the combined effect of communication and social image concerns on cooperation,
suggesting a high potential and the need for further research. While we fail to prove the
existence of social image concerns in our anonymous experimental set-up, one should not
transfer this finding to other settings. We rather want to point out the crucial role of the
design of the experiment, when trying to identify such subtle behavioral patterns. Lifting
anonymity (see e.g. Tadelis, 2011) might increase the relevance of social image concerns,
just like repeating the game and allowing for reputation building.
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A3 Appendix
Results separated for Com1 and Com2
In Table A3.1 we report Bs’ Roll rates in Com1, Com2, Com and NoCom, as well as the
corresponding Z-Statistics and p-values. Table A3.2 provides an overview of the messages
sent in Com1, Com2 and Com. Table A3.3 reports the Roll rates for each type of message
sent in both conditions.
Table A3.1: Bs’ average Roll rate by treatment and condition
Treatment Z Stat.
Com1 Com2 Com NoCom (p-value)
Condition
Rev
19/35 26/36 45/71 11/30 2.468
54% 72% 63% 37% (0.007)
NoRev
15/36 22/36 37/72 16/30 -0.179
42% 61% 51% 53% (0.429)
Z Stat. 1.062 1.000 1.450 -1.292
(p-value) (0.144) (0.159) (0.074) (0.098)
The Z Stat. reflects the test of proportions (see Glasnapp and Poggio, 1985). The p-value is on
one-tailed tests. The statistics in the last column test for the difference between Com treatment and
NoCom.
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Table A3.2: An overview of messages sent, detailed
Promise Intention Empty
Com1
Rev
20/35 6/35 9/35
57% 17% 26%
NoRev
14/36 13/36 9/36
39% 36% 25%
Z stat. 1.540 -1.805 0.069
(p-value) (0.062) (0.036) (0.472)
Com2
Rev
28/36 – 8/36
78% – 22%
NoRev
23/36 – 13/36
64% – 36%
Z stat. 1.296 – 1.296
(p-value) (0.097) – (0.097)
Com
Rev
48/71 6/71 17/71
68% 9% 24%
NoRev
37/72 13/72 22/72
51% 18% 31%
Z stat. 1.975 -1.692 0.888
(p-value) (0.024) (0.045) (0.187)
The Z Stat reflects the test of proportions for the two treatments or conditions (see Glasnapp and
Poggio, 1985). The p-value is on one-tailed tests.
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Table A3.3: Roll rates by type of message sent, detailed
Promise Intention Empty
Com1
Rev
16/20 1/6 2/9
80% 17% 22%
NoRev
10/14 4/13 1/9
71% 31% 11%
Z stat. 0.580 -0.650 0.633
(p-value) (0.281) (0.258) (0.264)
Com2
Rev
25/28 – 1/8
89% – 13%
NoRev
20/23 – 2/13
87% – 15%
Z stat. 0.257 – -0.183
(p-value) (0.400) – (0.427)
Com
Rev
41/48 1/6 3/17
85% 17% 18%
NoRev
30/37 4/13 3/22
81% 31% 14%
Z stat. 0.534 -0.650 0.344
(p-value) (0.270) (0.258) (0.365)
The Z Stat reflects the test of proportions for the two treatments or conditions (see Glasnapp and
Poggio, 1985). The p-value is on one-tailed tests.
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General Instructions39
We welcome you to this experiment. Please read these instructions carefully and follow
the instructions on your screen after the start of the experiment.
At the end of the experiment you will get paid according to your decisions and the decisions
of the other participants, as described below. In addition, you will get a fixed payment
of 4 euros for your attendance.
During the whole experiment you are not allowed to talk to other participants, to use
mobile phones, or to start other programs on your computer. If you disobey these rules,
we have to exclude you from the experiment and from all payments. If you have any
questions, please raise your hand. An experimenter will come to your seat to answer your
questions.
During the experiment, we are not talking about euros but about points. Your payment
will be calculated in points. At the end of the experiment your overall score will be
converted to euro, where
1 Point = 25 euro cents.
The experiment consists of two parts and a questionnaire. Part 1 will be explained below.
Once all participants have finished Part 1, you will get the instructions for Part 2. A
questionnaire follows after Part 2.
39Original instructions were in German and are available upon request. Passages occurring only in
the communication treatments are indicated by [. . . ].
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Instructions Part 1
At the start of the experiment, either role A or role B will be assigned randomly to
each participant. You will be informed on your screen which role was assigned to you.
One person A and one person B, respectively, form an interaction pair. The allocation
is random and anonymous. No participant will get to know the identity of his partner
during or after the experiment. Your payment in Part 1 depends on the decisions made
within your interaction pair.
Decisions:
Each person A chooses between IN and OUT. If A chooses OUT, A and B get 10 points
each. If person A chooses IN, the payments depend on B’s decision. Every person B
chooses between ROLL THE DIE and DON’T ROLL THE DIE. At the time of decision,
Person B doesn’t know whether A has chosen IN or OUT. But as B’s decision is only
relevant if A chose IN, every person B should make her decision under the assumption
that A has chosen IN.
If A chose IN and B chooses DON’T ROLL THE DIE, B gets 30 points and A 0 points.
If A chose IN and B chooses ROLL THE DIE, B gets 20 points and rolls a die at the end
of the experiment in order to determine A’s payoff. If the die shows 1, A gets 0 points, if
the die shows 2,3,4,5 or 6, A gets 24 points.
The following table summarizes the payments, depending on the decisions made within
an interaction pair and the result of rolling the die.
Decisions Payoff A Payoff B
A chooses OUT 10 10
A chooses IN, B chooses DON’T ROLL THE DIE 0 30
A chooses IN, B chooses ROLL THE DIE, Die=1 0 20
A chooses IN, B chooses ROLL THE DIE, Die=2,3,4,5,6 24 20
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Please note: Every participant with role B, regardless if she chose ROLL THE DIE or
DON’T ROLL THE DIE, will roll a die at the end of the experiment, such that rolling
the die won’t reveal the decision made by B. The result of rolling the die however is only
relevant for those interaction pairs where A chose IN and B chose ROLL THE DIE.
[Message:
Before A and B make their decision, B has the opportunity to choose one of three prede-
fined messages and send it to A.]
Bonus questions:
During the experiment every participant has the opportunity to earn extra points by
answering bonus questions correctly. The earnings out of these bonus questions will be
displayed separately at the end of the experiment. You will get more detailed information
during the experiment.
Control questions:
Before the start of the experiment control questions will appear on your screen to check
that you understood the instructions. When all participants have answered these ques-
tions correctly, Part 1 of the experiment starts.
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